Bute v. Illinois
Petitioner
Roy Bute
Respondent
State of Illinois
Petitioner's Claim
By not being advised of the right to legal counsel nor being asked if he desired legal counsel, petitioner was denied a fair, impartial trial under the provisions of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Victor Brudney
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
William C. Wines
Justices for the Court
Harold Burton (writing for the Court), Felix Frankfurter, Robert H. Jackson,Stanley Forman Reed, Fred Moore Vinson
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, William O. Douglas, Frank Murphy, Wiley Blount Rutledge
Place
Washington D.C.
Date of Decision
19 April 1948
Decision
Failure to advise the petitioner of his right to legal counsel did not invalidate his sentences; the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause did not require a state court to ask a defendant if he desired counsel nor was a state court required to offer counsel.
Significance
Although this decision was later reversed in 1963 by Gideon v. Wainwright, it provided lower courts with guidance regarding the rights of defendants in noncapital criminal proceedings. Hence, for a period of 15 years, noncapital criminal defendants were adjudicated even if the accused was not aware of the right to counsel and sometimes without being offered the opportunity tobe assigned a court-appointed attorney.
In 1938, the petitioner, Roy Bute, was twice-charged with a noncapital felony--taking indecent liberties with children. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 20 years in prison for each indictment. Eight years later, while servinghis sentence in the Illinois State Penitentiary, he filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of Illinois asking for a review of proceedings and circumstancesrelated to his trial. Bute's argument was that he was unfairly sentenced because he was denied representation by counsel--the court did not appoint an attorney to represent him. He was, therefore, rushed to trial without proper preparation and was not able to mount an adequate defense in court.
At the time he was indicted, Roy Bute, decided to represent himself in the Circuit Court of La Salle County, where the hearing took place. He was chargedwith taking indecent liberties with children under the age of 15, first withan 8-year-old girl and then with an 11-year-old girl. When Bute entered a guilty plea, the court explained the consequences and penalties which might proceed from his plea. Although the judge admonished that sentencing would proceed immediately if Bute remained steadfast in his guilty plea, Bute nonethelessindicated he understood that proceedings and wanted to continue. Unknowingly, by submitting to the immediate decision and sentencing of the court, Bute effectively waived his right to counsel. The court sentenced him to 20 years for each indictment and he was sent to the Illinois State Penitentiary to serve his sentence.
Eight years later, while serving his first 20-year term, Bute made an appealto the Supreme Court of Illinois and asked for a rehearing for each one of the charges and sentences adjudicated in the Illinois Supreme Court. Because the justice presiding over the lower court had not advised him of his right tolegal assistance, his petition claimed that he was rushed to trial and deprived of a fair, impartial hearing of his case. The right to representation by legal counsel, the petitioner claimed, was a guarantee to which he was entitled according to state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, found no merit in his claim and denied a rehearing.
In preparing their decision, the Supreme Court justices reviewed the statutory provisions under which the state of Illinois administered due process of law and traced the progression and procedural development of the case through Illinois courts. During the period of time in which Bute's trial was adjudicated, criminal case procedure for the state of Illinois was based on 1937 Illinois Revised Statues. Under those provisions, all litigants (especially the accused) were entitled to a specific set of rights: to be heard either in person or through legal counsel; to meet with witnesses; to bring witnesses who would provide supporting testimony; to have a speedy, public trial by jury; andto not be forced into self-incrimination.
The Code of Criminal Procedures for the state of Illinois stipulated that assignment of counsel was at the option of the accused. The Court thus held thata free interpretation of the Illinois code meant the state was not obligatedto assign counsel unless a defendant petitioned the court with a specific request for representation. Further, no evidence in the records of the petitioner's case led the justices to believe the petitioner did not have the abilityto understand what was being said in court. They concluded that, at the timethe trial took place, Roy Bute was fully aware of the crime he committed, was aware of all the facts presented at trial, was cognizant of the proceedings, and fully understood the gravity of the charges/sentences. (In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Vinson further supported the majority's convictionthat the petitioner had not been denied due process but had been fairly dealt with under provisions of state law. Roy Bute had appeared before the Illinois court on his own behalf, entered his plea of guilty and "persisted in hisdesire to do so," even after he had been advised by the court regarding the consequences and penalties which might result.)
