Petitioner
Morris A. Kent, Jr.
Respondent
United States
Petitioner's Claim
That the juvenile court order that sent Kent's case to trial in regular criminal court was invalid.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
Myron G. Ehrlich, Richard Arens
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Theodore George Gilinsky
Justices for the Court
William J. Brennan, Jr., Tom C. Clark, William O. Douglas, Abe Fortas (writing for the Court), Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
21 March 1966
Decision
That the waiver was indeed invalid, and the case was sent back to district court for a rehearing on its validity.
Significance
The Court's ruling ushered in an era of reform in the juvenile legal system that granted increasing constitutional protections to minors.
The first mention of District of Columbia resident Morris A. Kent, Jr., in that city's juvenile court records came in 1959. At the age of 14 Kent had beenarrested for several incidents of housebreaking and one of robbery. The juvenile court judge placed him on probation. Two years later, a woman was rapedand robbed by an intruder in her home. Fingerprints taken from the scene matched those provided by Kent in 1959 at the time of his first arrest. He was taken into custody and questioned.
A Social Ill
The problem with Kent's case, however, was that it was technically less a "crime" than a "social problem" under the formative guidelines of the juvenile court system. The early twentieth century heralded the formal creation of a separate judicial system for youthful offenders in the United States. Its aim was rehabilitation rather than punishment, and the juvenile courts were designed to provide a framework of support with this in mind. Social workers, probation officers, and psychologists--ruled over by a trained and sympathetic judge--would provide the offender with the necessary assistance to improve himself and stay out of trouble. Juvenile offenses were considered a social problem, not an infraction against society. The juvenile justice system was designed as an exchange of sorts: minors did not enjoy the same rights as adult defendants, but were treated more leniently. To grant them the equal protection dictated by the Constitution would have hindered the system's ability to provide rehabilitation.
Kent's mother obtained a lawyer, and a caseworker from juvenile court met with the attorney and advised him that they were considering "waiving" the case--that is, passing it over to the U.S. district court. There, Kent would be tried as an adult for all the offenses. The lawyer requested a hearing on the waiver, and also filed a request for access to the Social Services file that had been kept on Kent during his probation period. Meanwhile, Kent remained inthe District of Columbia's Receiving Home for Children for a week, without being formally arraigned on any charges. For adults, such detention without arraignment is considered unlawful under the Constitution.
Emotionally Ill
Kent's counsel also asked that his client be moved to another facility for psychiatric evaluation, and this was done. Staff at two hospitals wrote reportsdescribing Kent as severely emotionally ill. However, instead of the waiverhearing his attorney had requested, the juvenile court judge issued an orderwaiving jurisdiction on the basis of a "full investigation," and the case moved to district court.
At the regular criminal court Kent faced the charges of housebreaking, robbery and rape as an adult. His counsel motioned to dismiss the charges, claimingthe waiver that landed him in district court was invalid, since it did not encompass a "full investigation" as dictated by the Juvenile Court Act. The motion was denied, and Kent was found guilty on the housebreaking and robbery charges and sentenced to 30 to 90 years. The case was appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the waiver and thejudge's waiver order valid, and upheld the convictions. It was appealed againand came before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1966 as Kent v. United States.
In a 5-4 decision delivered on 21 March 1966 by Justice Fortas, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' rulings. It found that proper procedure had not been followed when the juvenile court judge waived jurisdiction. Furthermore, whether or not an offender should be tried as an adult--a portentous possibility--could not be determined without some representation on behalf of theyouth present.
