Petitioner
Griffin
Respondent
State of California
Petitioner's Claim
That a prosecutor's comment on the fact that the defendant, Griffin, did nottake the stand in a state criminal trial violated the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Morris Lavine
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Albert W. Harris
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., Tom C. Clark, William O. Douglas (writing for the Court), Arthur Goldberg, John Marshall Harlan II
Justices Dissenting
Potter Stewart, Byron R. White (Earl Warren did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
28 April 1965
Decision
State laws allowing adverse comment on the failure of a defendant to take thewitness stand to deny or explain evidence violates a defendant's right not to incriminate himself.
Significance
The decision to forbid comments by prosecutors or judges on the failure of adefendant to testify at his own trial preserved the presumption of innocenceto which a defendant is constitutionally entitled.
On the night that Essie Mae was found she had been seen by a Mr. Villasenor in an alley with petitioner Griffin. Griffin was later convicted of the firstdegree murder of Essie Mae, after a jury trial in a California court. He didnot testify at his trial, and while the trial court instructed the jury on the issue of guilt, stating that a defendant has a constitutional right not totestify, it also told the jury that they may take into consideration the factthat the defendant did not testify as tending to indicate the truth of the evidence and that of the inferences drawn from the evidence those unfavorableto the defendant are the more probable. The court also stated that the failure of a defendant to deny or explain the evidence of which he had knowledge does not create a presumption of guilt nor by itself warrant an inference of guilt nor relieve the prosecution of any of its burden of proof. During the trial, the prosecutor drew a great deal of attention to the fact that Griffin did not testify with such statements as, "Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell youher side of the story. The defendant won't." Griffin received the death penalty and the California Supreme Court affirmed this sentence.
A Remnant Of The Inquisitorial System
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to decide if comment on the failureto testify violated the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court had ruled in Malloy v. Hogan (1964) that this clause was applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloyv. Hogan was decided after the Supreme Court of California had affirmed Griffin's conviction.
Justice Douglas, in his opinion for the majority stated that the "comment rule" violated the Fifth Amendment. He noted that the comment rule is a rule ofevidence that allowed the state the privilege of offering to the jury for itsconsideration the failure of the accused to testify. The prosecutor's comments and the court's acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance. In Wilson v. United States (1893), the Court stated"the failure of the defendant in a criminal action to request to be a witnessshall not create any presumption against him."
Commenting on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the inquisitorial systemof criminal justice, which the Fifth Amendment outlawed. Such commenting is"a penalty imposed by court for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly . . . .What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer whenthe court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him isquite another." Justice Douglas summed up by stating that the Fifth Amendmentforbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.
Justice Harlan concurred "with great reluctance." He felt that the decision exemplified the "creeping paralysis with which this Court's recent adoption ofthe `incorporation' doctrine is infecting the operation of the federal system." Justice Harlan noted that Malloy v. Hogan put forth the argument that "It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege . . . , depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court. Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified." Justice Harlan responded to this statement in Malloy, incongruity within the limits of fundamental fairness is at the heart of the federal system. The powers and responsibilities of the state and federal governments are not congruent and the Constitution did not intend them to be. Justice Harlan suggested that the way to eliminate friction between the state and federalsystems is to attempt a working harmony, not for the federal system to override the states altogether.
Unwarranted Inferences
Justice Stewart wrote the dissent. He stated that the question in this case was whether Griffin had been "compelled . . . to be a witness against himself." Justice Stewart felt that compulsion was the key here. "I think that the Court in this case stretches the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds, and that whatever compulsion may exist derives from the defendant's choice not to testify, not from any comment by court or counsel." Justice Stewart, referring to the majority's opinion, did not understand what penalty was imposed here.
Justice Stewart did not feel that the defendant would be at more of a disadvantage under the California comment rule than in a court where no comment on asuspect's failure to take the witness stand was allowed. The inferences drawn by the jury under the limiting and carefully controlling language of instruction might be less detrimental than if the jury were "left to roam at largewith only its untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from the defendant's silence broad inferences of guilt."
