Harris v. New York

Petitioner
Viven Harris
Respondent
State of New York
Petitioner's Claim
That Harris's constitutional rights had been violated, and thus his narcoticsconviction should be overturned.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Joel Martin Aurnou
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
James J. Duggan
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger (writing for the Court), John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
24 February 1971
Decision
That statements considered inadmissible in convicting a defendant could be used to attack his or her credibility on the witness stand.
Significance
Narrowed suspects' rights in an attempt by a new conservative majority on theHigh Court to redress past liberal decisions.
Alleged Heroin Sale
On two occasions in early January of 1966, Viven Harris of New Rochelle, NewYork, was involved in the sale of heroin to undercover police. He claimed tohave acted as a middleman in both transactions, and for the second sale was promised part of the heroin. After Harris was arrested on 7 January, he admitted to police that he had made both sales, but asserted that the undercover officer had instructed him to do so. He also mentioned that he thought he should talk to a lawyer before answering any more questions. At his jury trial, the police officer was the chief witness for the prosecution, and provided evidence that Harris had sold him drugs. Harris took the stand in his own defense, and made statements that contradicted what he had said while in police custody, in which he admitted to both sales. Under oath, he denied making the first sale, and said that the second sale had merely been a scam, that the packet contained only baking powder.
When Harris was cross-examined by the prosecution, he was asked whether or not he had made confessional statements on 7 January. He claimed he could not remember what he had said to police after his arrest, nor what the questions were. Later, his lawyer would argue that at the time, Harris was suffering from heroin addiction withdrawal symptoms and had a host of other medical problems affecting his judgement and memory. The cross-examination that challengedHarris's assertions did not become part of the transcript upon which the jurywould decide his guilt or innocence. The statements initially made in policecustody were inadmissible to convict him, since they qualified as evidence not obtained within proper legal guidelines. This was a recent development inAmerican criminal law known as the Miranda warnings.
Miranda v. Arizona
In a significant Supreme Court decision of 1966, the Court ruled that evidence, such as confessional statements made to police, could not be used in courtif the defendant had not been informed of his right to a lawyer, as well asinstructed that anything he or she said could be used against them in court.It gave suspects the option of remaining silent and let them know that if they could not afford a lawyer, one would be provided free of charge. These admonitions came to be known as the Miranda warnings and were designed tocurb potential police misconduct. Harris's interrogation happened before Miranda rule went into effect, but the rules governing whether or not statements had been "coerced" still applied in his case.
Miranda was a controversial Supreme Court decision at the time, issuedby the Warren Court, a liberal-leaning majority led by Chief Justice Earl Warren. During the 1968 presidential campaign, Republican candidate Richard M.Nixon condemned the Warren Court and its liberal slant. During his first termin office, Nixon was able to appoint replacements for retiring justices, naming Burger chief justice and sending the conservative Blackmun to the bench.By the time Harris v. New York reached the High Court in 1971, these two, along with the three justices who had dissented in the Miranda case, formed a conservative "law-and-order" voting block.
Testifying Against Oneself
Harris's case tested whether statements made while in police custody--thoughconsidered legally inadmissible as a confession--could, however, be used to "impeach" (in this sense, to attack or discredit) a defendant's statements under oath. During that first trial, the judge instructed the jury that the statements Harris may or may not have made after his arrest should not be used todetermine evidence of his guilt, but rather to judge his credibility. The jury found him guilty of the second sale. Harris appealed to New York's state appellate court, claiming that the use of his earlier statements violated several rights guaranteed him by the U.S. Constitution, most importantly the Fifth Amendment, which holds that a person shall not be compelled to be a witnessagainst himself in a criminal trial. The appellate court rejected his argument as well, and it appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1971.
Decision on Harris
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that a defendant's statements, even though made without the obligatory Miranda warnings, were admissible in court to impeach his or her testimony. They cited other cases as legal precedent, specifically a 1954 Supreme Court decision that deemed knowledge of narcotics evidence taken in an illegalsearch (but not used to convict the person) was permitted to contradict a defendant's testimony in which he asserted that he had never been in possessionof drugs. Furthermore, Burger's opinion on Harris v. New York assertedthat exposing perjurious statements was a far more grave concern to the American justice system than any unsupported claim that this ruling might encourage police misconduct.
Opponents of the Harris v. New York decision criticized the ruling forits murky language and its reversal of all lower court decisions. They asserted that it gave little incentive for law-enforcement authorities to comply with the Miranda rules--for example, if police officers knew they mightobtain some sort of admissible statement, they might delay the moment in which they were compelled to ask the suspect if he wished to contact a lawyer. Criminal-rights advocates also pointed out that the Harris ruling, allowing such questioning, would discourage defendants from taking the stand in their own defense, a tactic that greatly improved their chances for acquittalin a jury trial.
Related Cases

• Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
  
• Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
  
• Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
  
• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
  
• Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
  
• Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).