Petitioner
United States
Respondent
Guy Ursery
Petitioner's Claim
That "in rem" civil property forfeiture proceedings, combined with a prison sentence for "manufacturing" marijuana, did not constitute double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Drew S. Days III, U.S. Solicitor General
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
Lawrence Robbins, David Michael, Jeffry K. Finer
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
24 June 1996
Decision
That, according to a two-part test which found that the property forfeiture was civil and remedial, not criminal and punitive, the seizure of property didnot constitute a "punishment" as such; hence, this was not a case of doublejeopardy.
Significance
United States v. Ursery, along with other cases in the mid-1990s suchas Bennis v. Michigan (1996), served notice that the Supreme Court waswilling to marshal every bit of constitutional firepower that it could against drug dealers and people involved in criminal activity--even, in the case of Bennis, people unknowingly or unwillingly involved in that activity.Many had cause to applaud this move to uphold law and order and the power ofthe states against criminals; others questioned the government's ability toseize property from a citizen, even a lawbreaker.
Guy Ursery Grows His Own
Guy Ursery grew his own marijuana, but this Flint, Michigan, auto worker wasnot a drug dealer. "The most you could say was he was giving it to friends,"his attorney later told the Los Angeles Times. On his property, Urseryhad some 142 marijuana plants, none more than two feet tall, according to police who raided his place on a tip from the former girlfriend of Ursery's son. Inside the house, authorities found marijuana seeds, stems, stalks, and a "grow light" for enhancing plant growth. The federal government instituted forfeiture proceedings against the house, because it had been used to facilitatethe processing of a controlled substance. Ursery settled the forfeiture claim with the federal government, paying $13,250; but just before the settlement, he was indicted for manufacturing marijuana and sentenced to five years, three months in jail.
The question before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was whether, by seizing his property and sending him to prison, the federal government hadviolated the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. The latter states thatno person may be tried twice for the same crime: " . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . " Even though Ursery had not ultimately forfeited his property, he hadpaid what amounted to a sizeable fine, and had then been subjected to imprisonment. In the eyes of the court, this constituted double jeopardy.
Around the same time, a case with some similarities to Ursery's came to the attention of the government. Charles Wesley Arlt and James Wren had been convicted of conspiracy to aid and abet the manufacture of methamphetamine, a stimulant, in violation of federal law. They were also convicted on conspiracy tolaunder money, and on various money-laundering counts. Arlt received a lifesentence plus ten years of supervised release, along with a fine of $250,000.Wren got a life sentence and a five-year term of supervised release. Beforethe end of the criminal trial, the United States filed an in rem, or civil property forfeiture, action against Arlt, Wren, and Payback Mines, a corporation controlled by Arlt. According to 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(A), "Any property . . . involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of [money-laundering statutes] is subject to forfeiture to the United States." Furthermore, 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6) provides that "All . . . things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for illegal drugs. . . all proceeds traceable to such an exchange . . . [and] all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to facilitate" a federaldrug felony, shall be forfeited.
The various parties in the Arlt-Wren matter agreed to defer litigation over the civil forfeiture action until the end of the criminal case. More than a year after the conclusion of that trial, by which time Arlt and Wren were behind bars, the district court granted the federal government's motion for summary judgment. Arlt and Wren appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the double-jeopardy grounds. Given the similarities to theUrsery case--although there were crucial differences, including the fact that Ursery was manufacturing drugs for his own use, not to mention the serious differences in potency between marijuana and methamphetamines--the U.S.Supreme Court agreed to review them together.
Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms
The Court ruled by an 8-1 vote that in rem civil forfeiture proceedings were neither "punishment" nor criminal in nature; hence the seizure of property, combined with prison sentences, did not constitute double jeopardy. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that federal authorities had Congress's authorization to conduct parallel civil and criminal actions, a history that went back at least to The Palmyra (1827). Citing cases such as Various Items of Personal Property v. United States (1931),One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States (1972), and United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms (1984), Rehnquist observed that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to forfeiture because it did not impose "punishment." Most recently, in 89 Firearms, the Court had applied a two-part test in considering whether a forfeiture was barred by prior criminalproceedings. It asked itself first "whether Congress intended the particularforfeiture to be a remedial civil sanction or a criminal penalty"; and second"whether the forfeiture proceedings are so punitive in fact as to establishthat they may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature," regardless of Congress's intent. If the action was a civil sanction that could not be judged"punitive," then it did not constitute double jeopardy.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that in analysis of various of the above-mentioned cases, "the conclusion was the same in each case: in rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines . . . " In personam penalties punish the person; in rem penalties "punish" the property, whichis no punishment at all. Rather, it is a remedial action, or one aimed at remedying a situation. The courts of appeals, Rehnquist wrote, had misunderstoodthe Supreme Court's rulings in United States v. Halper (1989), Austin v. United States (1993), and Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch (1994). They read them to imply that civil forfeitures did constitute double jeopardy when combined with imprisonment. "It would have beenremarkable," he wrote, "for the Court both to have held unconstitutional a well-established practice, and to have overruled a long line of precedent, without having even suggested that it was doing so." Those cases were different,involving respectively in personam civil penalties, civil forfeitures,and a punitive state tax on marijuana. Halper and Kurth Ranchat least involved the Double Jeopardy Clause, and Austin addressed civil forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, butonly the present case was concerned with in rem civil forfeitures under the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. (Austin, to which several justices would refer in concurrence or dissent, involved an attempt by thefederal government to seize a mobile home and auto body shop from a man convicted of selling two grams of cocaine. The Court overruled the lower court onthe grounds that the Eighth Amendment limited federal power to seize assets.)
Finally, the chief justice applied the 89 Firearms test to the presentcase. First, Sections 881 and 981, he wrote, had clearly been intended by Congress to serve civil functions. And second, there was little evidence to suggest that the forfeiture actions were punitive enough to earn them the labelof criminal, rather than civil, proceedings. Austin, Halper, and Kurth Ranch did not have as much bearing on the present case as thepetitioners had hoped. However, the statutes in question in the present casewere not substantially different from those upheld in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms. Four other factors gave further support to the understanding of 881 and 981 as non-punitive. First, in rem civil forfeiture had not been historically viewed as punishment. Second, the government was not required by the statute to demonstrate scienter(criminal intent), which further distinguished the statutes from criminal ones. Third, the seizure could serve civil goals in addition to its criminal deterrent aims. And fourth, the fact that 881 and 981 were "tied to criminal activity is insufficient in itself to render them punitive."
Concurrence and Dissent: Standing Austin on Its Head
Justice Kennedy issued a concurring opinion in which he reviewed the historyof past cases and showed why the Court's holding in the present action was consistent with its judgment not only in Austin, but also in Librettiv. United States (1995). "Forfeiture," he wrote, " . . . punishes an owner by taking property involved in a crime, and it may happen that the owner is also the wrongdoer charged with a criminal offense. But the forfeiture is not a second in personam punishment for the offense." Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment, holding that "the DoubleJeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecution, not successive punishment."In other words, one could receive more than a single punishment for a crime,but should not be tried twice for the same offense.
Justice Stevens concurred in part of the judgment-with regard to Arlt and Wren--and dissented in part of the judgment involving Ursery. "Because the numerous federal statutes authorizing forfeitures cover such a wide variety of situations," he wrote, "it is quite wrong to assume that there is only one answer to [the] question" of whether the actions against Ursery and the two othersconstituted double jeopardy. Justice Stevens then went on to establish crucial differences between Ursery's case and that of the two other men. The $405,089.23 seized from Arlt and Wren had come directly from criminal activity; whereas "none of the property seized in No. 95-345 [Ursery] constitutedproceeds of an illegal activity."
Looking closely at the facts, Justice Stevens noted a number of problems withthe case against Ursery. "Respondent Ursery," who "cultivated marijuana in aheavily wooded area not far from his home in Shiawassee County, Michigan," did so purely for the purpose of supplying his family with marijuana: "there is no evidence, and no contention by the Government, that he sold any of it tothird parties." Acting on the basis of the incorrect assumption that the marijuana plants were on respondent's property, the Michigan State Police executed a warrant to search the premises." The fact that they seized the grow light and other items used in the actual criminal activity, Justice Stevens suggested, was lawful. But the government overstepped the bounds when it attemptedto seize Ursery's house, because "There is no evidence that the house had been purchased with the proceeds of unlawful activity[,] and the house itself was surely not contraband." Justice Stevens then proceeded to address the government's four arguments supporting the seizure of the home, first establishing in his view that the forfeiture was punitive in nature.
