Petitioner
Terry
Respondent
State of Ohio
Petitioner's Claim
That the "stop and frisk" actions of police officer Martin McFadden constituted an unreasonable search and seizure.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Louis Stokes
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Reuben M. Payne
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., Abe Fortas, John Marshall Harlan II, Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart, Earl Warren (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William O. Douglas
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
10 June 1968
Decision
A police officer may stop a person and perform a limited weapons patdown if the officer has observed suspicious behavior which would justify making such an examination.
Significance
Terry v. Ohio expanded the right of police officers to "stop and frisk" individuals whom they deem to be suspicious. At the same time, it set limits on the conditions under which such a stop could take place.
Martin McFadden, a veteran Cleveland detective, was walking his beat one afternoon when he observed two strangers on a street corner. He saw them proceedalternately back and forth along an identical route and pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did over a dozen times. At some point, theywere joined by a third man. Suspecting the trio of "casing" the store for a potential burglary, McFadden followed them. The officer approached the three,identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something," at which point McFadden grabbed one of the men, Terry, spun him around, and patted down his outside clothing--a common police tactic known as "stop and frisk." He found a pistol in Terry's overcoat pocket but was unable to remove it. McFadden then ordered the three men into the store and removed Terry's overcoat. He removed the gun and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He then patted down the outer clothing of the other two men and seized another revolver. McFadden asked the store's proprietor to call the police, at which point they were placed under arrest for carrying concealed weapons.
Terry and his companions were convicted of carrying concealed weapons and sentenced to one to three years in prison. They appealed the conviction on the grounds that McFadden's actions were an unreasonable search and seizure underthe Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. If that were true, the evidence that was seized--the pistols--should not have been admitted in court. At Terry's trial, the court denied his motion to suppress this evidence on the grounds thatMcFadden had cause to believe the men were acting suspiciously, and that hehad the right to pat down their outer clothing if he had reasonable cause tobelieve that they might be armed. The court made a distinction between a "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons anda full-blown search for evidence of crime. An appellate court affirmed the guilty verdict, and the state supreme court dismissed Terry's appeal. The casethen came before the U.S. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court Decision
By an 8-1 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the stop and frisk practice. Though it was determined that Officer McFadden did not in fact have"probable cause" for a full search, the Court made an important distinction between a "stop and frisk" search and a full search. A frisk was deemed to be"an intrusion upon the sanctity of the person" and bound by Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections. However, it was ruled to be justified in an attempt to locate concealed weapons. Chief Justice Warren wrote the opinion for the majority:
In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that McFadden had to have had probablecause to believe that Terry was carrying a weapon before performing the stopand frisk. Despite his objections, however, the "Terry type search" became the standard by which police officers could measure the lawfulness of searchesperformed without obtaining a warrant.
Related Cases
Stop and Frisk Searches
The question of "stop and frisk" searches hinges on that most eternal of issues in American jurisprudence: civil liberties on the one hand, and law and order on the other. According to the doctrine articulated by the Supreme Courtin Terry, a police officer may stop someone on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in wrongdoing; and may on a similarlyreasonable basis--i.e., one that will hold up to scrutiny in the courtroom--"frisk" or search the subject.
In order to meet standards, police making a "stop" must witness unusual conduct which arouses suspicions that can be justified according to specific facts. In order to justify a "frisk" search, the officer must have reason to believe that the individual in question is armed and dangerous.
In extreme cases, stop and frisk searches are clearly justified, but many fall into a gray area that gives rise to questions regarding the justification for searching. For example, there have been numerous cases of black males wrongly subjected to suspicion; on the other hand, there have been situations inwhich fear of a civil-liberties violation kept officers from preventing a crime. As always, there is tension between the polarities of safeguarding the public's property and safeguarding its liberties.
Sources
Levy, Leonard W., ed. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
Terry
Respondent
State of Ohio
Petitioner's Claim
That the "stop and frisk" actions of police officer Martin McFadden constituted an unreasonable search and seizure.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Louis Stokes
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Reuben M. Payne
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., Abe Fortas, John Marshall Harlan II, Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart, Earl Warren (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William O. Douglas
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
10 June 1968
Decision
A police officer may stop a person and perform a limited weapons patdown if the officer has observed suspicious behavior which would justify making such an examination.
