Appellants
Albert C. Twining, David C. Cornell
Appellee
State of New Jersey
Appellants' Claim
That New Jersey's Court of Errors & Appeals erred in upholding a conviction obtained in a trial during which the appellants' Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process under the law were violated.
Chief Lawyers for Appellants
James Johnson, William Gooch, Herbert Smyth, Frederick Scofield (for Twining), Marshall Van Winkle (for Cornell)
Chief Lawyers for Appellee
H.M. Nevious, Robert McCarter
Justices for the Court
David Josiah Brewer, William Rufus Day, Melville Weston Fuller, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Joseph McKenna, William Henry Moody (writing for the Court), RufusWheeler Peckham, Edward Douglass White
Justices Dissenting
John Marshall Harlan I
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
9 November 1908
Decision
In favor of appellee, affirming the sentences of the appellants.
Significance
The 1908 Court's narrow interpretations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the Twining decision limited the right of individuals to remain silent in courtroom proceedings to avoid self-incrimination.
An Inference of Guilt
Few clauses of the U.S. Constitution are as familiar as the Fifth Amendment prohibition against being forced to give testimony which might be self-incriminatory. It might surprise many Americans to learn that such protection was anincomplete privilege for nearly two centuries after the amendment's ratification in 1791.
When the Monmouth Trust and Safety Deposit Company of Asbury Park closed itsdoors in February of 1903, Albert Twining's and David Cornell's troubles began. New Jersey bank examiner Larue Vreedenburg promptly arrived to inspect thedefunct bank's records. Among other things, President Twining and TreasurerCornell gave the inspector the minutes of a meeting at which several bank directors, including Twining and Cornell, had approved a payment of $44,875 for381 shares of First National Bank stock. When inspector Vreedenburg finishedhis investigation of the transaction, he had Twining and Cornell arrested under a New Jersey statute forbidding bank officials from intentionally providing false information or documents to state examiners.
In January of 1904, Twining and Cornell were convicted and sentenced to threeyears imprisonment for falsifying bank records relating to an estate account. They were out on bail when they returned to court to face the Vreedenburg charge. Although another bank director, whose name appeared on the questionable minutes approving the stock transfer, testified that he never signed the document and that the meeting never took place, neither Twining nor Cornell took the stand.
The presiding judge spoke at length about the fact that while the signaturesof both defendants appeared on the fraudulent document, both refused to speakabout the nonexistent meeting. He also spoke about their choice not to testify in their own defense. "Because a man does not go on the stand, you are notnecessarily justified in drawing an inference of guilt," concluded the judge. "But you have a right to consider the fact that he does not go on the standwhere a direct accusation is made against him." The jury took one hour to find Twining and Cornell guilty. The two men were sentenced to six and four years imprisonment respectively.
Twining and Cornell appealed their sentences to the New Jersey Supreme Court,without success. Their luck was no better at New Jersey's Court of Errors and Appeals, which affirmed the state supreme court's decision to uphold the convictions. Twining's and Cornell's appeal of their sentences on constitutional grounds, however, resulted in their argument being heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on 19 and 20 March 1908.
State Citizens, American Citizens
In Justice Moody's majority opinion of 9 November, the Court affirmed the decisions of New Jersey's courts, allowing the convictions to stand. The Court'sdecision was unconcerned with the merits of the case against Twining and Cornell. The judge's instructions to the jury in the criminal case were enteredas a matter of record, but the Court was more concerned with delineating therights of defendants in state versus federal trials.
Twining and Cornell were convicted of breaking a state law. The Court found no reason to reverse the decisions of that state's courts just because state statutes did not include an exemption from self-incrimination. It was true that federal law provided such an exemption within the Fifth Amendment. All buttwo states included the exemption in their own laws. One state which did notspecifically include the principles of the Fifth Amendment in its own constitution was Iowa. Unfortunately for Twining and Cornell, the other was New Jersey.
