Ullmann v. United States

Petitioner
William Ludwig Ullmann
Respondent
United States
Petitioner's Claim
That the Immunity Act of 1954, making it a criminal offense to refuse to testify about matters of national security, violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Leonard B. Boudin
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Charles F. Barber
Justices for the Court
Harold Burton, Tom C. Clark, Felix Frankfurter (writing for the Court), JohnMarshall Harlan II, Sherman Minton, Stanley Forman Reed, Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, William O. Douglas
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 March 1956
Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the Immunity Act.
Significance
Ullmann clarified the meaning of the privilege against self-incrimination.
On 3 November 1954, William Ludwig Ullmann put in an appearance in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. Ullmann had been subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury that had been convened to investigate espionage and other threats against the federal government. When the grand juryasked him a series of questions about his own or others' activities and Communist Party affiliations, Ullmann refused to answer, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The U.S. attorney for the district filed an application under the Immunity Act of 1954 for an order requiring Ullmann to testify. The Immunity Act provided witnesses with immunity from criminal prosecution for matters revealed by the compelled testimony. Ullmann in turn challenged the constitutionality of the act, claiming that the so-called "transactional" immunity it afforded would not protect him from other serious harm, such as job loss and social ostracism. The district court upheld the statute and ordered Ullmann to testify. When he again refused to answer questions put to him by a grand jury, he was convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to six months in jail. When his appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit failed, Ullmann petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review of his case.
Court Holds That the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Only Protects Against Criminal Prosecution
Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurterheld that the Fifth Amendment privilege only protects a witness from being compelled to give testimony that could result in criminal prosecution:

[T]he immunity granted need onlyremove those sanctions which generate the fear justifying invocation of theprivilege: "the interdiction of the 5th Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to incriminated himself,--in other words, to give testimony whichmay possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if the criminality has already been taken away, the amendment ceases to apply." [Quoting Hale v. Henek (1906)].

Since the Immunity Act removed the threat of prosecution for actions revealedby the compelled testimony, the privilege did not apply in Ullmann's case. The Fifth Amendment was not designed by the framers of the Constitution to protect against the kinds of harms Ullmann cited. Always a proponent of judicialrestraint and an advocate of legislative prerogatives, Frankfurter added that the Constitution could not be changed except by the formal amendatory process. The Immunity Act was upheld.
Ullmann had good reason to fear testifying before the grand jury. During thered-baiting period that followed World War II, those who refused to testify before investigative bodies like the notorious House Committee on Un-AmericanActivities (HUAC) became known as "Fifth Amendment Communists." For them, aninvocation of the privilege might as well have been an admission of guilt. Many lost jobs, families, friends, and all social status. When the Red Scare abated, cooling off to the point it became a Cold War with the Soviet Union, domestic persecution of suspected communists also eased. But in 1954, transactional immunity could not really protect William Ullmann adequately.
In the 1970s, Congress enacted a law providing for "use immunity." This typeof immunity offers even less coverage than transactional immunity, in that itonly protects a witness from use in a subsequent prosecution of the compelled testimony and any evidence obtained because of it. Unlike transactional immunity, it does not protect a witness from being prosecuted for the same offense if evidence is independently obtained. Use immunity, like transactional immunity, has been upheld as constitutional. The purpose of the Fifth Amendmentprivilege against self-incrimination has been interpreted as a support for the fundamental proposition that under the American system of laws, the prosecution has to carry the burden of proof. If witnesses are granted immunity--ofeither sort--in exchange for their testimony, they will not be doing the prosecution's work for them.
Related Cases

• Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
  
• Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City, 350 U.S.551 (1956).
  
• Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).

Prima Facie Evidence
The Latin phrase prima facie means on first appearance and prima facieevidence refers to the apparent truth of a piece evidence on initial inspection that supports a case or an argument in a case that requires support. Bothcivil and criminal law rely on the notion of prima facie evidence.
Prima facie evidence comes into play, for example, when a prosecutor in an assault case offers letters in which the defendant threatens the victim. Here,the prosecutor presents prima facie evidence that the defendant intended to harm the victim, which the prosecutor must demonstrate before the defendant can be convicted. In addition, statutes also determine what counts as prima facie evidence. For instance, an appropriately verified copy of a criminal record can be used against a defendant in court as prima facie evidence.
Sources
West's Encyclopedia of American Law. Minneapolis, MN: West Publishing,1998.