Significance
Terry v. Ohio expanded the right of police officers to "stop and frisk" individuals whom they deem to be suspicious. At the same time, it set limits on the conditions under which such a stop could take place.
Martin McFadden, a veteran Cleveland detective, was walking his beat one afternoon when he observed two strangers on a street corner. He saw them proceedalternately back and forth along an identical route and pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did over a dozen times. At some point, theywere joined by a third man. Suspecting the trio of "casing" the store for a potential burglary, McFadden followed them. The officer approached the three,identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something," at which point McFadden grabbed one of the men, Terry, spun him around, and patted down his outside clothing--a common police tactic known as "stop and frisk." He found a pistol in Terry's overcoat pocket but was unable to remove it. McFadden then ordered the three men into the store and removed Terry's overcoat. He removed the gun and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He then patted down the outer clothing of the other two men and seized another revolver. McFadden asked the store's proprietor to call the police, at which point they were placed under arrest for carrying concealed weapons.
Terry and his companions were convicted of carrying concealed weapons and sentenced to one to three years in prison. They appealed the conviction on the grounds that McFadden's actions were an unreasonable search and seizure underthe Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. If that were true, the evidence that was seized--the pistols--should not have been admitted in court. At Terry's trial, the court denied his motion to suppress this evidence on the grounds thatMcFadden had cause to believe the men were acting suspiciously, and that hehad the right to pat down their outer clothing if he had reasonable cause tobelieve that they might be armed. The court made a distinction between a "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons anda full-blown search for evidence of crime. An appellate court affirmed the guilty verdict, and the state supreme court dismissed Terry's appeal. The casethen came before the U.S. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court Decision
By an 8-1 vote, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the stop and frisk practice. Though it was determined that Officer McFadden did not in fact have"probable cause" for a full search, the Court made an important distinction between a "stop and frisk" search and a full search. A frisk was deemed to be"an intrusion upon the sanctity of the person" and bound by Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections. However, it was ruled to be justified in an attempt to locate concealed weapons. Chief Justice Warren wrote the opinion for the majority:
We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence against him. At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true factsand neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each case will, of course, have to be decided onits own facts. We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves todispel his reasonable fear for his own or other's safety, he is entitled forthe protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might have been used to assault him.
In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that McFadden had to have had probablecause to believe that Terry was carrying a weapon before performing the stopand frisk. Despite his objections, however, the "Terry type search" became the standard by which police officers could measure the lawfulness of searchesperformed without obtaining a warrant.
Related Cases
- Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
- Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
Stop and Frisk Searches
The question of "stop and frisk" searches hinges on that most eternal of issues in American jurisprudence: civil liberties on the one hand, and law and order on the other. According to the doctrine articulated by the Supreme Courtin Terry, a police officer may stop someone on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in wrongdoing; and may on a similarlyreasonable basis--i.e., one that will hold up to scrutiny in the courtroom--"frisk" or search the subject.
In order to meet standards, police making a "stop" must witness unusual conduct which arouses suspicions that can be justified according to specific facts. In order to justify a "frisk" search, the officer must have reason to believe that the individual in question is armed and dangerous.
In extreme cases, stop and frisk searches are clearly justified, but many fall into a gray area that gives rise to questions regarding the justification for searching. For example, there have been numerous cases of black males wrongly subjected to suspicion; on the other hand, there have been situations inwhich fear of a civil-liberties violation kept officers from preventing a crime. As always, there is tension between the polarities of safeguarding the public's property and safeguarding its liberties.
Sources
Levy, Leonard W., ed. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
Further Readings
- Chandler, Ralph C. The Constitutional Law Dictionary. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1987.
- Cushman, Robert F. Cases in Constitutional Law. Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986.
- Ducat, Craig R., and Harold W. Chase. Constitutional Interpretation. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1988.
- Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
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