Petitioner
State of Kentucky
Respondent
William Dennison, Governor of Ohio
Petitioner's Claim
That Governor Dennison should return to Kentucky the man, Willis Lago, who had allegedly helped a slave to escape and who had been indicted in Kentucky for what was a crime under the laws of that state.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
John W. Stevenson, Humphrey Marshall
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Ohio Attorney General Christopher P. Wolcott
Justices for the Court
John Archibald Campbell, John Catron, Nathan Clifford, Robert Cooper Grier, John McLean, Samuel Nelson, Roger Brooke Taney (writing for the Court), JamesMoore Wayne
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
14 March 1861
Decision
That although it was in fact Governor Dennison's duty to return a fugitive from justice to another state, as the executive authority of a state, he couldnot be coerced into doing so.
Significance
At the time, the decision was seen as a victory for Southern states' right todemand that Northern states support the institution of slavery. The decisionsupported the ability of a governor to refuse to extradite a fugitive from justice to another state until it was reversed by Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987).
The years before the Civil War were full of legal battles between the slave states and the free states. In 1793, Congress had passed a law providing for the return of fugitive slaves. This law drew on Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, which read:
In other words, if a person committed a crime in one state and ran away to another, the second state was supposed to return the person to the first state,where he or she could stand trial. Since running away from slavery was considered a crime in the slave states, a slave who ran away, or a person who helped a slave run away, was supposed to be returned to stand trial.
Of course, abolitionists--people who opposed slavery--objected to this use ofthe law. Since abolitionists believed that slavery was wrong, they wanted tohelp slaves escape to freedom. They wanted slaves to be able to remain in those parts of the United States where they could be free.
Who Decides?
In the early 1840s, the main controversy over this question had concerned NewYork Governor William H. Seward. Seward had refused to send to Virginia three free African American men who had allegedly helped a slave to escape to NewYork. Virginia, a slave state, pointed out that each state had the right todecide what was legal and what was not. Since helping a slave to escape was illegal in Virginia, Seward ought to respect Virginia's laws and send the menback. Seward agreed that each state had the right to make its own laws, but argued that he was obligated only to enforce the laws of his own state. Sincehelping someone to escape from slavery was not a crime in his state, he had no obligation to enforce Virginia's laws. Moreover, in his opinion, the section of the Constitution that referred to returning fugitives from justice did not apply to this case. Seward also became involved in a similar controversy with the slave state of Georgia. Several Georgia governors had similar conflicts with governors of the free state of Maine.
When these kinds of conflicts occur between states, Congress often passes federal legislation to clarify the matter. In this case, however, Congress was torn between members from Southern states, who wanted to preserve slavery, anda growing number of abolitionists, who wished to abolish it. By the time ofKentucky v. Dennison, feelings were running strong on both sides.
A Slave Girl and the Man Who Helped Her
The Kentucky v. Dennison case began when Charlotte, a slave girl who lived in Louisville, Kentucky, was allowed to go with her owner, C. W. Nichols, to visit her mother in Wheeling, Virginia, where Nichols was going on business. (In some parts of the court record, his name is spelled "Nuckols.") Theroute Nichols chose took him through Cincinnati, in the free state of Ohio. There Charlotte met some abolitionists who helped her escape slavery. They took her to a state court, which ruled that she was free.
Nichols tried to fight the Ohio court's decision. Since slavery was not legalin Ohio, he could not claim that Charlotte was property that had been "stolen." Ironically, he declared that the abolitionists were the ones who had deprived Charlotte of her liberty, which was a crime under Ohio state law.
Meanwhile, Governor Beriah Magoffin of Kentucky demanded that Ohio governor,William Dennison, return a man who was supposed to have helped Charlotte. Dennison had run for office specifically on the platform that he would not allowrunaway slaves to be returned South. He had already refused to return one man who had been charged with helping a slave to escape, but when he learned that the man had also stolen jewelry, he changed his mind. In this case, however, he was adamant.
The man whom Dennison refused to return was Willis Lago, a free African American. He had been indicted by a county grand jury for offending "against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Kentucky." Dennison argued that the Constitution only required him to return a person accused of treason or felony. Since Lago was guilty of neither treason nor of a felony under Ohio state law, Ohio had no obligation to send him back to Kentucky.
Governor Magoffin was determined to have Lago returned. He wrote back to Dennison, claiming that the framers of the Constitution had in fact intended forfugitive slaves to be sent back. According to Magoffin, "the Constitution wasthe work of slaveholders . . . their wisdom, moderation, and prudence gave it to us. Non-slaveholding states were the exception, not the rule."
Ohio continued to refuse, so Kentucky tried a new strategy. It petitioned theSupreme Court, asking for a writ of mandamus, which would force the governor to return Lago. The petition was submitted by Thomas B. Monroe, Jr.,Kentucky's secretary of state.