The Court found that statutory provisions for criminal case procedure in Illinois courts were consistently applied to the petitioner's case. In comparingand contrasting court protocol of the (Illinois) state and federal courts, the justices found appropriate corollary. From the Sixth Amendment, federal courts derived the practice that in all criminal procedures, the accused had theright to be assisted by legal counsel. While Illinois, at the time of Bute'strial, exercised criminal court procedure uniquely apart from federal practice, the Court found the state, like federal courts, embraced consistent, legal protocol. Cases in which the accused pleaded guilty were labeled "instant cases" according to Illinois statute. Instant cases required that a guilty plea not be entered until the court fully explained the consequences of such a plea. If the accused still persisted in pleading guilty, only then would the plea be accepted and recorded. The court rendered immediate judgment and execution in the same way as if the defendant's case had been presented before a jury and they had rendered a guilty verdict.
Because majority justices felt that Illinois followed consistent procedure incriminal cases, they ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require thecourts of Illinois to apply the same practice applied in federal courts. Thedue process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require counsel for Roy Bute's defense because state courts are not obligated by the procedures that federal courts are obligated to follow. Although the justices acknowledgedthat federal courts were subject to strict guidelines regarding due processand, specifically, the right of legal representation, the justices held thatthe Fourteenth Amendment did not necessarily require states to provide legalcounsel if a defendant did not specifically so request. Neither were state courts (unlike federal courts) even bound to inform a defendant about the rightto legal counsel. Moreover, under the provisions of the Tenth Amendment, because each state was entitled to exercise jurisdiction over their own police powers and to control procedure undertaken in criminal trials in their own courts, the majority opinion reasoned that differences could concurrently existbetween court protocol and conduct of criminal cases at state and federal level.
Minority Opinion
The dissenting justices questioned the logic of Illinois court criminal procedure. Justice Douglas voiced the opinion of dissenting justices that if Bute's trial had been held in a federal court, it would have been mandatory to appoint counsel for him even if he did not ask for an attorney. Believing that the constitutional standards of fairness did not depend on what court conducted a trial, Justice Douglas opined that "the Bill of Rights was applicable toall courts at all times." Further, he reasoned, the main purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to further safeguard basic provisions contained in the Bill of Rights, specifically protection against infringement of personal rightswhether that be at federal or state level. Thus, minority justices failed tosee how an accused defendant could be denied counsel in the Illinois state court if, according to the U.S. Constitution, that benefit could not been taken away from him in a federal court.
Impact
The Supreme Court confirmed that state courts were not bound to follow federal court criminal procedure. Provisions of the Tenth Amendment gave states great latitude in the exercise of jurisdiction over judicial procedure undertaken in state courts. Unlike federal courts, which had to assign legal counsel for defendants who did not have an attorney, state courts were under no such obligation so long as the state's judicial protocol provided for appointment of counsel if specifically requested by a defendant. The Court also made clearthat states were not obliged to assign counsel automatically; neither were they obligated to inform the accused of any right to request counsel if the accused committed a noncapital crime. Thus, for the 15 years before this rulingwas struck down by Gideon v. Wainwright, the decision in Bute v. Illinois established that appointment of an attorney for the accused was not necessarily a fundamental right for defendants in state courts.
Related Cases
Self Representation
Sources
1991 Study of Self-Represented Litigants. American Bar Association.
Roy Bute
Respondent
State of Illinois
Petitioner's Claim
By not being advised of the right to legal counsel nor being asked if he desired legal counsel, petitioner was denied a fair, impartial trial under the provisions of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Victor Brudney
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
William C. Wines
Justices for the Court
Harold Burton (writing for the Court), Felix Frankfurter, Robert H. Jackson,Stanley Forman Reed, Fred Moore Vinson
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, William O. Douglas, Frank Murphy, Wiley Blount Rutledge
Place
Washington D.C.