A prosecutor will seek to encourage the drawing of inferences unfavorable tothe defendant, but the defendant's counsel has an equal opportunity to explain why a defendant may not wish to take the stand. The California comment rule"is not a coercive device which impairs the right against self-incrimination, but rather a means of articulating and bringing into the light of rationaldiscussion a fact inescapably impressed on the jury's consciousness." The rule protects the defendant against unwarranted inferences that an uninformed jury might draw. It also attempts to recognize and articulate what the state believes to the natural probative force of certain facts.
Justice Stewart stated that the formulation of procedural rules governing theadministration of criminal justice in the states should be a matter of localconcern; the Supreme Court's function is to prevent violations of the Constitution. California has not compelled anyone to be a witness against himself.Whenever a defendant in a criminal trial exercises this constitutional right,the jury is bound to draw inferences. "No constitution can prevent the operation of the human mind. Without limiting instruction, the danger exists thatthe inferences drawn by the jury may be unfairly broad."
Impact
The decision in Griffin v. California overruled Twining v. State ofNew Jersey (1908) and Adamson v. California (1947). Not only maya prosecutor not comment to the jury about a defendant's refusal to take thestand, but a prosecutor may not tell the jury that a defendant who has givenan alibi at trial originally refused to speak to the police. If the defense requests it, the judge must tell the jury to give no weight whatsoever to thefact that the defendant chose not to take the stand.
Related Cases
Federal Circuit Court
The term "circuit court" originally referred to the route a judge rode to hold trials in each district in a designated circuit. In sparsely populated areas, the circuit court system alleviated the costs associated with setting up acourt in every small town or village.
The U.S. Federal Circuit Court system consists of 12 circuits. The First through Eleventh Circuits contain three or more states each. Territories such asthe Virgin Islands and Guam are also included in these circuits. The twelfthcircuit is the court for the District of Columbia. Federal circuit courts have jurisdiction over only the states or counties within their circuits. The decisions made by federal district courts can be reviewed by the court of appeals in each circuit.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing,1998.
Griffin
Respondent
State of California
Petitioner's Claim
That a prosecutor's comment on the fact that the defendant, Griffin, did nottake the stand in a state criminal trial violated the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Morris Lavine
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Albert W. Harris
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., Tom C. Clark, William O. Douglas (writing for the Court), Arthur Goldberg, John Marshall Harlan II
Justices Dissenting
Potter Stewart, Byron R. White (Earl Warren did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
28 April 1965
Decision
State laws allowing adverse comment on the failure of a defendant to take thewitness stand to deny or explain evidence violates a defendant's right not to incriminate himself.
Significance
The decision to forbid comments by prosecutors or judges on the failure of adefendant to testify at his own trial preserved the presumption of innocenceto which a defendant is constitutionally entitled.
On the night that Essie Mae was found she had been seen by a Mr. Villasenor in an alley with petitioner Griffin. Griffin was later convicted of the firstdegree murder of Essie Mae, after a jury trial in a California court. He didnot testify at his trial, and while the trial court instructed the jury on the issue of guilt, stating that a defendant has a constitutional right not totestify, it also told the jury that they may take into consideration the factthat the defendant did not testify as tending to indicate the truth of the evidence and that of the inferences drawn from the evidence those unfavorableto the defendant are the more probable. The court also stated that the failure of a defendant to deny or explain the evidence of which he had knowledge does not create a presumption of guilt nor by itself warrant an inference of guilt nor relieve the prosecution of any of its burden of proof. During the trial, the prosecutor drew a great deal of attention to the fact that Griffin did not testify with such statements as, "Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell youher side of the story. The defendant won't." Griffin received the death penalty and the California Supreme Court affirmed this sentence.
A Remnant Of The Inquisitorial System
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to decide if comment on the failureto testify violated the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court had ruled in Malloy v. Hogan (1964) that this clause was applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloyv. Hogan was decided after the Supreme Court of California had affirmed Griffin's conviction.
Justice Douglas, in his opinion for the majority stated that the "comment rule" violated the Fifth Amendment. He noted that the comment rule is a rule ofevidence that allowed the state the privilege of offering to the jury for itsconsideration the failure of the accused to testify. The prosecutor's comments and the court's acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance. In Wilson v. United States (1893), the Court stated"the failure of the defendant in a criminal action to request to be a witnessshall not create any presumption against him."