After reviewing Austin, a decision which he held that the Court "todaystands . . . on its head," Justice Stevens wrote, "Even if the point had notbeen settled by prior decisions, common sense would dictate the result in this case. There is simply no rational basis for characterizing the seizure ofthis respondent's home as anything other than punishment for his crime." He further questioned the majority's view that "There is some mystical differencebetween in rem and in personam proceedings, such that only thelatter can give rise to double jeopardy concerns." He further took issue with the government's view "that the word `jeopardy' refers only to a criminal proceeding." Justice Stevens concluded by referring to Various Items and other Prohibition-Era decisions cited by the Court in the present ruling. "Consider how drastic the remedy would have been," he observed, "if Congress in 1931 had authorized the forfeiture of every home in which alcoholic beverages were consumed."
Impact
Justice Stevens may have been the only dissenter on the Supreme Court in Ursery, but he was far from the only American alarmed by the Court's ruling in the case. The decision reflected a law-and-order trend which, while it may have responded to genuine threats to the public order posed by drug dealers, appeared to catch relatively innocent people in its snares as well. Thus,in a related 1996 decision, Bennis v. Michigan, the Court held that acar used for an illegal act--sex with a prostitute, could be seized even if the co-owner of the car had no knowledge of the illegal activities. This was anew trend, a change from the civil-libertarian stance of Austin, noted both by Justice Stevens and David G. Savage of the Los Angeles Times, who wrote, " . . . Monday's decision is something of a surprise. Three years ago, the justices moved to rein in the aggressive use of civil forfeiture."William R. Schroeder in The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin noted "A decline in the use of asset forfeiture by federal law enforcement over the past2 years" which had "prompted this reinvigoration effort." Mark Feldman, a former federal prosecutor, likewise told National Public Radio just after the ruling, "I think the government will be enormously emboldened, relieved, as a result of this opinion, and you'll see--we will all see the number of seizuresand forfeiture cases increase substantially." In an ABA Journal article, John Gibeaut used the title of a popular 1960s song whose protagonist hassmoked too much marijuana--"One Toke Over the Line"--to suggest that the federal government's Ursery ruling would have far-ranging implications for civil liberties. The decision could be used to defeat double-jeopardy challenges by drunk drivers and sex offenders, as Gibeaut indicated; but it was quite possible that in future cases it could be wielded against more mainstreamelements of society as well.
Related Cases
Criminal Cases v. Civil Cases
In a typical civil case, a person files suit against another person or groupof persons, claiming that he or she has suffered some kind of harm or injury.The case is tried to determine if such injury has in fact occurred and to provide a legal remedy. Although the remedy sought may involve forcing the defendant to perform a certain act, or to cease certain activities, the usual remedy sought is a money settlement, and if found guilty the defendant is not imprisoned.
Criminal cases are initiated by the state against an individual or group forconduct deemed offensive to society, such as theft or murder. Defendants found guilty in criminal cases may be imprisoned as well as fined.
Since severe penalties, including death, may be imposed in criminal cases, criminal procedure is distinguished from civil procedure by the greater emphasis on the rights of the defendant. Further, the standard of proof is more stringent in criminal cases<-->the defendant must be proved guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt," whereas in civil cases the defendant may be found guilty bya "preponderance of the evidence."
Sources
Carp, Robert A. Judicial Procedure in America. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998.
The War on Drugs
The expression "War on Drugs" was popularized by President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, but it was President Richard M. Nixon who first described federal antidrug efforts as a "war." Between 1969, when Nixon became president, and 1983, the third year of Reagan's administration, annual federal spending on drug eradication grew from $37 million to $1.06 billion.
The government's "war," waged chiefly by the Drug Enforcement Administration(DEA) with help from a variety of federal and local agencies, was aimed at stopping drugs from entering the United States. These law-enforcement initiatives were augmented by the "Just Say No" public-relations campaign, whose spokesperson was First Lady Nancy Reagan. The private sector responded in 1986, when a group of advertising executives formed the nonprofit Partnership for a Drug-Free America. The latter launched a series of memorable antidrug advertising campaigns that included a spot comparing the brain of a drug user to an egg frying in a pan ("this is your brain on drugs").
The drug war has not been generally judged a success, and appraisals have been less than glowing: according to one estimate, in the years between 1987 to1992, when the federal government put $10 billion into the War on Drugs, druguse declined by one-tenth of one percent.
Sources
"Report on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy." United States Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov.