Date of Decision
19 April 1948
Decision
Failure to advise the petitioner of his right to legal counsel did not invalidate his sentences; the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause did not require a state court to ask a defendant if he desired counsel nor was a state court required to offer counsel.
Significance
Although this decision was later reversed in 1963 by Gideon v. Wainwright, it provided lower courts with guidance regarding the rights of defendants in noncapital criminal proceedings. Hence, for a period of 15 years, noncapital criminal defendants were adjudicated even if the accused was not aware of the right to counsel and sometimes without being offered the opportunity tobe assigned a court-appointed attorney.
In 1938, the petitioner, Roy Bute, was twice-charged with a noncapital felony--taking indecent liberties with children. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 20 years in prison for each indictment. Eight years later, while servinghis sentence in the Illinois State Penitentiary, he filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of Illinois asking for a review of proceedings and circumstancesrelated to his trial. Bute's argument was that he was unfairly sentenced because he was denied representation by counsel--the court did not appoint an attorney to represent him. He was, therefore, rushed to trial without proper preparation and was not able to mount an adequate defense in court.
At the time he was indicted, Roy Bute, decided to represent himself in the Circuit Court of La Salle County, where the hearing took place. He was chargedwith taking indecent liberties with children under the age of 15, first withan 8-year-old girl and then with an 11-year-old girl. When Bute entered a guilty plea, the court explained the consequences and penalties which might proceed from his plea. Although the judge admonished that sentencing would proceed immediately if Bute remained steadfast in his guilty plea, Bute nonethelessindicated he understood that proceedings and wanted to continue. Unknowingly, by submitting to the immediate decision and sentencing of the court, Bute effectively waived his right to counsel. The court sentenced him to 20 years for each indictment and he was sent to the Illinois State Penitentiary to serve his sentence.
Eight years later, while serving his first 20-year term, Bute made an appealto the Supreme Court of Illinois and asked for a rehearing for each one of the charges and sentences adjudicated in the Illinois Supreme Court. Because the justice presiding over the lower court had not advised him of his right tolegal assistance, his petition claimed that he was rushed to trial and deprived of a fair, impartial hearing of his case. The right to representation by legal counsel, the petitioner claimed, was a guarantee to which he was entitled according to state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, found no merit in his claim and denied a rehearing.
In preparing their decision, the Supreme Court justices reviewed the statutory provisions under which the state of Illinois administered due process of law and traced the progression and procedural development of the case through Illinois courts. During the period of time in which Bute's trial was adjudicated, criminal case procedure for the state of Illinois was based on 1937 Illinois Revised Statues. Under those provisions, all litigants (especially the accused) were entitled to a specific set of rights: to be heard either in person or through legal counsel; to meet with witnesses; to bring witnesses who would provide supporting testimony; to have a speedy, public trial by jury; andto not be forced into self-incrimination.
The Code of Criminal Procedures for the state of Illinois stipulated that assignment of counsel was at the option of the accused. The Court thus held thata free interpretation of the Illinois code meant the state was not obligatedto assign counsel unless a defendant petitioned the court with a specific request for representation. Further, no evidence in the records of the petitioner's case led the justices to believe the petitioner did not have the abilityto understand what was being said in court. They concluded that, at the timethe trial took place, Roy Bute was fully aware of the crime he committed, was aware of all the facts presented at trial, was cognizant of the proceedings, and fully understood the gravity of the charges/sentences. (In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Vinson further supported the majority's convictionthat the petitioner had not been denied due process but had been fairly dealt with under provisions of state law. Roy Bute had appeared before the Illinois court on his own behalf, entered his plea of guilty and "persisted in hisdesire to do so," even after he had been advised by the court regarding the consequences and penalties which might result.)
