Appellant
James Alphonzo Frye
Appellee
United States
Appellant's Claim
That the trial court erred when it refused the introduction of a systolic blood pressure deception test and expert testimony on the test as evidence.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
Richard V. Mattingly, Foster Wood
Chief Lawyers for Appellee
Peyton Gordon, J. H. Bilbrey
Justices for the Court
George Ewing Martin, Constantine J. Smyth, Josiah A. Van Orsdel (writing forthe court)
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
3 December 1923
Decision
Upheld the conviction of Frye by refusing to admit the deception test into evidence.
Significance
The ruling set a standard for the acceptance of expert testimony in court that, by the early 1970s, was adopted by almost all state and federal courts.
In 1923 James Alphonzo Frye appealed his conviction for second degree murder.Frye, who had confessed and later retracted his admission, had been prosecuted by the federal government and convicted by a jury sitting in a Washington,D.C. trial court. At trial, the court refused to let Frye introduce evidenceabout his truthfulness through a "systolic blood pressure deception test," acrude precursor to what is now popularly known as a lie detector or polygraph test. The court also refused to let Frye introduce an expert witness to testify about the deception test.
The sole basis of Frye's appeal was the failure of the trial court to admit the deception test. In a unanimous decision, the three-judge Court of Appealsof the District of Columbia ruled for the United States in a short opinion that became one of the most notorious opinions written by a federal appeals court.
In the opinion, written by Justice Van Orsdel, the court described how the machine operated and how, when attached to a subject, it supposedly could detect whether a subject was being deceptive. "It is asserted," said the court, "that blood pressure is influenced by change in the emotions of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system." Frye argued that systolic blood pressure rose in a predictable curve when a subject wasbeing deceptive and afraid that the falsehood could be detected. The curve,maintained Frye, corresponded "exactly to the struggle going on in the subject's mind, between fear and attempted control of that fear, as the examinationtouches the vital points in respect of which he is attempting to deceive theexaminer."
The court characterized the information offered by Frye as a "theory" holdingthat "truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in theblood pressure." As there were no prior similar cases for use as guidance, the court was left to make up a rule on the admissibility in court of deception tests. Frye insisted that the deception test could be explained by a witness who was an expert in the field, but the court rejected this with these now-famous words:
In the court's opinion, the systolic blood pressure deception test had not gained enough "standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities" to justify its admission as evidence in courts of law.The court approved of the exclusion of the deception test, and Frye's conviction was affirmed.
Impact
For years, lie detector tests were inadmissible as evidence in virtually allcourts. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, as the practice of lie detection gradually gained respect in the scientific community, some courts began to admitthe evidence in certain situations and for limited purposes in both criminaland civil trials. However, courts in most states continue to prohibit any and all forms of polygraph evidence.
On the topic of the admission of expert testimony, the formula in the Frye decision reigned supreme for 70 years. This was especially true in the early 1970s when, just before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, courts across the country began to cite Frye. The formula for admissibility of scientific evidence created by Frye--whether the practice or procedure was generally accepted in the scientific community--eventually proved too difficult for courts to manage as the scientific community expanded and progressed. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) the High Court held that admissibility of expert testimony should be controlled byRule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and that it need not be generallyaccepted in the scientific community to be admitted; rather, expert testimony should be admitted if it rests on a reliable scientific foundation and is relevant to the issue at hand.
Related Cases
The Polygraph
A polygraph machine measures an examinee's rate of heartbeat and blood pressure, perspiration, and breathing with various sensing devices. Questions are asked of the examinee while he or she is connected to the machine, and polygraph examiners claim to be able to detect when an examinee is not telling the truth by analysis of these measurements.
The American Polygraph Association claims that polygraph examinations are highly accurate when properly conducted, citing studies finding an average accuracy of 98 percent. According to the association, most of the controversy regarding accuracy involves differing interpretations of tests that are inconclusive: critics label inconclusive tests as inaccurate, while the association does not. Some critics claim the polygraph has no validity, however, and that trained persons may easily and consistently "beat" polygraph examinations.
Polygraph examination results may or may not be admissible in court, depending on the jurisdiction; often they are deemed admissible when both parties toa case agree on such admissibility before the test is administered. Some jurisdictions have specific rules on admissibility, and in others admissibility is at the discretion of the trial judge.
Sources
American Polygraph Association. http://www.polygraph.org
James Alphonzo Frye
Appellee
United States
Appellant's Claim
That the trial court erred when it refused the introduction of a systolic blood pressure deception test and expert testimony on the test as evidence.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
Richard V. Mattingly, Foster Wood
Chief Lawyers for Appellee
Peyton Gordon, J. H. Bilbrey
Justices for the Court
George Ewing Martin, Constantine J. Smyth, Josiah A. Van Orsdel (writing forthe court)
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
3 December 1923
Decision
Upheld the conviction of Frye by refusing to admit the deception test into evidence.
Significance
The ruling set a standard for the acceptance of expert testimony in court that, by the early 1970s, was adopted by almost all state and federal courts.