United States
Respondent
Guy Ursery
Petitioner's Claim
That "in rem" civil property forfeiture proceedings, combined with a prison sentence for "manufacturing" marijuana, did not constitute double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Drew S. Days III, U.S. Solicitor General
Chief Lawyers for Respondent
Lawrence Robbins, David Michael, Jeffry K. Finer
Justices for the Court
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
24 June 1996
Decision
That, according to a two-part test which found that the property forfeiture was civil and remedial, not criminal and punitive, the seizure of property didnot constitute a "punishment" as such; hence, this was not a case of doublejeopardy.
Significance
United States v. Ursery, along with other cases in the mid-1990s suchas Bennis v. Michigan (1996), served notice that the Supreme Court waswilling to marshal every bit of constitutional firepower that it could against drug dealers and people involved in criminal activity--even, in the case of Bennis, people unknowingly or unwillingly involved in that activity.Many had cause to applaud this move to uphold law and order and the power ofthe states against criminals; others questioned the government's ability toseize property from a citizen, even a lawbreaker.
Guy Ursery Grows His Own
Guy Ursery grew his own marijuana, but this Flint, Michigan, auto worker wasnot a drug dealer. "The most you could say was he was giving it to friends,"his attorney later told the Los Angeles Times. On his property, Urseryhad some 142 marijuana plants, none more than two feet tall, according to police who raided his place on a tip from the former girlfriend of Ursery's son. Inside the house, authorities found marijuana seeds, stems, stalks, and a "grow light" for enhancing plant growth. The federal government instituted forfeiture proceedings against the house, because it had been used to facilitatethe processing of a controlled substance. Ursery settled the forfeiture claim with the federal government, paying $13,250; but just before the settlement, he was indicted for manufacturing marijuana and sentenced to five years, three months in jail.
The question before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was whether, by seizing his property and sending him to prison, the federal government hadviolated the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. The latter states thatno person may be tried twice for the same crime: " . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . " Even though Ursery had not ultimately forfeited his property, he hadpaid what amounted to a sizeable fine, and had then been subjected to imprisonment. In the eyes of the court, this constituted double jeopardy.
Around the same time, a case with some similarities to Ursery's came to the attention of the government. Charles Wesley Arlt and James Wren had been convicted of conspiracy to aid and abet the manufacture of methamphetamine, a stimulant, in violation of federal law. They were also convicted on conspiracy tolaunder money, and on various money-laundering counts. Arlt received a lifesentence plus ten years of supervised release, along with a fine of $250,000.Wren got a life sentence and a five-year term of supervised release. Beforethe end of the criminal trial, the United States filed an in rem, or civil property forfeiture, action against Arlt, Wren, and Payback Mines, a corporation controlled by Arlt. According to 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(A), "Any property . . . involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of [money-laundering statutes] is subject to forfeiture to the United States." Furthermore, 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6) provides that "All . . . things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for illegal drugs. . . all proceeds traceable to such an exchange . . . [and] all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to facilitate" a federaldrug felony, shall be forfeited.
The various parties in the Arlt-Wren matter agreed to defer litigation over the civil forfeiture action until the end of the criminal case. More than a year after the conclusion of that trial, by which time Arlt and Wren were behind bars, the district court granted the federal government's motion for summary judgment. Arlt and Wren appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the double-jeopardy grounds. Given the similarities to theUrsery case--although there were crucial differences, including the fact that Ursery was manufacturing drugs for his own use, not to mention the serious differences in potency between marijuana and methamphetamines--the U.S.Supreme Court agreed to review them together.
Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms
The Court ruled by an 8-1 vote that in rem civil forfeiture proceedings were neither "punishment" nor criminal in nature; hence the seizure of property, combined with prison sentences, did not constitute double jeopardy. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that federal authorities had Congress's authorization to conduct parallel civil and criminal actions, a history that went back at least to The Palmyra (1827). Citing cases such as Various Items of Personal Property v. United States (1931),One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States (1972), and United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms (1984), Rehnquist observed that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply to forfeiture because it did not impose "punishment." Most recently, in 89 Firearms, the Court had applied a two-part test in considering whether a forfeiture was barred by prior criminalproceedings. It asked itself first "whether Congress intended the particularforfeiture to be a remedial civil sanction or a criminal penalty"; and second"whether the forfeiture proceedings are so punitive in fact as to establishthat they may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature," regardless of Congress's intent. If the action was a civil sanction that could not be judged"punitive," then it did not constitute double jeopardy.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that in analysis of various of the above-mentioned cases, "the conclusion was the same in each case: in rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines . . . " In personam penalties punish the person; in rem penalties "punish" the property, whichis no punishment at all. Rather, it is a remedial action, or one aimed at remedying a situation. The courts of appeals, Rehnquist wrote, had misunderstoodthe Supreme Court's rulings in United States v. Halper (1989), Austin v. United States (1993), and Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch (1994). They read them to imply that civil forfeitures did constitute double jeopardy when combined with imprisonment. "It would have beenremarkable," he wrote, "for the Court both to have held unconstitutional a well-established practice, and to have overruled a long line of precedent, without having even suggested that it was doing so." Those cases were different,involving respectively in personam civil penalties, civil forfeitures,and a punitive state tax on marijuana. Halper and Kurth Ranchat least involved the Double Jeopardy Clause, and Austin addressed civil forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, butonly the present case was concerned with in rem civil forfeitures under the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. (Austin, to which several justices would refer in concurrence or dissent, involved an attempt by thefederal government to seize a mobile home and auto body shop from a man convicted of selling two grams of cocaine. The Court overruled the lower court onthe grounds that the Eighth Amendment limited federal power to seize assets.)
Finally, the chief justice applied the 89 Firearms test to the presentcase. First, Sections 881 and 981, he wrote, had clearly been intended by Congress to serve civil functions. And second, there was little evidence to suggest that the forfeiture actions were punitive enough to earn them the labelof criminal, rather than civil, proceedings. Austin, Halper, and Kurth Ranch did not have as much bearing on the present case as thepetitioners had hoped. However, the statutes in question in the present casewere not substantially different from those upheld in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms. Four other factors gave further support to the understanding of 881 and 981 as non-punitive. First, in rem civil forfeiture had not been historically viewed as punishment. Second, the government was not required by the statute to demonstrate scienter(criminal intent), which further distinguished the statutes from criminal ones. Third, the seizure could serve civil goals in addition to its criminal deterrent aims. And fourth, the fact that 881 and 981 were "tied to criminal activity is insufficient in itself to render them punitive."
Concurrence and Dissent: Standing Austin on Its Head
Justice Kennedy issued a concurring opinion in which he reviewed the historyof past cases and showed why the Court's holding in the present action was consistent with its judgment not only in Austin, but also in Librettiv. United States (1995). "Forfeiture," he wrote, " . . . punishes an owner by taking property involved in a crime, and it may happen that the owner is also the wrongdoer charged with a criminal offense. But the forfeiture is not a second in personam punishment for the offense." Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment, holding that "the DoubleJeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecution, not successive punishment."In other words, one could receive more than a single punishment for a crime,but should not be tried twice for the same offense.
Justice Stevens concurred in part of the judgment-with regard to Arlt and Wren--and dissented in part of the judgment involving Ursery. "Because the numerous federal statutes authorizing forfeitures cover such a wide variety of situations," he wrote, "it is quite wrong to assume that there is only one answer to [the] question" of whether the actions against Ursery and the two othersconstituted double jeopardy. Justice Stevens then went on to establish crucial differences between Ursery's case and that of the two other men. The $405,089.23 seized from Arlt and Wren had come directly from criminal activity; whereas "none of the property seized in No. 95-345 [Ursery] constitutedproceeds of an illegal activity."
Looking closely at the facts, Justice Stevens noted a number of problems withthe case against Ursery. "Respondent Ursery," who "cultivated marijuana in aheavily wooded area not far from his home in Shiawassee County, Michigan," did so purely for the purpose of supplying his family with marijuana: "there is no evidence, and no contention by the Government, that he sold any of it tothird parties." Acting on the basis of the incorrect assumption that the marijuana plants were on respondent's property, the Michigan State Police executed a warrant to search the premises." The fact that they seized the grow light and other items used in the actual criminal activity, Justice Stevens suggested, was lawful. But the government overstepped the bounds when it attemptedto seize Ursery's house, because "There is no evidence that the house had been purchased with the proceeds of unlawful activity[,] and the house itself was surely not contraband." Justice Stevens then proceeded to address the government's four arguments supporting the seizure of the home, first establishing in his view that the forfeiture was punitive in nature.