A System Ill
More importantly than just ruling that juvenile offenders had the right to awaiver hearing, as well as access to their Social Service records, Fortas's opinion brought a new era of change to the juvenile justice system in the United States. The ruling, in essence, allowed that certain due-process procedures must still be followed even though a juvenile court case is technically a civil case, not a criminal one. The denial to Kent of certain safeguards normally allowed adult criminal defendants--evidenced by his week-long detention before arraignment--and then the arbitrary ruling that placed him in the muchmore severe realm of the adult criminal courts--seemed a definite factor in the decision. Fortas wrote of the abysmal state of the juvenile court system on the whole, and maintained that trade-off had not worked, and in effect, youthful offenders received neither constitutional protection nor the rehabilitative, lenient treatment that prevented them from growing into adult offenders. Justice Stewart and three of his colleagues on the bench dissented, asserting the case should have been sent to a court of appeals.
The Kent case was one of several significant Supreme Court decisions that granted minors charged with crimes the same guarantees as adult defendants. In essence, it began to treat an entire group as citizens, after several decades of denying them constitutional protections. This trend was reversed with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), which denied the right to a jury trial for minors.
Related Cases
Juvenile Justice; or How a Survey Can Influence an Act of Congress
In 1966, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) conducted a survey of juvenile and adult facilities, as well as aspects of juvenile probation and aftercare. From this pivotal study emerged, eight years later, elementsof the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974.
At the time the NCCD conducted its survey, only seven percent of the nation'sjuvenile court jurisdictions possessed juvenile facilities. Within the existing facilities, the study found overcrowding and abusive conditions. A numberof other concerns emerged over the course of the survey, and at its completion the NCCD made several recommendations for "a revised philosophy of the juvenile court," as well as for the correctional system and other aspects of juvenile justice.
Congress in 1974 built four of the NCCD's specific recommendations into the JJDP. A quarter of a century later, most U.S. states and territories were in compliance with these four: deinstitutionalization of status offenders (54 states and territories in full compliance); separation of juveniles from adultsin confinement (53 states and territories); jail and lockup removal (53 states and territories); and reduction in the disproportionate confinement of minorities (28 states are nearing full compliance, and others are at various stages.)
Sources
Howell, James C. "NCCD's Survey of Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facilities." Crime & Delinquency, January 1998.
Morris A. Kent, Jr.
Respondent
United States
Petitioner's Claim
That the juvenile court order that sent Kent's case to trial in regular criminal court was invalid.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
Myron G. Ehrlich, Richard Arens
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Theodore George Gilinsky
Justices for the Court
William J. Brennan, Jr., Tom C. Clark, William O. Douglas, Abe Fortas (writing for the Court), Earl Warren
Justices Dissenting
Hugo Lafayette Black, John Marshall Harlan II, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
21 March 1966
Decision
That the waiver was indeed invalid, and the case was sent back to district court for a rehearing on its validity.
Significance
The Court's ruling ushered in an era of reform in the juvenile legal system that granted increasing constitutional protections to minors.
The first mention of District of Columbia resident Morris A. Kent, Jr., in that city's juvenile court records came in 1959. At the age of 14 Kent had beenarrested for several incidents of housebreaking and one of robbery. The juvenile court judge placed him on probation. Two years later, a woman was rapedand robbed by an intruder in her home. Fingerprints taken from the scene matched those provided by Kent in 1959 at the time of his first arrest. He was taken into custody and questioned.
A Social Ill
The problem with Kent's case, however, was that it was technically less a "crime" than a "social problem" under the formative guidelines of the juvenile court system. The early twentieth century heralded the formal creation of a separate judicial system for youthful offenders in the United States. Its aim was rehabilitation rather than punishment, and the juvenile courts were designed to provide a framework of support with this in mind. Social workers, probation officers, and psychologists--ruled over by a trained and sympathetic judge--would provide the offender with the necessary assistance to improve himself and stay out of trouble. Juvenile offenses were considered a social problem, not an infraction against society. The juvenile justice system was designed as an exchange of sorts: minors did not enjoy the same rights as adult defendants, but were treated more leniently. To grant them the equal protection dictated by the Constitution would have hindered the system's ability to provide rehabilitation.
