Petitioner
State of Illinois
Respondent
Lloyd Perkins
Petitioner's Claim
That Perkins's jailhouse admission of murder to an undercover agent should beadmissible, even though Perkins did not receive Miranda warnings before thequestioning.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Marcia L. Friedl
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Dan W. Evers
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Anthony M. Kennedy (writing for the Court), Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 June 1990
Decision
An undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not giveMiranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that mayelicit an incriminating response.
Significance
In Illinois v. Perkins, the Court recognized limitations to the rule announced in Miranda. Perkins was an example of a custodial interrogation that created no compulsion. Since Miranda was not intended to protect individuals from themselves, the Court held there was no need to advise Perkins of his Miranda rights prior to his conversation with an undercover police officer. This decision allowed law enforcement to use undercover agents ina jail without necessitating the giving of Miranda warnings to the suspect.
Richard Stephenson was murdered in November of 1984 in a suburb of East St. Louis, Illinois. His murder remained unsolved until March of 1986, when DonaldCharlton told police that Lloyd Perkins had confessed to the murder while the two were in jail together at the Graham Correctional Facility. By this time, Perkins was in a different jail on a charge of aggravated battery, not connected to the Stephenson murder. The police decided to place an undercover agent in the cellblock with Perkins and Charlton. John Parisi, the undercover agent, and Charlton posed as escapees from a work release program whom had beenarrested for burglary. While in the same cellblock with Perkins, Parisi suggested that the three of them try to escape from the jail. While discussing the escape plan, Parisi asked Perkins if he had ever killed anyone. Perkins described Stephenson's murder. Parisi asked more questions about the murder, including what type of weapon was used.
Perkins was charged with the murder, but before the trial, he asked that theevidence of his statements made to Parisi in jail be suppressed (not allowedin court) on the ground that Parisi had not given him the Miranda warnings before their conversations. The trial court granted the motion to suppress. TheAppellate Court of Illinois affirmed the ruling, stating that Mirandaprohibits all undercover contacts with incarcerated suspects that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
A Coercive Atmosphere Is Lacking
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Kennedy wrote that Miranda warningsare not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement. Miranda v. Arizona,gave rise to the Miranda warnings that are read to suspects when they are arrested. The warnings state that the person has a right to remain silent and that whatever a person says may be used against him in court. Kennedy noted that in Miranda, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits admitting statements given by a suspect during"custodial interrogation" without prior warning. Miranda rights were formulated to make sure people did not incriminate themselves while in a "police-dominated atmosphere" which generates "compelling pressures." The Court held that conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not involve such anatmosphere or compulsion; an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone hethinks is a fellow inmate. When a suspect considers himself in the company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive atmosphere is lacking.
Miranda stated that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation. Kennedy rejected the argument that the Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect is in custody and converses with someone who happens to be a government agent. When a suspect does notknow that he is talking to a government agent, pressure does not exist. "Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner."Kennedy quoted Miranda: "Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compellinginfluences is, of course, admissible in evidence." Kennedy noted that ploysto mislead a suspect are not compulsion or coercion and Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities. The tactic used by the police in Perkins's case to elicit a voluntary confession does not violate the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In several past cases the Court held that the government may not use an undercover agent to circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel once a suspecthas been charged with a crime. In this case, no charges had been filed against Perkins regarding the subject of the interrogation, the murder of Stephenson, thus the Sixth Amendment precedents did not apply here. Law enforcement officers will have little difficulty putting into practice the ruling that undercover agents need not give Miranda warnings to incarcerated suspects. Miranda warnings are not required to safeguard the constitutional rights of inmates who make voluntary statements to undercover agents. These statements are admissible at trial.
Deception And Manipulation Practiced
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion. He agreed that when a suspect does not know that his questioner is a police agent, the questioning does not amount to "interrogation" in an "inherently coercive" environment and thus doesnot require the Miranda warnings. However, Brennan felt that the deception and manipulation practiced on Perkins raised a substantial claim that the confession violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In his opinion, the state was in a unique position to exploit a suspect's vulnerability because it had complete control over the suspect's environment. An undercover agent could barrage a suspect with questions until he confessed, as in Perkins's case. The deliberate use of deception and manipulation by the police was incompatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that inquisitorial means will not be used to get a conviction.
Compulsion Includes Police Deception
Justice Marshall dissented. He noted that the conditions that require the police to read a suspect the Miranda warnings--custodial interrogation conductedby an agent of the police--were present in Illinois v. Perkins. Because Perkins did not receive his Miranda warnings before he was subjected to custodial interrogation, his confession should be inadmissible. The majority'screation of an exception to the Miranda rule that applies when an undercoveragent asks questions that may elicit an incriminating response was inconsistent with the rationale supporting Miranda, in Marshall's opinion. It allowed police officers intentionally to take advantage of suspects who are unaware of their constitutional rights.