On the Eve of the Civil War
By the time the Supreme Court heard the case, most of the slave states had seceded from the Union. The whole idea of the federal government forcing the states to do anything had been put in question. Kentucky, however, was still deciding whether or not to secede. Thomas B. Monroe, Jr., the man who had firstargued Kentucky's case, would become a Confederate officer and die in the Civil War. His father, a federal judge, would resign in order to support the Confederate cause. Between the time the case was argued and the time the decision was handed down, Abraham Lincoln traveled secretly through Baltimore to avoid possible mob violence on his way to being sworn in as president.
Moreover, the Supreme Court became quite unpopular in the North after the Dred Scott decision, another case involving a fugitive slave in which the Courthad ruled in favor of Southern states' rights to enforce slavery. Chief Justice Taney was known to be highly sympathetic to the South.
Yet the decision in Kentucky v. Dennison surprised and angered both the North and the South. Taney, who wrote the majority decision, supported Kentucky's right to expect Governor Dennison to respect its laws. He agreed withthe Southern governors who had argued throughout the 1830s and 1840s that they had the right to extradite slaves, those who helped free slaves, and anyoneelse who had been indicted for a crime within their states.
Previously, lawyers and politicians had argued over whether the seriousness of the crime should be a factor in another state's obligation to return an alleged criminal. Taney went further than anyone had ever gone: he said that a state had the obligation to return even someone indicted for a misdemeanor inanother state. In the strongest possible terms, he held that the decision ofwhether a person should stand trial for a crime should be made by the state where the crime was committed, not by the state to which the person had escaped.
However, Taney struck one final blow for states' rights that offended both the North and the South. He said that in the final analysis, a governor was theexecutive authority of a state. Congress could authorize a governor to perform a particular duty, but, Taney wrote, "if he [sic] declines to do so, it does not follow that he may be coerced, or punished for his refusal." In otherwords, although Dennison was wrong not to return Lago to Kentucky, no federalpower could force him to do it.
With slavery long abolished, Taney's decision stood for many years as an important ruling in the matter of states returning fugitives from justice. Whilemost of the time such returns were routine, every so often, a governor decided not to comply with another state's demand. In 1987 the Court reversed its position in Puerto Rico v. Branstad which dictated governors to enforcerequests for the return of a criminal.
Related Cases
State of Kentucky
Respondent
William Dennison, Governor of Ohio
Petitioner's Claim
That Governor Dennison should return to Kentucky the man, Willis Lago, who had allegedly helped a slave to escape and who had been indicted in Kentucky for what was a crime under the laws of that state.
Chief Lawyers for Petitioner
John W. Stevenson, Humphrey Marshall
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Ohio Attorney General Christopher P. Wolcott
Justices for the Court
John Archibald Campbell, John Catron, Nathan Clifford, Robert Cooper Grier, John McLean, Samuel Nelson, Roger Brooke Taney (writing for the Court), JamesMoore Wayne
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
14 March 1861
Decision
That although it was in fact Governor Dennison's duty to return a fugitive from justice to another state, as the executive authority of a state, he couldnot be coerced into doing so.
Significance
At the time, the decision was seen as a victory for Southern states' right todemand that Northern states support the institution of slavery. The decisionsupported the ability of a governor to refuse to extradite a fugitive from justice to another state until it was reversed by Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987).
The years before the Civil War were full of legal battles between the slave states and the free states. In 1793, Congress had passed a law providing for the return of fugitive slaves. This law drew on Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, which read:
A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from whichhe fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.
In other words, if a person committed a crime in one state and ran away to another, the second state was supposed to return the person to the first state,where he or she could stand trial. Since running away from slavery was considered a crime in the slave states, a slave who ran away, or a person who helped a slave run away, was supposed to be returned to stand trial.
Of course, abolitionists--people who opposed slavery--objected to this use ofthe law. Since abolitionists believed that slavery was wrong, they wanted tohelp slaves escape to freedom. They wanted slaves to be able to remain in those parts of the United States where they could be free.
Who Decides?
In the early 1840s, the main controversy over this question had concerned NewYork Governor William H. Seward. Seward had refused to send to Virginia three free African American men who had allegedly helped a slave to escape to NewYork. Virginia, a slave state, pointed out that each state had the right todecide what was legal and what was not. Since helping a slave to escape was illegal in Virginia, Seward ought to respect Virginia's laws and send the menback. Seward agreed that each state had the right to make its own laws, but argued that he was obligated only to enforce the laws of his own state. Sincehelping someone to escape from slavery was not a crime in his state, he had no obligation to enforce Virginia's laws. Moreover, in his opinion, the section of the Constitution that referred to returning fugitives from justice did not apply to this case. Seward also became involved in a similar controversy with the slave state of Georgia. Several Georgia governors had similar conflicts with governors of the free state of Maine.
