Petitioner
Jerry Lane Jurek
Respondent
State of Texas
Petitioner's Claim
The death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Anthony G. Amsterdam
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
John L. Hill
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
2 July 1976
Decision
Upheld the state of Texas' claim that the death penalty was not cruel and unusual punishment and therefore was not unconstitutional.
Significance
This case determined that the death penalty, if applied fairly and without discrimination, was not considered cruel and unusual punishment, and thereforewas not an infringement on an individual's constitutional rights as put forthin the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In 1976 Jerry Lane Jurek, 22 years of age, was charged by indictment with themurder of Wendy Adams, a ten-year-old girl. The murder was considered quitebrutal, Jurek "choking and strangling her with his hands, and . . . drowningher in water by throwing her into a river . . . in the course of committing and attempting to commit kidnapping of and forcible rape . . . " Evidence against Jurek was quite convincing, and included the testimony of several peoplewho saw him with the victim on the day of her murder, technical evidence, andincriminating statements made by the petitioner himself. This evidence indicated that the petitioner, while drinking beer with two friends and driving his truck, had expressed an interest in having sexual relations with some younggirls they saw. After his friends stated that the girls were too young, Jurek dropped them off at a pool hall, then returned and was seen talking to Wendy Adams at a public swimming pool. Witnesses stated that a man resembling Jurek was later seen driving out of town at a high rate of speed with a girl matching Adam's description in the bed of the truck; the girl was screaming "help me, help me." According to Jurek's own statement, he took the girl to the river, choked her and disposed of the unconscious body in the water. The girl's dead body was found two days later.
The jury found Jurek guilty. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury had to consider two of three specific questions before rendering a judgment that could result in a capital sentence: 1) Was the conduct of the defendant that led to the death of the deceased committed deliberately with death asthe ultimate goal? and 2) Should the defendant be considered a threat to society because he was likely to commit other acts of violence? The third question, concerning whether the defendant's conduct was an unreasonable response toprovocation by the deceased, was not considered.
Texas statutes maintained that if the jury found that the state proved beyonda reasonable doubt that the answer to each question was "yes," then the death sentence would be imposed. If the answer to any question was "no," then thedefendant faced life imprisonment. In the case of Jurek v. Texas thejury unanimously voted "yes" for both questions presented. The judge sentenced Jerry Lane Jurek to death.
Action and Reaction
Jurek appealed his sentencing, claiming that the death penalty--under any circumstances--was cruel and unusual punishment and represented a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Jurek's attorney said that a certain amount of arbitrariness existed in Texas' criminal justice system and that it was also impossible to predict any individual's futurebehavior. The U.S. Supreme Court took up the task to determine whether or not this was so.
One of the most important elements considered by the Supreme Court was the revision of Texas' capital-sentencing procedure. This revision took place in the mid-1970s, a result of what many justices viewed as an uneven application of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia (1972), Jackson v. Georgia (1972), and Branch v. Texas (1972). In each of these cases a black defendant received the death penalty for killing a white person. In attempting to pinpoint racial bias as to why these defendants were sentenced to death while others in similar circumstances were not, the Court discovered a certain randomness in the application of the death penalty. It was held that thedeath penalty in these cases was cruel and unusual punishment, and thereforeviolated the Constitution. This forced states and the national legislature toreevaluate their capital-sentencing structures to guarantee that the death penalty would be administered in a responsible manner.
Texas responded to this by narrowing the circumstances in which the state could seek the death penalty. Capital punishment could now be only applied in five situations: 1) the murder of a fireman or a peace officer; 2) murder committed in the course of burglary, forcible rape, arson, kidnapping, or robbery;3) murder committed for pay; 4) murder of a prison employee by a prison inmate; and 5) murder committed during escape or attempted escape from a penal institution. Texas also adopted the new capital-sentencing procedure requiringthe jury to answer three specific questions designed to maintain guilt beyonda reasonable doubt.
When considering the claim that Texas' death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court also examined how the death penalty was applied by other states. Georgia and Florida each used a list of aggravating circumstances to justify the enforcement of the death penalty. Each of the five classes of murder stipulated in the Texas statute was represented in these lists byone or more statutory aggravating circumstances. It was found that the primary difference between Texas and the other two states was that the death penalty was available as a sentencing option for a smaller class of murders in Texas.
Constitutional Infringement?
Lastly, the Court considered the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Eighth Amendment states "Excessive bail shall not be required,nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted," while the Fourteenth Amendment essentially guarantees an individual's rights todue process and equal protection under the law. In order for a capital-sentence ruling to be constitutional a jury must consider the case based not onlyon evidence showing why a death sentence should be imposed, but also on the factors surrounding why it should not be imposed. In other words, mitigating circumstances must be considered. The Texas statute only directed jurors to answer three questions. Did these required questions allow consideration of themitigating circumstances during the sentencing of Jurek?
