Petitioner
Aubrey Scott
Respondent
State of Illinois
Petitioner's Claim
That the state of Illinois's failure to supply him with legal counsel for histrial on a shoplifting charge violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
John S. Elson
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Gerri Papushkewych
Justices for the Court
Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for theCourt), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
5 March 1979
Decision
Upheld the decisions of the Illinois Intermediate Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court, denying the petitioner's claim and holding that the right of due process does not extend to criminal cases in which no prison term isimposed.
Significance
The ruling clarified the Court's reasoning with regard to provision of legalcounsel to indigent criminal defendants as outlined in Argersinger v. Hamlin, (1972). In Argersinger the Court had ruled that a state must provide legal counsel to indigent criminal defendants potentially subject to prison terms of not greater than six months. Scott v. Illinois limiteda state's obligation to provide legal counsel to indigent defendants to thosecases in which a sentence of imprisonment was imposed.
An Open-and-Shut Case?
Aubrey Scott was found guilty of shoplifting merchandise with a value of greater than $50, a misdemeanor. The verdict was announced during a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, at which he was not provided with free legal counsel by the state of Illinois. Under Illinois state law he faced a sentence of up to one year in prison, a fine of up to $500, or both for his conviction. Scott was merely fined $50. Despite the relative lightnessof his sentence Scott appealed his case to the Illinois Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the circuit court ruling. He then took his case to theIllinois Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court holdings in the case,stating that the legal precedent set in Argersinger v. Hamlin did notapply to this case since Scott did not receive a sentence of imprisonment forhis crime. Scott disagreed with this position, and appealed the case to theU.S. Supreme Court, which heard arguments in the matter on 4 December 1978.
Legal Precedents
It is generally agreed that the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees due process of law to those accused of crimes, was not intendedby its writers to demand provision of legal counsel to the accused, but rather only to bar the state from denying individuals the right to legal representation in court. Nevertheless, since the 1930s the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that the Sixth Amendment does guarantee legal counsel to thoseaccused of crimes. In Powell v. Alabama (1932) the Court overturned the sentences of eight black youths who were convicted and sentenced to deathin an abbreviated trial without the benefit of legal counsel. The Court continued to broaden its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of due process in Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), ruling that federal criminal defendants who lacked the financial means to retain legal counsel must be providedwith an attorney by the court. In each of these cases the Court reasoned thatdue process could only be guaranteed by the presence of counsel, and, in Johnson, that an individual's financial means should not unduly impact upon their legal status.
The Court failed to extend the same guarantee of counsel to individuals accused of felonies by the states. In Betts v. Brady (1942), the Court heldthat states were free to judge the circumstances under which felony defendants facing state charges need be provided with counsel. This ruling was overturned in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), however, when the Court ruled that all state felony defendants must be provided with legal counsel if unable to obtain it for themselves. Finally, in Argersinger, the Court held that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor was entitled to state appointed counsel.
Interpreting Argersinger
In reaching its decision to affirm the findings of the Illinois IntermediateAppellate Court and Illinois Supreme Court, the Supreme Court made a very narrow interpretation of the ruling in Argersinger. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that Argersinger applied only to cases in which a defendant was actually sentenced to time in prison, and was inapplicable in cases where imprisonment was either not part of the sentencing guidelines or merely a sentencing option. This reflects a very literal reading ofthe majority opinion in Argersinger, which stated that "every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented bycounsel." Rehnquist went on to conclude that "the central premise of Argersinger that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment--is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel." Finally, to extend the guarantee of legal counsel to all misdemeanor defendants would cause "confusion and impose unpredictable, butnecessarily substantial, costs" on the states.
The four dissenting justices disagreed strongly with the majority's reasoning. In their view, the Sixth Amendment clearly delineated the right of defendants to legal counsel regardless of the circumstances of their trial or the potential sentences they faced. The dissent also maintained that Argersinger extended the right to counsel to all defendants facing a possible prisonterm, regardless of their actual sentence.
Impact
Scott v. Illinois marked a stepping back from the trend established bythe Court in the 1930s to expand the right of the accused to legal counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The ruling narrowed the scope of Argersinger v.Hamlin, which had guaranteed state appointed counsel for misdemeanor defendants facing possible prison sentences, by mandating appointment of counselonly in cases where a sentence of imprisonment was sought. Practically, the ruling enabled the state to forgo appointment of counsel in cases where the prosecution did not seek a prison sentence for the accused.
