Petitioner
Julius A. Wolf
Respondent
People of the State of Colorado
Petitioner's Claim
That evidence, obtained illegally, should not have been used against Wolf athis state trial for a state offense because it violated his constitutional rights.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Philip Hornbein
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
James S. Henderson
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, Harold Burton, Felix Frankfurter (writing for the Court), Robert H. Jackson, Stanley Forman Reed, Fred Moore Vinson
Justices Dissenting
William O. Douglas, Frank Murphy, Wiley Blount Rutledge
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
27 June 1949
Decision
Affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado to let stand Wolf's conviction on the ground that, although the Fourth Amendment applied to the states, the states were not required to exclude evidence obtained unlawfully.
Significance
The decision in Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado advised that states should exclude evidence from trial if it was illegally obtained, but left the ultimate decision for such exclusion in the hands of the state.
Wolf was convicted of conspiracy to commit abortion in Colorado. He challenged this conviction on the ground that the seizure and use of the evidence against him violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the conviction.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to decide if the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure was incorporated by theDue Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applied both to thestates and the federal government. The Court also looked at whether the exclusionary rule, which prohibited the use of unlawfully gathered evidence by thefederal government, also applied to the states.
Due Process Represents A Living Principle
Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion for the majority. In considering the restrictions which the Due Process Clause imposed on the states regarding the enforcement of criminal law, Frankfurter noted that "this clause exacts from the States for the lowliest and the most outcast all that is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Frankfurter felt that the requirements of due process of law are neither formal nor fixed nor narrow. Due process is all the rights which the courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society; they are eternal verities. A free society advances in its ideas what is reasonable and right. Thus due process represents a living principle and is notconfined by what may be considered fundamental rights at any given time. Trying to define a fundamental right ignores the movements of a free society. The Court should not be asked to draw a line delimiting due process once and for all, but it should draw that line by the "gradual and empiric process of inclusion and exclusion."
Being secure against arbitrary intrusion by the police is basic to a free society and is at the core of the Fourth Amendment. Because this is implicit inthe concept of ordered liberty it is enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause. "The knock at the door . . . as a prelude to a search,without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did notneed the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English speaking peoples."
If a state sanctioned police incursion into privacy, it would run counter tothe guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. The question of enforcing this basic right has many possible answers. In Weeks v. United States (1914),the Court held that in a federal prosecution, the Fourth Amendment barred theuse of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure. This rulingwas a matter of judicial implication. In 1949, 30 states rejected the Weeks doctrine and 17 agreed with it. Excluding from trial evidence illegally obtained only protects a person on whose premises something incriminating has beenfound. Such people, and innocent people, have private action and the internaldiscipline of the police as remedies. Excluding evidence may be an effectivedeterrent against unreasonable searches, but the states may use other methods equally effective. Excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by federal police is more compelling than excluding such evidence obtained by state or localauthorities because the public opinion of a community can be more effectively exerted at the local level, than at the federal level.
Frankfurter concluded that "in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure."
Justice Black wrote in his concurring opinion that "the federal exclusionaryrule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate." Black felt that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make the Fourth Amendment in its entirety applicableto the states. He stated that "I am unable to agree that the protection of people from overzealous or ruthless state officers is any less essential in a country of `ordered liberty' than is the protection of people from overzealousor ruthless federal officers."
Only Exclusion Will Deter Violations
Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion. He felt that the Fourth Amendmentwas applicable to the states and that evidence obtained in violation of it must be excluded from state as well as federal prosecutions. Without the exclusionary rule, the amendment would have no effective sanction.
Justice Murphy also wrote a dissenting opinion. He noted that there were three remedies possible in the enforcement of the search and seizure clause: judicial exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence; criminal prosecution of violators; and civil action against violators for trespassing.
Concerning criminal prosecutions for those violating the clause, Murphy notedthat "Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heightsif we expect a District Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates forwell-meaning violations of the search and seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates have ordered." Regarding a trespass action,a person can only receive the amount equal to the damage to physical property. If the officer searches carefully there will be no damage. Where punitivedamages are permitted the plaintiff must show real ill will or malice to thedefendant. "Surely it is not unreasonable to assume that one in honest pursuit of crime bears no malice toward the search victim." Murphy concluded that only the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence will deter violations of thesearch and seizure clause. Without judicial action, there are no effective sanctions available. Murphy felt that "Today's decision will do inestimable harm to the cause of fair police methods in our cities and states. Even more important, perhaps, it must have a tragic effect upon public respect for our judiciary." Murphy felt that the Court was now allowing lawlessness by officersof the law.
Justice Rutledge also wrote a dissent. He felt that unless the Fourth Amendment was enforced, it was a dead letter. He noted that "the version of the Fourth Amendment today held applicable to the states hardly rises to the dignityof a form of words; at best it is a pale and frayed carbon copy of the original, bearing little resemblance to the Amendment . . . I had heretofore thought to be an indispensable need for a democratic society."
Impact
The 12 years following the decision in Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado showed that states without exclusionary rules had not found an effective means of deterring unlawful searches. Suits in tort proved to be a paperremedy rather than a useful sanction. In fact, during that time, several states adopted state exclusionary rules. In Mapp v. Ohio (1961), the Court accepted the minority position, overturned its decision in Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado and imposed the exclusionary rule on the states.