In determining this, the Supreme Court focused primarily on the question concerning the petitioner's potential danger to society. It was noted that the jury in this case had to consider various factors concerning Jurek, such as hisage, his emotional state-of-mind, and his past conduct. These observations were presented not only by the prosecutor, but also by the defense.
The Supreme Court concluded that Texas' capital-sentencing structure did notviolate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This decision was reached due to the narrowing of the definition of capital murder, requiring at least one statutory aggravating circumstance of five be present before a death sentencecan be considered. By allowing the defense to provide testimony as to why thedeath penalty should not be invoked during the separate sentencing hearing,the Court felt that mitigating circumstances concerning the defendant were brought to light, thus providing the jury with an acceptable amount of guidanceto enable accurate sentencing. The substantive crime of murder was defined in a precise enough manner under Texas' revised statute so that the issues presented in Furman v. Georgia, Branch v. Texas, and Jackson v.Georgia did not come to bear.
Impact
The verdict of Jurek v. Texas confirmed that the death penalty could be invoked without the disruption of an individual's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The most important consequence of this pertained to the amountof evidence presented to a jury. It was recognized that there was a significant difference between the death penalty and all other punishments--and therefore "a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in determining whether the death sentence is appropriately imposed in a particular case." This case maintained that the jury must be made aware of all relevant information concerning the defendant whose life is on the line; therefore all mitigating circumstances must be considered in capital-sentencing cases.
Related Cases
Types of Capital Punishment
There are five basic types of execution in the United States: hanging, firingsquads, electrocution, lethal gas, and lethal injection. Each of the 38 states with a death-penalty statute authorizes at least one of these forms. In addition, lethal injection is the method authorized by the federal government.
Lethal injection is by far the predominant method of execution, with 32 states authorizing it as of 1997. In 1997, 92 percent of all executions took placeby this method, as compared with 28 percent in 1987. With 284 lethal injections, it was also the most common method among those administered to the 432 prisoners executed between 1977 and 1997, as compared with 134 electrocutions,nine killed by lethal gas, three by hanging, and two by firing squad.
Sixty-eight of the 74 executions during 1997 were by lethal injection, and six were by electrocution. Texas led the nation in executions, with 37. Virginia had nine; Missouri had six; Arkansas four; Alabama three; Arizona, Illinois, and South Carolina two each; and the remaining nine states one each. Of the74 men executed, 41 were non-Hispanic white, 26 non-Hispanic African American, four white Hispanic, and one each black Hispanic, American Indian, and Asian American.
Sources
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Capital Punishment 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 1998.
Jerry Lane Jurek
Respondent
State of Texas
Petitioner's Claim
The death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Anthony G. Amsterdam
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
John L. Hill
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
2 July 1976
Decision
Upheld the state of Texas' claim that the death penalty was not cruel and unusual punishment and therefore was not unconstitutional.
Significance
This case determined that the death penalty, if applied fairly and without discrimination, was not considered cruel and unusual punishment, and thereforewas not an infringement on an individual's constitutional rights as put forthin the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In 1976 Jerry Lane Jurek, 22 years of age, was charged by indictment with themurder of Wendy Adams, a ten-year-old girl. The murder was considered quitebrutal, Jurek "choking and strangling her with his hands, and . . . drowningher in water by throwing her into a river . . . in the course of committing and attempting to commit kidnapping of and forcible rape . . . " Evidence against Jurek was quite convincing, and included the testimony of several peoplewho saw him with the victim on the day of her murder, technical evidence, andincriminating statements made by the petitioner himself. This evidence indicated that the petitioner, while drinking beer with two friends and driving his truck, had expressed an interest in having sexual relations with some younggirls they saw. After his friends stated that the girls were too young, Jurek dropped them off at a pool hall, then returned and was seen talking to Wendy Adams at a public swimming pool. Witnesses stated that a man resembling Jurek was later seen driving out of town at a high rate of speed with a girl matching Adam's description in the bed of the truck; the girl was screaming "help me, help me." According to Jurek's own statement, he took the girl to the river, choked her and disposed of the unconscious body in the water. The girl's dead body was found two days later.
The jury found Jurek guilty. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury had to consider two of three specific questions before rendering a judgment that could result in a capital sentence: 1) Was the conduct of the defendant that led to the death of the deceased committed deliberately with death asthe ultimate goal? and 2) Should the defendant be considered a threat to society because he was likely to commit other acts of violence? The third question, concerning whether the defendant's conduct was an unreasonable response toprovocation by the deceased, was not considered.
Texas statutes maintained that if the jury found that the state proved beyonda reasonable doubt that the answer to each question was "yes," then the death sentence would be imposed. If the answer to any question was "no," then thedefendant faced life imprisonment. In the case of Jurek v. Texas thejury unanimously voted "yes" for both questions presented. The judge sentenced Jerry Lane Jurek to death.
Action and Reaction
Jurek appealed his sentencing, claiming that the death penalty--under any circumstances--was cruel and unusual punishment and represented a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Jurek's attorney said that a certain amount of arbitrariness existed in Texas' criminal justice system and that it was also impossible to predict any individual's futurebehavior. The U.S. Supreme Court took up the task to determine whether or not this was so.