After reviewing Austin, a decision which he held that the Court "todaystands . . . on its head," Justice Stevens wrote, "Even if the point had notbeen settled by prior decisions, common sense would dictate the result in this case. There is simply no rational basis for characterizing the seizure ofthis respondent's home as anything other than punishment for his crime." He further questioned the majority's view that "There is some mystical differencebetween in rem and in personam proceedings, such that only thelatter can give rise to double jeopardy concerns." He further took issue with the government's view "that the word `jeopardy' refers only to a criminal proceeding." Justice Stevens concluded by referring to Various Items and other Prohibition-Era decisions cited by the Court in the present ruling. "Consider how drastic the remedy would have been," he observed, "if Congress in 1931 had authorized the forfeiture of every home in which alcoholic beverages were consumed."
Impact
Justice Stevens may have been the only dissenter on the Supreme Court in Ursery, but he was far from the only American alarmed by the Court's ruling in the case. The decision reflected a law-and-order trend which, while it may have responded to genuine threats to the public order posed by drug dealers, appeared to catch relatively innocent people in its snares as well. Thus,in a related 1996 decision, Bennis v. Michigan, the Court held that acar used for an illegal act--sex with a prostitute, could be seized even if the co-owner of the car had no knowledge of the illegal activities. This was anew trend, a change from the civil-libertarian stance of Austin, noted both by Justice Stevens and David G. Savage of the Los Angeles Times, who wrote, " . . . Monday's decision is something of a surprise. Three years ago, the justices moved to rein in the aggressive use of civil forfeiture."William R. Schroeder in The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin noted "A decline in the use of asset forfeiture by federal law enforcement over the past2 years" which had "prompted this reinvigoration effort." Mark Feldman, a former federal prosecutor, likewise told National Public Radio just after the ruling, "I think the government will be enormously emboldened, relieved, as a result of this opinion, and you'll see--we will all see the number of seizuresand forfeiture cases increase substantially." In an ABA Journal article, John Gibeaut used the title of a popular 1960s song whose protagonist hassmoked too much marijuana--"One Toke Over the Line"--to suggest that the federal government's Ursery ruling would have far-ranging implications for civil liberties. The decision could be used to defeat double-jeopardy challenges by drunk drivers and sex offenders, as Gibeaut indicated; but it was quite possible that in future cases it could be wielded against more mainstreamelements of society as well.
Related Cases
- The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1 (1827).
- Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577(1931).
- One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
- United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
- United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
- Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
- Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
- Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995).
Criminal Cases v. Civil Cases
In a typical civil case, a person files suit against another person or groupof persons, claiming that he or she has suffered some kind of harm or injury.The case is tried to determine if such injury has in fact occurred and to provide a legal remedy. Although the remedy sought may involve forcing the defendant to perform a certain act, or to cease certain activities, the usual remedy sought is a money settlement, and if found guilty the defendant is not imprisoned.
Criminal cases are initiated by the state against an individual or group forconduct deemed offensive to society, such as theft or murder. Defendants found guilty in criminal cases may be imprisoned as well as fined.
Since severe penalties, including death, may be imposed in criminal cases, criminal procedure is distinguished from civil procedure by the greater emphasis on the rights of the defendant. Further, the standard of proof is more stringent in criminal cases<-->the defendant must be proved guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt," whereas in civil cases the defendant may be found guilty bya "preponderance of the evidence."
Sources
Carp, Robert A. Judicial Procedure in America. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998.
The War on Drugs
The expression "War on Drugs" was popularized by President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, but it was President Richard M. Nixon who first described federal antidrug efforts as a "war." Between 1969, when Nixon became president, and 1983, the third year of Reagan's administration, annual federal spending on drug eradication grew from $37 million to $1.06 billion.
The government's "war," waged chiefly by the Drug Enforcement Administration(DEA) with help from a variety of federal and local agencies, was aimed at stopping drugs from entering the United States. These law-enforcement initiatives were augmented by the "Just Say No" public-relations campaign, whose spokesperson was First Lady Nancy Reagan. The private sector responded in 1986, when a group of advertising executives formed the nonprofit Partnership for a Drug-Free America. The latter launched a series of memorable antidrug advertising campaigns that included a spot comparing the brain of a drug user to an egg frying in a pan ("this is your brain on drugs").
The drug war has not been generally judged a success, and appraisals have been less than glowing: according to one estimate, in the years between 1987 to1992, when the federal government put $10 billion into the War on Drugs, druguse declined by one-tenth of one percent.
Sources
"Report on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy." United States Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov.
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