The two defendants were American citizens, but they were also citizens of thestate of New Jersey. Citing the 1872 Slaughterhouse Cases, Justice Moody stated that citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a state were distinct from each other. The Court ruled that the first eight amendments to theU.S. Constitution applied only to action by federal authorities. However fundamental they might be, privileges found within the amendments were not specifically protections against action in state courts. The Court declared that the Fifth Amendment was reserved for use in federal trials only.
Twining's and Cornell's attorneys were aware that appealing the convictions by claiming the protection of the Fifth Amendment would be ineffective. Instead, all of their appeals were grounded in the argument that the judge's comments in the criminal trial violated an immunity from self-incrimination, not under the Fifth Amendment, but under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "due process" under the law. This strategy was equally unsuccessful. Justice Moody pointed out that the framers of the Constitution had seen fit to enumerate the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment as a distinct and separate right, notas part of the general legal framework known as "due process."
Only Justice Harlan dissented from this opinion. Justice Harlan chided his associates for skirting the issue of whether or not Twining's and Cornell's rights had been infringed by the judge's comments in their trial. Harlan also differed from the majority in his belief that "exemption from testimonial compulsion" was protected by both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, Harlan adamantly rejected the distinction the other justices made between individual privileges under state and federal law, which allowed differing interpretations of the right to silence.
"The declaration of the Court, in the opinion just delivered, that immunity from self-incrimination is of great value, a protection to the innocent, and asafeguard against tyrannical prosecutions, meets my cordial approval," Harlan wrote. But, he added, in view of the Court's long-held view that forcing defendants to testify against themselves "was in violation of universal American law, was contrary to the principles of free government and a weapon of despotic power which could not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty andpersonal freedom, I cannot agree that a State may make that rule a part of its law and binding on citizens despite the Constitution of the United States."
Regardless of Justice Harlan's foresight in the matter, the majority decisionin the Twining decision remained the policy of the Court for decades.In 1947, the decision's principles were reaffirmed in Adamson v. California. Not until the Court's 1964 Malloy v. Hogan decision did the guarantee against self-incrimination extend to defendants in both state and federal trials.
Related Cases
Albert C. Twining, David C. Cornell
Appellee
State of New Jersey
Appellants' Claim
That New Jersey's Court of Errors & Appeals erred in upholding a conviction obtained in a trial during which the appellants' Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process under the law were violated.
Chief Lawyers for Appellants
James Johnson, William Gooch, Herbert Smyth, Frederick Scofield (for Twining), Marshall Van Winkle (for Cornell)
Chief Lawyers for Appellee
H.M. Nevious, Robert McCarter
Justices for the Court
David Josiah Brewer, William Rufus Day, Melville Weston Fuller, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Joseph McKenna, William Henry Moody (writing for the Court), RufusWheeler Peckham, Edward Douglass White
Justices Dissenting
John Marshall Harlan I
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
9 November 1908
Decision
In favor of appellee, affirming the sentences of the appellants.
Significance
The 1908 Court's narrow interpretations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the Twining decision limited the right of individuals to remain silent in courtroom proceedings to avoid self-incrimination.
An Inference of Guilt
Few clauses of the U.S. Constitution are as familiar as the Fifth Amendment prohibition against being forced to give testimony which might be self-incriminatory. It might surprise many Americans to learn that such protection was anincomplete privilege for nearly two centuries after the amendment's ratification in 1791.
When the Monmouth Trust and Safety Deposit Company of Asbury Park closed itsdoors in February of 1903, Albert Twining's and David Cornell's troubles began. New Jersey bank examiner Larue Vreedenburg promptly arrived to inspect thedefunct bank's records. Among other things, President Twining and TreasurerCornell gave the inspector the minutes of a meeting at which several bank directors, including Twining and Cornell, had approved a payment of $44,875 for381 shares of First National Bank stock. When inspector Vreedenburg finishedhis investigation of the transaction, he had Twining and Cornell arrested under a New Jersey statute forbidding bank officials from intentionally providing false information or documents to state examiners.