Related Cases
Julius A. Wolf
Respondent
People of the State of Colorado
Petitioner's Claim
That evidence, obtained illegally, should not have been used against Wolf athis state trial for a state offense because it violated his constitutional rights.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Philip Hornbein
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
James S. Henderson
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, Harold Burton, Felix Frankfurter (writing for the Court), Robert H. Jackson, Stanley Forman Reed, Fred Moore Vinson
Justices Dissenting
William O. Douglas, Frank Murphy, Wiley Blount Rutledge
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
27 June 1949
Decision
Affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado to let stand Wolf's conviction on the ground that, although the Fourth Amendment applied to the states, the states were not required to exclude evidence obtained unlawfully.
Significance
The decision in Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado advised that states should exclude evidence from trial if it was illegally obtained, but left the ultimate decision for such exclusion in the hands of the state.
Wolf was convicted of conspiracy to commit abortion in Colorado. He challenged this conviction on the ground that the seizure and use of the evidence against him violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the conviction.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to decide if the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure was incorporated by theDue Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applied both to thestates and the federal government. The Court also looked at whether the exclusionary rule, which prohibited the use of unlawfully gathered evidence by thefederal government, also applied to the states.
Due Process Represents A Living Principle
Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion for the majority. In considering the restrictions which the Due Process Clause imposed on the states regarding the enforcement of criminal law, Frankfurter noted that "this clause exacts from the States for the lowliest and the most outcast all that is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Frankfurter felt that the requirements of due process of law are neither formal nor fixed nor narrow. Due process is all the rights which the courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society; they are eternal verities. A free society advances in its ideas what is reasonable and right. Thus due process represents a living principle and is notconfined by what may be considered fundamental rights at any given time. Trying to define a fundamental right ignores the movements of a free society. The Court should not be asked to draw a line delimiting due process once and for all, but it should draw that line by the "gradual and empiric process of inclusion and exclusion."
Being secure against arbitrary intrusion by the police is basic to a free society and is at the core of the Fourth Amendment. Because this is implicit inthe concept of ordered liberty it is enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause. "The knock at the door . . . as a prelude to a search,without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did notneed the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English speaking peoples."
If a state sanctioned police incursion into privacy, it would run counter tothe guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. The question of enforcing this basic right has many possible answers. In Weeks v. United States (1914),the Court held that in a federal prosecution, the Fourth Amendment barred theuse of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure. This rulingwas a matter of judicial implication. In 1949, 30 states rejected the Weeks doctrine and 17 agreed with it. Excluding from trial evidence illegally obtained only protects a person on whose premises something incriminating has beenfound. Such people, and innocent people, have private action and the internaldiscipline of the police as remedies. Excluding evidence may be an effectivedeterrent against unreasonable searches, but the states may use other methods equally effective. Excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by federal police is more compelling than excluding such evidence obtained by state or localauthorities because the public opinion of a community can be more effectively exerted at the local level, than at the federal level.
Frankfurter concluded that "in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure."
Justice Black wrote in his concurring opinion that "the federal exclusionaryrule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate." Black felt that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make the Fourth Amendment in its entirety applicableto the states. He stated that "I am unable to agree that the protection of people from overzealous or ruthless state officers is any less essential in a country of `ordered liberty' than is the protection of people from overzealousor ruthless federal officers."
Only Exclusion Will Deter Violations
Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion. He felt that the Fourth Amendmentwas applicable to the states and that evidence obtained in violation of it must be excluded from state as well as federal prosecutions. Without the exclusionary rule, the amendment would have no effective sanction.
Justice Murphy also wrote a dissenting opinion. He noted that there were three remedies possible in the enforcement of the search and seizure clause: judicial exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence; criminal prosecution of violators; and civil action against violators for trespassing.
Concerning criminal prosecutions for those violating the clause, Murphy notedthat "Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heightsif we expect a District Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates forwell-meaning violations of the search and seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates have ordered." Regarding a trespass action,a person can only receive the amount equal to the damage to physical property. If the officer searches carefully there will be no damage. Where punitivedamages are permitted the plaintiff must show real ill will or malice to thedefendant. "Surely it is not unreasonable to assume that one in honest pursuit of crime bears no malice toward the search victim." Murphy concluded that only the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence will deter violations of thesearch and seizure clause. Without judicial action, there are no effective sanctions available. Murphy felt that "Today's decision will do inestimable harm to the cause of fair police methods in our cities and states. Even more important, perhaps, it must have a tragic effect upon public respect for our judiciary." Murphy felt that the Court was now allowing lawlessness by officersof the law.
Justice Rutledge also wrote a dissent. He felt that unless the Fourth Amendment was enforced, it was a dead letter. He noted that "the version of the Fourth Amendment today held applicable to the states hardly rises to the dignityof a form of words; at best it is a pale and frayed carbon copy of the original, bearing little resemblance to the Amendment . . . I had heretofore thought to be an indispensable need for a democratic society."
Impact
The 12 years following the decision in Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado showed that states without exclusionary rules had not found an effective means of deterring unlawful searches. Suits in tort proved to be a paperremedy rather than a useful sanction. In fact, during that time, several states adopted state exclusionary rules. In Mapp v. Ohio (1961), the Court accepted the minority position, overturned its decision in Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado and imposed the exclusionary rule on the states.
Related Cases
- Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
- Palko v. California, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
- McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
- Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
- Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
- Hall, Kermit L., ed. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court ofthe United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Levy, Leonard W., ed. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. Vol. 4. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
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