Related Cases
Aubrey Scott
Respondent
State of Illinois
Petitioner's Claim
That the state of Illinois's failure to supply him with legal counsel for histrial on a shoplifting charge violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
John S. Elson
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Gerri Papushkewych
Justices for the Court
Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for theCourt), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
5 March 1979
Decision
Upheld the decisions of the Illinois Intermediate Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court, denying the petitioner's claim and holding that the right of due process does not extend to criminal cases in which no prison term isimposed.
Significance
The ruling clarified the Court's reasoning with regard to provision of legalcounsel to indigent criminal defendants as outlined in Argersinger v. Hamlin, (1972). In Argersinger the Court had ruled that a state must provide legal counsel to indigent criminal defendants potentially subject to prison terms of not greater than six months. Scott v. Illinois limiteda state's obligation to provide legal counsel to indigent defendants to thosecases in which a sentence of imprisonment was imposed.
An Open-and-Shut Case?
Aubrey Scott was found guilty of shoplifting merchandise with a value of greater than $50, a misdemeanor. The verdict was announced during a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, at which he was not provided with free legal counsel by the state of Illinois. Under Illinois state law he faced a sentence of up to one year in prison, a fine of up to $500, or both for his conviction. Scott was merely fined $50. Despite the relative lightnessof his sentence Scott appealed his case to the Illinois Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the circuit court ruling. He then took his case to theIllinois Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court holdings in the case,stating that the legal precedent set in Argersinger v. Hamlin did notapply to this case since Scott did not receive a sentence of imprisonment forhis crime. Scott disagreed with this position, and appealed the case to theU.S. Supreme Court, which heard arguments in the matter on 4 December 1978.
Legal Precedents
It is generally agreed that the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees due process of law to those accused of crimes, was not intendedby its writers to demand provision of legal counsel to the accused, but rather only to bar the state from denying individuals the right to legal representation in court. Nevertheless, since the 1930s the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that the Sixth Amendment does guarantee legal counsel to thoseaccused of crimes. In Powell v. Alabama (1932) the Court overturned the sentences of eight black youths who were convicted and sentenced to deathin an abbreviated trial without the benefit of legal counsel. The Court continued to broaden its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of due process in Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), ruling that federal criminal defendants who lacked the financial means to retain legal counsel must be providedwith an attorney by the court. In each of these cases the Court reasoned thatdue process could only be guaranteed by the presence of counsel, and, in Johnson, that an individual's financial means should not unduly impact upon their legal status.
The Court failed to extend the same guarantee of counsel to individuals accused of felonies by the states. In Betts v. Brady (1942), the Court heldthat states were free to judge the circumstances under which felony defendants facing state charges need be provided with counsel. This ruling was overturned in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), however, when the Court ruled that all state felony defendants must be provided with legal counsel if unable to obtain it for themselves. Finally, in Argersinger, the Court held that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor was entitled to state appointed counsel.
Interpreting Argersinger
In reaching its decision to affirm the findings of the Illinois IntermediateAppellate Court and Illinois Supreme Court, the Supreme Court made a very narrow interpretation of the ruling in Argersinger. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that Argersinger applied only to cases in which a defendant was actually sentenced to time in prison, and was inapplicable in cases where imprisonment was either not part of the sentencing guidelines or merely a sentencing option. This reflects a very literal reading ofthe majority opinion in Argersinger, which stated that "every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented bycounsel." Rehnquist went on to conclude that "the central premise of Argersinger that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment--is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel." Finally, to extend the guarantee of legal counsel to all misdemeanor defendants would cause "confusion and impose unpredictable, butnecessarily substantial, costs" on the states.
The four dissenting justices disagreed strongly with the majority's reasoning. In their view, the Sixth Amendment clearly delineated the right of defendants to legal counsel regardless of the circumstances of their trial or the potential sentences they faced. The dissent also maintained that Argersinger extended the right to counsel to all defendants facing a possible prisonterm, regardless of their actual sentence.
Impact
Scott v. Illinois marked a stepping back from the trend established bythe Court in the 1930s to expand the right of the accused to legal counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The ruling narrowed the scope of Argersinger v.Hamlin, which had guaranteed state appointed counsel for misdemeanor defendants facing possible prison sentences, by mandating appointment of counselonly in cases where a sentence of imprisonment was sought. Practically, the ruling enabled the state to forgo appointment of counsel in cases where the prosecution did not seek a prison sentence for the accused.
Related Cases
- Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
- Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
- Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
- Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Guide to the Supreme Court ofthe United States. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1997.
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