Commenting on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the inquisitorial systemof criminal justice, which the Fifth Amendment outlawed. Such commenting is"a penalty imposed by court for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly . . . .What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer whenthe court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him isquite another." Justice Douglas summed up by stating that the Fifth Amendmentforbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.
Justice Harlan concurred "with great reluctance." He felt that the decision exemplified the "creeping paralysis with which this Court's recent adoption ofthe `incorporation' doctrine is infecting the operation of the federal system." Justice Harlan noted that Malloy v. Hogan put forth the argument that "It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege . . . , depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court. Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified." Justice Harlan responded to this statement in Malloy, incongruity within the limits of fundamental fairness is at the heart of the federal system. The powers and responsibilities of the state and federal governments are not congruent and the Constitution did not intend them to be. Justice Harlan suggested that the way to eliminate friction between the state and federalsystems is to attempt a working harmony, not for the federal system to override the states altogether.
Unwarranted Inferences
Justice Stewart wrote the dissent. He stated that the question in this case was whether Griffin had been "compelled . . . to be a witness against himself." Justice Stewart felt that compulsion was the key here. "I think that the Court in this case stretches the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds, and that whatever compulsion may exist derives from the defendant's choice not to testify, not from any comment by court or counsel." Justice Stewart, referring to the majority's opinion, did not understand what penalty was imposed here.
Justice Stewart did not feel that the defendant would be at more of a disadvantage under the California comment rule than in a court where no comment on asuspect's failure to take the witness stand was allowed. The inferences drawn by the jury under the limiting and carefully controlling language of instruction might be less detrimental than if the jury were "left to roam at largewith only its untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from the defendant's silence broad inferences of guilt."
A prosecutor will seek to encourage the drawing of inferences unfavorable tothe defendant, but the defendant's counsel has an equal opportunity to explain why a defendant may not wish to take the stand. The California comment rule"is not a coercive device which impairs the right against self-incrimination, but rather a means of articulating and bringing into the light of rationaldiscussion a fact inescapably impressed on the jury's consciousness." The rule protects the defendant against unwarranted inferences that an uninformed jury might draw. It also attempts to recognize and articulate what the state believes to the natural probative force of certain facts.
Justice Stewart stated that the formulation of procedural rules governing theadministration of criminal justice in the states should be a matter of localconcern; the Supreme Court's function is to prevent violations of the Constitution. California has not compelled anyone to be a witness against himself.Whenever a defendant in a criminal trial exercises this constitutional right,the jury is bound to draw inferences. "No constitution can prevent the operation of the human mind. Without limiting instruction, the danger exists thatthe inferences drawn by the jury may be unfairly broad."
Impact
The decision in Griffin v. California overruled Twining v. State ofNew Jersey (1908) and Adamson v. California (1947). Not only maya prosecutor not comment to the jury about a defendant's refusal to take thestand, but a prosecutor may not tell the jury that a defendant who has givenan alibi at trial originally refused to speak to the police. If the defense requests it, the judge must tell the jury to give no weight whatsoever to thefact that the defendant chose not to take the stand.
Related Cases
- Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
- Twining v. State of New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
- Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
- Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Federal Circuit Court
The term "circuit court" originally referred to the route a judge rode to hold trials in each district in a designated circuit. In sparsely populated areas, the circuit court system alleviated the costs associated with setting up acourt in every small town or village.
The U.S. Federal Circuit Court system consists of 12 circuits. The First through Eleventh Circuits contain three or more states each. Territories such asthe Virgin Islands and Guam are also included in these circuits. The twelfthcircuit is the court for the District of Columbia. Federal circuit courts have jurisdiction over only the states or counties within their circuits. The decisions made by federal district courts can be reviewed by the court of appeals in each circuit.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing,1998.
Further Readings
- FindLaw Internet Legal Resources. http://www.findlaw.com.
- Hall, Kermit L., ed. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of theUnited States. New York: Oxford Press, 1992.
- Levy, Leonard W., ed. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. Vol. 4. New York: Macmillan, 1986.
- Lieberman, Jethro K. The Evolving Constitution. New York: Random House, 1992.
User Comments Add a comment…
10 months ago
i think this case sucked and he should of died or he did and i dont get it? make it a better story or dont make it a website