One of the most important elements considered by the Supreme Court was the revision of Texas' capital-sentencing procedure. This revision took place in the mid-1970s, a result of what many justices viewed as an uneven application of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia (1972), Jackson v. Georgia (1972), and Branch v. Texas (1972). In each of these cases a black defendant received the death penalty for killing a white person. In attempting to pinpoint racial bias as to why these defendants were sentenced to death while others in similar circumstances were not, the Court discovered a certain randomness in the application of the death penalty. It was held that thedeath penalty in these cases was cruel and unusual punishment, and thereforeviolated the Constitution. This forced states and the national legislature toreevaluate their capital-sentencing structures to guarantee that the death penalty would be administered in a responsible manner.
Texas responded to this by narrowing the circumstances in which the state could seek the death penalty. Capital punishment could now be only applied in five situations: 1) the murder of a fireman or a peace officer; 2) murder committed in the course of burglary, forcible rape, arson, kidnapping, or robbery;3) murder committed for pay; 4) murder of a prison employee by a prison inmate; and 5) murder committed during escape or attempted escape from a penal institution. Texas also adopted the new capital-sentencing procedure requiringthe jury to answer three specific questions designed to maintain guilt beyonda reasonable doubt.
When considering the claim that Texas' death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court also examined how the death penalty was applied by other states. Georgia and Florida each used a list of aggravating circumstances to justify the enforcement of the death penalty. Each of the five classes of murder stipulated in the Texas statute was represented in these lists byone or more statutory aggravating circumstances. It was found that the primary difference between Texas and the other two states was that the death penalty was available as a sentencing option for a smaller class of murders in Texas.
Constitutional Infringement?
Lastly, the Court considered the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Eighth Amendment states "Excessive bail shall not be required,nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted," while the Fourteenth Amendment essentially guarantees an individual's rights todue process and equal protection under the law. In order for a capital-sentence ruling to be constitutional a jury must consider the case based not onlyon evidence showing why a death sentence should be imposed, but also on the factors surrounding why it should not be imposed. In other words, mitigating circumstances must be considered. The Texas statute only directed jurors to answer three questions. Did these required questions allow consideration of themitigating circumstances during the sentencing of Jurek?
In determining this, the Supreme Court focused primarily on the question concerning the petitioner's potential danger to society. It was noted that the jury in this case had to consider various factors concerning Jurek, such as hisage, his emotional state-of-mind, and his past conduct. These observations were presented not only by the prosecutor, but also by the defense.
The Supreme Court concluded that Texas' capital-sentencing structure did notviolate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This decision was reached due to the narrowing of the definition of capital murder, requiring at least one statutory aggravating circumstance of five be present before a death sentencecan be considered. By allowing the defense to provide testimony as to why thedeath penalty should not be invoked during the separate sentencing hearing,the Court felt that mitigating circumstances concerning the defendant were brought to light, thus providing the jury with an acceptable amount of guidanceto enable accurate sentencing. The substantive crime of murder was defined in a precise enough manner under Texas' revised statute so that the issues presented in Furman v. Georgia, Branch v. Texas, and Jackson v.Georgia did not come to bear.
Impact
The verdict of Jurek v. Texas confirmed that the death penalty could be invoked without the disruption of an individual's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The most important consequence of this pertained to the amountof evidence presented to a jury. It was recognized that there was a significant difference between the death penalty and all other punishments--and therefore "a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in determining whether the death sentence is appropriately imposed in a particular case." This case maintained that the jury must be made aware of all relevant information concerning the defendant whose life is on the line; therefore all mitigating circumstances must be considered in capital-sentencing cases.
Related Cases
- Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
- Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
- Jackson v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
- Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
- Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
- Jacobs v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
Types of Capital Punishment
There are five basic types of execution in the United States: hanging, firingsquads, electrocution, lethal gas, and lethal injection. Each of the 38 states with a death-penalty statute authorizes at least one of these forms. In addition, lethal injection is the method authorized by the federal government.
Lethal injection is by far the predominant method of execution, with 32 states authorizing it as of 1997. In 1997, 92 percent of all executions took placeby this method, as compared with 28 percent in 1987. With 284 lethal injections, it was also the most common method among those administered to the 432 prisoners executed between 1977 and 1997, as compared with 134 electrocutions,nine killed by lethal gas, three by hanging, and two by firing squad.
Sixty-eight of the 74 executions during 1997 were by lethal injection, and six were by electrocution. Texas led the nation in executions, with 37. Virginia had nine; Missouri had six; Arkansas four; Alabama three; Arizona, Illinois, and South Carolina two each; and the remaining nine states one each. Of the74 men executed, 41 were non-Hispanic white, 26 non-Hispanic African American, four white Hispanic, and one each black Hispanic, American Indian, and Asian American.
Sources
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Capital Punishment 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 1998.
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