Kent's mother obtained a lawyer, and a caseworker from juvenile court met with the attorney and advised him that they were considering "waiving" the case--that is, passing it over to the U.S. district court. There, Kent would be tried as an adult for all the offenses. The lawyer requested a hearing on the waiver, and also filed a request for access to the Social Services file that had been kept on Kent during his probation period. Meanwhile, Kent remained inthe District of Columbia's Receiving Home for Children for a week, without being formally arraigned on any charges. For adults, such detention without arraignment is considered unlawful under the Constitution.
Emotionally Ill
Kent's counsel also asked that his client be moved to another facility for psychiatric evaluation, and this was done. Staff at two hospitals wrote reportsdescribing Kent as severely emotionally ill. However, instead of the waiverhearing his attorney had requested, the juvenile court judge issued an orderwaiving jurisdiction on the basis of a "full investigation," and the case moved to district court.
At the regular criminal court Kent faced the charges of housebreaking, robbery and rape as an adult. His counsel motioned to dismiss the charges, claimingthe waiver that landed him in district court was invalid, since it did not encompass a "full investigation" as dictated by the Juvenile Court Act. The motion was denied, and Kent was found guilty on the housebreaking and robbery charges and sentenced to 30 to 90 years. The case was appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the waiver and thejudge's waiver order valid, and upheld the convictions. It was appealed againand came before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1966 as Kent v. United States.
In a 5-4 decision delivered on 21 March 1966 by Justice Fortas, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' rulings. It found that proper procedure had not been followed when the juvenile court judge waived jurisdiction. Furthermore, whether or not an offender should be tried as an adult--a portentous possibility--could not be determined without some representation on behalf of theyouth present.
A System Ill
More importantly than just ruling that juvenile offenders had the right to awaiver hearing, as well as access to their Social Service records, Fortas's opinion brought a new era of change to the juvenile justice system in the United States. The ruling, in essence, allowed that certain due-process procedures must still be followed even though a juvenile court case is technically a civil case, not a criminal one. The denial to Kent of certain safeguards normally allowed adult criminal defendants--evidenced by his week-long detention before arraignment--and then the arbitrary ruling that placed him in the muchmore severe realm of the adult criminal courts--seemed a definite factor in the decision. Fortas wrote of the abysmal state of the juvenile court system on the whole, and maintained that trade-off had not worked, and in effect, youthful offenders received neither constitutional protection nor the rehabilitative, lenient treatment that prevented them from growing into adult offenders. Justice Stewart and three of his colleagues on the bench dissented, asserting the case should have been sent to a court of appeals.
The Kent case was one of several significant Supreme Court decisions that granted minors charged with crimes the same guarantees as adult defendants. In essence, it began to treat an entire group as citizens, after several decades of denying them constitutional protections. This trend was reversed with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), which denied the right to a jury trial for minors.
Related Cases
- In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
- McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, In re burrus, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
- Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Juvenile Justice; or How a Survey Can Influence an Act of Congress
In 1966, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) conducted a survey of juvenile and adult facilities, as well as aspects of juvenile probation and aftercare. From this pivotal study emerged, eight years later, elementsof the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974.
At the time the NCCD conducted its survey, only seven percent of the nation'sjuvenile court jurisdictions possessed juvenile facilities. Within the existing facilities, the study found overcrowding and abusive conditions. A numberof other concerns emerged over the course of the survey, and at its completion the NCCD made several recommendations for "a revised philosophy of the juvenile court," as well as for the correctional system and other aspects of juvenile justice.
Congress in 1974 built four of the NCCD's specific recommendations into the JJDP. A quarter of a century later, most U.S. states and territories were in compliance with these four: deinstitutionalization of status offenders (54 states and territories in full compliance); separation of juveniles from adultsin confinement (53 states and territories); jail and lockup removal (53 states and territories); and reduction in the disproportionate confinement of minorities (28 states are nearing full compliance, and others are at various stages.)
Sources
Howell, James C. "NCCD's Survey of Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facilities." Crime & Delinquency, January 1998.
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