While Perkins was confined he was subjected to express questioning likely toevoke an incriminating response. Miranda dealt with any police tacticsthat might compel a suspect to make incriminating statements without full awareness of his constitutional rights. The point of the Miranda warnings is tomake a suspect aware of the Fifth Amendment privilege and the consequences of foregoing it. "Thus when a law enforcement agent structures a custodial interrogation so that a suspect feels compelled to reveal incriminating information, he must inform the suspect of his constitutional rights and give him anopportunity to decide whether or not to talk."
The compulsion described in Miranda includes police deception. The police deceptively took advantage of Perkins's psychological vulnerability by including him in a sham escape plot, where he would feel compelled to show hiswillingness to shoot a guard by discussing his past involvement in a murder.The pressure unique to custody allowed the police to use deception to compela suspect to make incriminating statements. The suspect's ignorance of the agent's real identity did not mean compulsion was not used.
The Court's adoption of this exception to the Miranda warnings was incompatible with the principle that the doctrine should be simple and clear. The Court's ruling complicated a previously clear and straightforward doctrine. "WouldMiranda be violated, for instance, if an undercover police officer beat a confession out of a suspect, but the suspect thought the officer was another prisoner who wanted the information for his own purposes?" The exceptioncreated in this case may result in police officers conducting interrogationsof confined suspects through undercover agents, getting around the need to administer Miranda warnings. "The Court's adoption of the `undercover exception' to the Miranda rule thus is necessarily also the adoption of a substantialloophole in our jurisprudence protecting suspects' Fifth Amendment rights."
Impact
Legal scholars have debated the legality and propriety of using cellmate informants. Some scholars find the practice a strategic deception that takes advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in a person he thinks is a fellow prisoner. Others view the use of cellmate informants as offensive to a civilized system of justice. Law enforcement officers find that the use of cellmate informants is a method that works. Illinois v. Perkins answered some questions regarding the constitutionality of using cellmate informants. The case resolved the issue of exactly when Miranda warnings must be given. A suspect'sbeing in custody alone does not necessitate the warnings. The impact on the suspect of both police interrogation and police custody makes custodial policeinterrogation so corrosive and thus requires "adequate protective devices."This decision paved the way for law enforcement officers to take advantage ofusing cellmate informants.
Related Cases
State of Illinois
Respondent
Lloyd Perkins
Petitioner's Claim
That Perkins's jailhouse admission of murder to an undercover agent should beadmissible, even though Perkins did not receive Miranda warnings before thequestioning.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Marcia L. Friedl
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Dan W. Evers
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Anthony M. Kennedy (writing for the Court), Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 June 1990
Decision
An undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not giveMiranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that mayelicit an incriminating response.
Significance
In Illinois v. Perkins, the Court recognized limitations to the rule announced in Miranda. Perkins was an example of a custodial interrogation that created no compulsion. Since Miranda was not intended to protect individuals from themselves, the Court held there was no need to advise Perkins of his Miranda rights prior to his conversation with an undercover police officer. This decision allowed law enforcement to use undercover agents ina jail without necessitating the giving of Miranda warnings to the suspect.
Richard Stephenson was murdered in November of 1984 in a suburb of East St. Louis, Illinois. His murder remained unsolved until March of 1986, when DonaldCharlton told police that Lloyd Perkins had confessed to the murder while the two were in jail together at the Graham Correctional Facility. By this time, Perkins was in a different jail on a charge of aggravated battery, not connected to the Stephenson murder. The police decided to place an undercover agent in the cellblock with Perkins and Charlton. John Parisi, the undercover agent, and Charlton posed as escapees from a work release program whom had beenarrested for burglary. While in the same cellblock with Perkins, Parisi suggested that the three of them try to escape from the jail. While discussing the escape plan, Parisi asked Perkins if he had ever killed anyone. Perkins described Stephenson's murder. Parisi asked more questions about the murder, including what type of weapon was used.
Perkins was charged with the murder, but before the trial, he asked that theevidence of his statements made to Parisi in jail be suppressed (not allowedin court) on the ground that Parisi had not given him the Miranda warnings before their conversations. The trial court granted the motion to suppress. TheAppellate Court of Illinois affirmed the ruling, stating that Mirandaprohibits all undercover contacts with incarcerated suspects that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
A Coercive Atmosphere Is Lacking
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Kennedy wrote that Miranda warningsare not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement. Miranda v. Arizona,gave rise to the Miranda warnings that are read to suspects when they are arrested. The warnings state that the person has a right to remain silent and that whatever a person says may be used against him in court. Kennedy noted that in Miranda, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits admitting statements given by a suspect during"custodial interrogation" without prior warning. Miranda rights were formulated to make sure people did not incriminate themselves while in a "police-dominated atmosphere" which generates "compelling pressures." The Court held that conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not involve such anatmosphere or compulsion; an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone hethinks is a fellow inmate. When a suspect considers himself in the company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive atmosphere is lacking.