When these kinds of conflicts occur between states, Congress often passes federal legislation to clarify the matter. In this case, however, Congress was torn between members from Southern states, who wanted to preserve slavery, anda growing number of abolitionists, who wished to abolish it. By the time ofKentucky v. Dennison, feelings were running strong on both sides.
A Slave Girl and the Man Who Helped Her
The Kentucky v. Dennison case began when Charlotte, a slave girl who lived in Louisville, Kentucky, was allowed to go with her owner, C. W. Nichols, to visit her mother in Wheeling, Virginia, where Nichols was going on business. (In some parts of the court record, his name is spelled "Nuckols.") Theroute Nichols chose took him through Cincinnati, in the free state of Ohio. There Charlotte met some abolitionists who helped her escape slavery. They took her to a state court, which ruled that she was free.
Nichols tried to fight the Ohio court's decision. Since slavery was not legalin Ohio, he could not claim that Charlotte was property that had been "stolen." Ironically, he declared that the abolitionists were the ones who had deprived Charlotte of her liberty, which was a crime under Ohio state law.
Meanwhile, Governor Beriah Magoffin of Kentucky demanded that Ohio governor,William Dennison, return a man who was supposed to have helped Charlotte. Dennison had run for office specifically on the platform that he would not allowrunaway slaves to be returned South. He had already refused to return one man who had been charged with helping a slave to escape, but when he learned that the man had also stolen jewelry, he changed his mind. In this case, however, he was adamant.
The man whom Dennison refused to return was Willis Lago, a free African American. He had been indicted by a county grand jury for offending "against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Kentucky." Dennison argued that the Constitution only required him to return a person accused of treason or felony. Since Lago was guilty of neither treason nor of a felony under Ohio state law, Ohio had no obligation to send him back to Kentucky.
Governor Magoffin was determined to have Lago returned. He wrote back to Dennison, claiming that the framers of the Constitution had in fact intended forfugitive slaves to be sent back. According to Magoffin, "the Constitution wasthe work of slaveholders . . . their wisdom, moderation, and prudence gave it to us. Non-slaveholding states were the exception, not the rule."
Ohio continued to refuse, so Kentucky tried a new strategy. It petitioned theSupreme Court, asking for a writ of mandamus, which would force the governor to return Lago. The petition was submitted by Thomas B. Monroe, Jr.,Kentucky's secretary of state.
On the Eve of the Civil War
By the time the Supreme Court heard the case, most of the slave states had seceded from the Union. The whole idea of the federal government forcing the states to do anything had been put in question. Kentucky, however, was still deciding whether or not to secede. Thomas B. Monroe, Jr., the man who had firstargued Kentucky's case, would become a Confederate officer and die in the Civil War. His father, a federal judge, would resign in order to support the Confederate cause. Between the time the case was argued and the time the decision was handed down, Abraham Lincoln traveled secretly through Baltimore to avoid possible mob violence on his way to being sworn in as president.
Moreover, the Supreme Court became quite unpopular in the North after the Dred Scott decision, another case involving a fugitive slave in which the Courthad ruled in favor of Southern states' rights to enforce slavery. Chief Justice Taney was known to be highly sympathetic to the South.
Yet the decision in Kentucky v. Dennison surprised and angered both the North and the South. Taney, who wrote the majority decision, supported Kentucky's right to expect Governor Dennison to respect its laws. He agreed withthe Southern governors who had argued throughout the 1830s and 1840s that they had the right to extradite slaves, those who helped free slaves, and anyoneelse who had been indicted for a crime within their states.
Previously, lawyers and politicians had argued over whether the seriousness of the crime should be a factor in another state's obligation to return an alleged criminal. Taney went further than anyone had ever gone: he said that a state had the obligation to return even someone indicted for a misdemeanor inanother state. In the strongest possible terms, he held that the decision ofwhether a person should stand trial for a crime should be made by the state where the crime was committed, not by the state to which the person had escaped.
However, Taney struck one final blow for states' rights that offended both the North and the South. He said that in the final analysis, a governor was theexecutive authority of a state. Congress could authorize a governor to perform a particular duty, but, Taney wrote, "if he [sic] declines to do so, it does not follow that he may be coerced, or punished for his refusal." In otherwords, although Dennison was wrong not to return Lago to Kentucky, no federalpower could force him to do it.
With slavery long abolished, Taney's decision stood for many years as an important ruling in the matter of states returning fugitives from justice. Whilemost of the time such returns were routine, every so often, a governor decided not to comply with another state's demand. In 1987 the Court reversed its position in Puerto Rico v. Branstad which dictated governors to enforcerequests for the return of a criminal.
Related Cases
- Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
- Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
- Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987).
User Comments Add a comment…