Penry v. Lynaugh - Further Readings

Petitioner
Johnny Paul Penry
Respondent
James A. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections
Petitioner's Claim
That execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment ban oncruel and unusual punishment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Curtis C. Mason
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Charles A. Palmer
Justices for the Court
Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Byron R. White,
Justices Dissenting
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1989
Decision
The Supreme Court reversed Penry's death sentence.
Significance
Penry underscored the point that in capital cases--especially when they involve defendants with diminished mental capacities--factors which mitigate guilt must be taken into account. At the same time, the case stands for theproposition that the death penalty is constitutional in most such cases.
Johnny Paul Penry was moderately mentally retarded. As an adult, he had the mental maturity of a six and a half year old child. Possibly, his brain damagedated from birth; more probably it dated from his childhood, when he had been beaten and abused. On the morning of 25 October 1979, when he was 22 yearsold, Penry raped, beat, and fatally stabbed Pamela Carpenter in her home in Livingston, Texas. During the hearing of his murder trial, expert testimony was offered as to his mental state at the time of the killing. Dr. Jose Garciatestified that, as a result of his brain disorder, Penry suffered from poor impulse control and an inability to learn from experience. These disorders, said Dr. Garcia, made it impossible for Penry to appreciate the wrongfulness ofhis acts.
The state introduced expert testimony that although Penry had limited mentalcapacity, he was not mentally ill and that he knew right from wrong. The juryrejected Penry's insanity defense and found him guilty of capital murder. Finding that Penry had deliberately killed and would probably kill again, the jurors sentenced him to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Penry's conviction and sentence, as did two federal courts. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, stressed that it found merit in Penry's argument that the jury had not been allowed to consider all of the mitigating circumstances surrounding his crime. When Penry applied to the U.S. Supreme Courtfor review, the Court agreed to do so. For the justices, two questions regarding Penry's case remained unanswered: 1) whether Penry's Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the judge's failure to instruct the jury properly as tomitigating circumstances, and 2) whether it was cruel and unusual punishmentto execute a mentally retarded person with Penry's capacity to reason.
Supreme Court Finds Application of Capital Punishment to the Mentally Retarded Constitutional
The Court struck down Penry's conviction and sentence in a 5-4 vote. Althoughthey agreed on an outcome, in part because they were obliged to consider twoquestions, the justices could not agree on an opinion. Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered two separate opinions of the Court. In the first, she stated the reasons for reversing Penry's death sentence. In Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the case which reaffirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty, the Court mandated that mitigating circumstances be reviewed in each capital case. Here again, the Court stressed the importance of this requirement:

In order to ensure "reliability in thedetermination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case,"[Quoting Woodson v. North Carolina (1976)], the jury must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant'sbackground and character or the circumstances of the crime.

Because at Penry's trial the judge had failed to instruct the jury specifically that they could consider mitigating circumstances, Penry's constitutional rights had been violated. His death sentence was overturned.
The justices were even more divided with the regard to the constitutionality,in general, of sentencing the mentally retarded to death for capital crimes.While upholding their decision in Ford v. Wainwright (1986) that execution of an insane person is cruel and unusual punishment, they neverthelessheld now that mental retardation was not, of itself, a violation of the Eighth Amendment. While stressing that diminished mental capacity was a mitigatingfactor and admitting that severe retardation may result in acquittal in capital cases, the Court said that not all mentally retarded people who share Penry's level of awareness lack the capacity to appreciate their crimes. Such was the consensus among the framers of the Constitution, and such was the consensus in today's society:

[A]t present, there is insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

Impact
The Court's opinion in Penry expressed uncertainty about the constitutionality of executing a mentally handicapped individual. O'Connor essentiallydeferred to the legislative branch suggesting that if a majority of the public opposed the practice that sentiment would eventually find its way into legislative statutes. Although the petitioner offered empirical data suggestingthat a majority of people opposed the execution of mentally handicapped individuals, even in Texas where capital punishment is generally accepted, O'Connor was not persuaded to resolve the matter. Since Penry the public hasdecisively weighed in on the matter. Organizations such as the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), the Association for Retarded Citizens (ARC) and the American Psychological Association (APA) have formally adopted positions in opposition to administering the death penalty to mentally handicapped individuals. In addition, some states have adopted legislation prohibiting the practice.
O'Connor's opinion in Penry was important because it suggested that the Court should include the "national consensus" on matters in its deliberations. Justice Scalia echoed O'Connor's point in Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) stating that the Supreme Court has a "constitutional obligation" to consider the sentiments of the public, or to conduct what he called "proportionality analysis." If the Court is true to its word, it seems likely that the application of capital punishment to mentally handicapped individuals will be prohibited by the Court in due course.
Related Cases

• Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
  
• Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
  
• Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
  
• Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).