Miranda stated that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation. Kennedy rejected the argument that the Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect is in custody and converses with someone who happens to be a government agent. When a suspect does notknow that he is talking to a government agent, pressure does not exist. "Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner."Kennedy quoted Miranda: "Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compellinginfluences is, of course, admissible in evidence." Kennedy noted that ploysto mislead a suspect are not compulsion or coercion and Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities. The tactic used by the police in Perkins's case to elicit a voluntary confession does not violate the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In several past cases the Court held that the government may not use an undercover agent to circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel once a suspecthas been charged with a crime. In this case, no charges had been filed against Perkins regarding the subject of the interrogation, the murder of Stephenson, thus the Sixth Amendment precedents did not apply here. Law enforcement officers will have little difficulty putting into practice the ruling that undercover agents need not give Miranda warnings to incarcerated suspects. Miranda warnings are not required to safeguard the constitutional rights of inmates who make voluntary statements to undercover agents. These statements are admissible at trial.
Deception And Manipulation Practiced
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion. He agreed that when a suspect does not know that his questioner is a police agent, the questioning does not amount to "interrogation" in an "inherently coercive" environment and thus doesnot require the Miranda warnings. However, Brennan felt that the deception and manipulation practiced on Perkins raised a substantial claim that the confession violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In his opinion, the state was in a unique position to exploit a suspect's vulnerability because it had complete control over the suspect's environment. An undercover agent could barrage a suspect with questions until he confessed, as in Perkins's case. The deliberate use of deception and manipulation by the police was incompatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that inquisitorial means will not be used to get a conviction.
Compulsion Includes Police Deception
Justice Marshall dissented. He noted that the conditions that require the police to read a suspect the Miranda warnings--custodial interrogation conductedby an agent of the police--were present in Illinois v. Perkins. Because Perkins did not receive his Miranda warnings before he was subjected to custodial interrogation, his confession should be inadmissible. The majority'screation of an exception to the Miranda rule that applies when an undercoveragent asks questions that may elicit an incriminating response was inconsistent with the rationale supporting Miranda, in Marshall's opinion. It allowed police officers intentionally to take advantage of suspects who are unaware of their constitutional rights.
While Perkins was confined he was subjected to express questioning likely toevoke an incriminating response. Miranda dealt with any police tacticsthat might compel a suspect to make incriminating statements without full awareness of his constitutional rights. The point of the Miranda warnings is tomake a suspect aware of the Fifth Amendment privilege and the consequences of foregoing it. "Thus when a law enforcement agent structures a custodial interrogation so that a suspect feels compelled to reveal incriminating information, he must inform the suspect of his constitutional rights and give him anopportunity to decide whether or not to talk."
The compulsion described in Miranda includes police deception. The police deceptively took advantage of Perkins's psychological vulnerability by including him in a sham escape plot, where he would feel compelled to show hiswillingness to shoot a guard by discussing his past involvement in a murder.The pressure unique to custody allowed the police to use deception to compela suspect to make incriminating statements. The suspect's ignorance of the agent's real identity did not mean compulsion was not used.
The Court's adoption of this exception to the Miranda warnings was incompatible with the principle that the doctrine should be simple and clear. The Court's ruling complicated a previously clear and straightforward doctrine. "WouldMiranda be violated, for instance, if an undercover police officer beat a confession out of a suspect, but the suspect thought the officer was another prisoner who wanted the information for his own purposes?" The exceptioncreated in this case may result in police officers conducting interrogationsof confined suspects through undercover agents, getting around the need to administer Miranda warnings. "The Court's adoption of the `undercover exception' to the Miranda rule thus is necessarily also the adoption of a substantialloophole in our jurisprudence protecting suspects' Fifth Amendment rights."
Impact
Legal scholars have debated the legality and propriety of using cellmate informants. Some scholars find the practice a strategic deception that takes advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in a person he thinks is a fellow prisoner. Others view the use of cellmate informants as offensive to a civilized system of justice. Law enforcement officers find that the use of cellmate informants is a method that works. Illinois v. Perkins answered some questions regarding the constitutionality of using cellmate informants. The case resolved the issue of exactly when Miranda warnings must be given. A suspect'sbeing in custody alone does not necessitate the warnings. The impact on the suspect of both police interrogation and police custody makes custodial policeinterrogation so corrosive and thus requires "adequate protective devices."This decision paved the way for law enforcement officers to take advantage ofusing cellmate informants.
Related Cases
- Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
- Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
- Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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