In 1923 James Alphonzo Frye appealed his conviction for second degree murder.Frye, who had confessed and later retracted his admission, had been prosecuted by the federal government and convicted by a jury sitting in a Washington,D.C. trial court. At trial, the court refused to let Frye introduce evidenceabout his truthfulness through a "systolic blood pressure deception test," acrude precursor to what is now popularly known as a lie detector or polygraph test. The court also refused to let Frye introduce an expert witness to testify about the deception test.
The sole basis of Frye's appeal was the failure of the trial court to admit the deception test. In a unanimous decision, the three-judge Court of Appealsof the District of Columbia ruled for the United States in a short opinion that became one of the most notorious opinions written by a federal appeals court.
In the opinion, written by Justice Van Orsdel, the court described how the machine operated and how, when attached to a subject, it supposedly could detect whether a subject was being deceptive. "It is asserted," said the court, "that blood pressure is influenced by change in the emotions of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by nervous impulses sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system." Frye argued that systolic blood pressure rose in a predictable curve when a subject wasbeing deceptive and afraid that the falsehood could be detected. The curve,maintained Frye, corresponded "exactly to the struggle going on in the subject's mind, between fear and attempted control of that fear, as the examinationtouches the vital points in respect of which he is attempting to deceive theexaminer."
The court characterized the information offered by Frye as a "theory" holdingthat "truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in theblood pressure." As there were no prior similar cases for use as guidance, the court was left to make up a rule on the admissibility in court of deception tests. Frye insisted that the deception test could be explained by a witness who was an expert in the field, but the court rejected this with these now-famous words:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult todefine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principlemust be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting experttestimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established tohave gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
In the court's opinion, the systolic blood pressure deception test had not gained enough "standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities" to justify its admission as evidence in courts of law.The court approved of the exclusion of the deception test, and Frye's conviction was affirmed.
Impact
For years, lie detector tests were inadmissible as evidence in virtually allcourts. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, as the practice of lie detection gradually gained respect in the scientific community, some courts began to admitthe evidence in certain situations and for limited purposes in both criminaland civil trials. However, courts in most states continue to prohibit any and all forms of polygraph evidence.
On the topic of the admission of expert testimony, the formula in the Frye decision reigned supreme for 70 years. This was especially true in the early 1970s when, just before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, courts across the country began to cite Frye. The formula for admissibility of scientific evidence created by Frye--whether the practice or procedure was generally accepted in the scientific community--eventually proved too difficult for courts to manage as the scientific community expanded and progressed. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) the High Court held that admissibility of expert testimony should be controlled byRule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and that it need not be generallyaccepted in the scientific community to be admitted; rather, expert testimony should be admitted if it rests on a reliable scientific foundation and is relevant to the issue at hand.
Related Cases
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
- United States v. Scheffer, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (1998).
The Polygraph
A polygraph machine measures an examinee's rate of heartbeat and blood pressure, perspiration, and breathing with various sensing devices. Questions are asked of the examinee while he or she is connected to the machine, and polygraph examiners claim to be able to detect when an examinee is not telling the truth by analysis of these measurements.
The American Polygraph Association claims that polygraph examinations are highly accurate when properly conducted, citing studies finding an average accuracy of 98 percent. According to the association, most of the controversy regarding accuracy involves differing interpretations of tests that are inconclusive: critics label inconclusive tests as inaccurate, while the association does not. Some critics claim the polygraph has no validity, however, and that trained persons may easily and consistently "beat" polygraph examinations.
Polygraph examination results may or may not be admissible in court, depending on the jurisdiction; often they are deemed admissible when both parties toa case agree on such admissibility before the test is administered. Some jurisdictions have specific rules on admissibility, and in others admissibility is at the discretion of the trial judge.
Sources
American Polygraph Association. http://www.polygraph.org
Further Readings
- Cushman, Robert F. Leading Constitutional Decisions. EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982.
- Green, Eric D., and Charles R. Nesson. "Expert Testimony, Scientific Proof, and Junk Science." Problems, Cases, and Materials on Evidence. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994.
- Lyons, Thomas. "Frye, Daubert, and Where Do We Go From Here?" Rhode Island Bar Journal, January 1997.
User Comments Add a comment…
about 1 month ago
james lealofisa_higano22 ((at)) yahoo dot com
what was the result of the case. the court decision?
about 1 month ago
james
how many courts did the frye case went through?
2 months ago
Angela Sa'o
How many courts did this case go through?
2 months ago
Angela Sa'o
is there any other resouces about this case, i need it for my class.
5 months ago
Lexy Green lexy_green8315 ((at)) yahoo dot com
What was the reason Frye was in court anyways, I'm doing a project on this case but everywhere i go just talk about the end of the court case.
over 2 years ago
John R. Fleming wimpydodo ((at)) yahoo dot com
Was there a Federal Law in the U.S. Constitution regulating Lie Detector Tests before the Appeals Court made a Ruling in Frye vs.United States in 1923? Thank You! Sincerely: John