The Court found that statutory provisions for criminal case procedure in Illinois courts were consistently applied to the petitioner's case. In comparingand contrasting court protocol of the (Illinois) state and federal courts, the justices found appropriate corollary. From the Sixth Amendment, federal courts derived the practice that in all criminal procedures, the accused had theright to be assisted by legal counsel. While Illinois, at the time of Bute'strial, exercised criminal court procedure uniquely apart from federal practice, the Court found the state, like federal courts, embraced consistent, legal protocol. Cases in which the accused pleaded guilty were labeled "instant cases" according to Illinois statute. Instant cases required that a guilty plea not be entered until the court fully explained the consequences of such a plea. If the accused still persisted in pleading guilty, only then would the plea be accepted and recorded. The court rendered immediate judgment and execution in the same way as if the defendant's case had been presented before a jury and they had rendered a guilty verdict.
Because majority justices felt that Illinois followed consistent procedure incriminal cases, they ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require thecourts of Illinois to apply the same practice applied in federal courts. Thedue process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require counsel for Roy Bute's defense because state courts are not obligated by the procedures that federal courts are obligated to follow. Although the justices acknowledgedthat federal courts were subject to strict guidelines regarding due processand, specifically, the right of legal representation, the justices held thatthe Fourteenth Amendment did not necessarily require states to provide legalcounsel if a defendant did not specifically so request. Neither were state courts (unlike federal courts) even bound to inform a defendant about the rightto legal counsel. Moreover, under the provisions of the Tenth Amendment, because each state was entitled to exercise jurisdiction over their own police powers and to control procedure undertaken in criminal trials in their own courts, the majority opinion reasoned that differences could concurrently existbetween court protocol and conduct of criminal cases at state and federal level.
Minority Opinion
The dissenting justices questioned the logic of Illinois court criminal procedure. Justice Douglas voiced the opinion of dissenting justices that if Bute's trial had been held in a federal court, it would have been mandatory to appoint counsel for him even if he did not ask for an attorney. Believing that the constitutional standards of fairness did not depend on what court conducted a trial, Justice Douglas opined that "the Bill of Rights was applicable toall courts at all times." Further, he reasoned, the main purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to further safeguard basic provisions contained in the Bill of Rights, specifically protection against infringement of personal rightswhether that be at federal or state level. Thus, minority justices failed tosee how an accused defendant could be denied counsel in the Illinois state court if, according to the U.S. Constitution, that benefit could not been taken away from him in a federal court.
Impact
The Supreme Court confirmed that state courts were not bound to follow federal court criminal procedure. Provisions of the Tenth Amendment gave states great latitude in the exercise of jurisdiction over judicial procedure undertaken in state courts. Unlike federal courts, which had to assign legal counsel for defendants who did not have an attorney, state courts were under no such obligation so long as the state's judicial protocol provided for appointment of counsel if specifically requested by a defendant. The Court also made clearthat states were not obliged to assign counsel automatically; neither were they obligated to inform the accused of any right to request counsel if the accused committed a noncapital crime. Thus, for the 15 years before this rulingwas struck down by Gideon v. Wainwright, the decision in Bute v. Illinois established that appointment of an attorney for the accused was not necessarily a fundamental right for defendants in state courts.
Related Cases
- Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
- Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
- Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
- Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
- Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Self Representation
- Sixty-one percent of middle-income people with legal problems have had no interaction with the country's judicial system.
- More than half of couples going through a divorce received it without legal representation.
- In 88 percent of divorce cases at least one party was self-representedor defaulted.
- People earning less than $50,000 a year are more likely to represent themselves in court.
- At least 20 percent of litigantswho represent themselves in court can afford legal representation, but do notwant professional help.
- People who represent themselves in court tend to more satisfied with the judicial system than those who obtain legal representation.
- Nearly 75 percent of individuals who have represented themselves in court say they would do so again.
Sources
1991 Study of Self-Represented Litigants. American Bar Association.
Further Readings
- Biskupic, Joan, and Elder Witt, eds. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996.
User Comments Add a comment…