In January of 1904, Twining and Cornell were convicted and sentenced to threeyears imprisonment for falsifying bank records relating to an estate account. They were out on bail when they returned to court to face the Vreedenburg charge. Although another bank director, whose name appeared on the questionable minutes approving the stock transfer, testified that he never signed the document and that the meeting never took place, neither Twining nor Cornell took the stand.
The presiding judge spoke at length about the fact that while the signaturesof both defendants appeared on the fraudulent document, both refused to speakabout the nonexistent meeting. He also spoke about their choice not to testify in their own defense. "Because a man does not go on the stand, you are notnecessarily justified in drawing an inference of guilt," concluded the judge. "But you have a right to consider the fact that he does not go on the standwhere a direct accusation is made against him." The jury took one hour to find Twining and Cornell guilty. The two men were sentenced to six and four years imprisonment respectively.
Twining and Cornell appealed their sentences to the New Jersey Supreme Court,without success. Their luck was no better at New Jersey's Court of Errors and Appeals, which affirmed the state supreme court's decision to uphold the convictions. Twining's and Cornell's appeal of their sentences on constitutional grounds, however, resulted in their argument being heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on 19 and 20 March 1908.
State Citizens, American Citizens
In Justice Moody's majority opinion of 9 November, the Court affirmed the decisions of New Jersey's courts, allowing the convictions to stand. The Court'sdecision was unconcerned with the merits of the case against Twining and Cornell. The judge's instructions to the jury in the criminal case were enteredas a matter of record, but the Court was more concerned with delineating therights of defendants in state versus federal trials.
Twining and Cornell were convicted of breaking a state law. The Court found no reason to reverse the decisions of that state's courts just because state statutes did not include an exemption from self-incrimination. It was true that federal law provided such an exemption within the Fifth Amendment. All buttwo states included the exemption in their own laws. One state which did notspecifically include the principles of the Fifth Amendment in its own constitution was Iowa. Unfortunately for Twining and Cornell, the other was New Jersey.
The two defendants were American citizens, but they were also citizens of thestate of New Jersey. Citing the 1872 Slaughterhouse Cases, Justice Moody stated that citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a state were distinct from each other. The Court ruled that the first eight amendments to theU.S. Constitution applied only to action by federal authorities. However fundamental they might be, privileges found within the amendments were not specifically protections against action in state courts. The Court declared that the Fifth Amendment was reserved for use in federal trials only.
Twining's and Cornell's attorneys were aware that appealing the convictions by claiming the protection of the Fifth Amendment would be ineffective. Instead, all of their appeals were grounded in the argument that the judge's comments in the criminal trial violated an immunity from self-incrimination, not under the Fifth Amendment, but under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "due process" under the law. This strategy was equally unsuccessful. Justice Moody pointed out that the framers of the Constitution had seen fit to enumerate the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment as a distinct and separate right, notas part of the general legal framework known as "due process."
Only Justice Harlan dissented from this opinion. Justice Harlan chided his associates for skirting the issue of whether or not Twining's and Cornell's rights had been infringed by the judge's comments in their trial. Harlan also differed from the majority in his belief that "exemption from testimonial compulsion" was protected by both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, Harlan adamantly rejected the distinction the other justices made between individual privileges under state and federal law, which allowed differing interpretations of the right to silence.
"The declaration of the Court, in the opinion just delivered, that immunity from self-incrimination is of great value, a protection to the innocent, and asafeguard against tyrannical prosecutions, meets my cordial approval," Harlan wrote. But, he added, in view of the Court's long-held view that forcing defendants to testify against themselves "was in violation of universal American law, was contrary to the principles of free government and a weapon of despotic power which could not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty andpersonal freedom, I cannot agree that a State may make that rule a part of its law and binding on citizens despite the Constitution of the United States."
Regardless of Justice Harlan's foresight in the matter, the majority decisionin the Twining decision remained the policy of the Court for decades.In 1947, the decision's principles were reaffirmed in Adamson v. California. Not until the Court's 1964 Malloy v. Hogan decision did the guarantee against self-incrimination extend to defendants in both state and federal trials.
Related Cases
- Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
- Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
- Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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