Petitioner
Troy Leon Gregg
Respondent
State of Georgia
Petitioner's Claim
That the death penalty, even when imposed under the safeguards applied in thestate of Georgia, violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
G. Hughel Harrison
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
G. Thomas Davis
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
2 July 1976
Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the death penalty as imposed by Georgia.
Significance
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court had declared that thedeath penalty was unconstitutional. Over the next few years, a change in justices, as well as the imposition of certain procedures to prevent arbitrariness and prejudice in state trials of capital crimes, resulted in a changed attitude towards capital punishment.
Troy Gregg was charged with two counts each of armed robbery and murder. At his trial, evidence was presented that Gregg, together with a traveling companion, Floyd Allen, had been hitchhiking north in Florida when, on 21 November1973, they had been picked up by Fred Simmons and Bob Moore. After their carbroke down, Simmons purchased another with cash that he was carrying, and thefour traveled on together into Georgia, where they stopped at a highway reststop. The next morning, Simmons's and Moore's bodies were found in a nearbyditch. Allen and Gregg, who were riding in Simmons's car, were picked up thenext afternoon by police. Claiming self-defense, Gregg signed a confession admitting he had shot, then robbed, Simmons and Moore. Allen, however, told police that Gregg had first threatened to rob the two victims after they left the car. When they started to climb up an embankment towards the car, Allen said, Gregg climbed up on the automobile in order to improve his aim. After felling the two men, Gregg shot each in the head, execution style, and robbed them of their valuables.
Owing to a U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Furman v. Georgia (1972), that had been handed down just the year before, the state of Georgia had implemented new procedures for trying criminal defendants charged with crimes punishable by death. Before Furman, in which the Court for the first time struck down the death penalty as unconstitutional, the decision of whether or notto impose capital punishment had been more or less left to the unlimited discretion of juries. The result was often arbitrary, with African-American, poor, or socially disadvantaged defendants being sentenced to death in disproportionate numbers. After Furman, all 36 states that authorized the deathpenalty halted executions while procedural safeguards were put in place.
In Georgia, the legislature adopted the following provisions: 1) in trials for capital offenses, guilt or innocence is determined in the first part of a two-part trial, during which the judge is required to instruct the jury aboutthe possibility of finding guilt for other, lesser offenses, 2) after a verdict is handed down, another hearing is conducted as to the possible presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances that could affect the sentence imposed, 3) at least one of 10 aggravating circumstances (such as the defendant having a prior criminal record) must exist before the death penalty could be imposed, 4) after the death sentence is imposed, it is automatically appealedin order to determine whether it was fairly imposed and is proportional to the crime, and 5) if the death penalty is upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court,that court must include in its decision references to other, similar cases the court has considered.
The trial judge in Gregg followed these procedures. He advised the jury that it could impose either life-in-prison or the death penalty for each ofthe crimes charged and that it could consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He instructed the jury that the death sentence would apply only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murders were committed under any of three possible scenarios that could be considered aggravating: 1) that they were committed in the course of committing other capital crimes, 2)that they were committed to facilitate robbery, or 3) that they were outrageously inhumane. The jury found that the first two aggravating circumstances applied and sentenced Gregg to death. The Georgia Supreme Court, following thenew statutory guidelines, upheld the sentence, finding that it was neither excessive nor arbitrary. It did, however, reverse the sentences for robbery, finding that the death penalty was rarely imposed for this crime. Gregg then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In Furman, the Court had declined to declare the death penalty a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The reason given in this case for outlawing capital punishment was that itwas improperly administered. With the adoption and application of court rules such as those under consideration in Gregg, this objection seemed tohave been answered. The Court upheld the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court. Justices Brennan and Marshall were the two dissenting votes; in Gregg, as in every death penalty case that came before the Court during their tenures, the dissenting justices found capital punishment a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Death Penalty Upheld Under Certain Circumstances
The justices were unable to agree on a single opinion, but Justices Stewart,Powell, and Stevens spoke for the seven-member majority. The Eighth Amendmentprohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was not a static concept, they declared. Instead, it was subject to the public's evolving standards of decency. At the time the Constitution and Bill of Rights were drafted, capitalpunishment was a common practice. Although less common in the latter half ofthe twentieth century, the ultimate punishment was still endorsed by publicopinion as expressed in the legislation of a majority of the states. Accordingly, the Court was obliged to defer to public acceptance of the appropriateness of the death penalty as punishment for certain crimes, provided that it was imposed under strict conditions designed to rule out cruelty and unfairness:
Subsequent critics have pointed out the disparity between the Court's claim that the Eighth Amendment embodies a concept of fundamental human decency andits endorsement of a wide variety of considerations by state courts in deathpenalty cases. How, these critics ask, can a single standard for evaluating the appropriateness of the death penalty be squared with a proliferation of rules for its application? Seen from this perspective, Gregg gave statespermission to continue to impose the death penalty without providing much guidance as to how this should be done. For some Court observers--as well as for Justices Brennan and Marshall--the Gregg decision had only succeededin perpetuating the arbitrariness Furman condemned.
Related Cases
Caryl Chessman Trial
After eight stays of execution, the convicted "Red Light Bandit," Caryl Chessman, was put to death 2 May 1960, just seconds before a ninth stay of execution was telephoned. The case was significant due to the generation of worldwide attention and sympathy for Chessman's documented struggle against capital punishment and the U.S. death penalty process.
The main point of argument for a new trial had been that after Chessman had been sentenced 21 May 1948, the court reporter, Ernest Perry, died of coronarythrombosis, leaving behind 1,800 pages of shorthand testimony to be transcribed. Under California law, if the court reporter dies before transcribing hisnotes a new trial must be held. On 25 June 1948, Judge Charles W. Fricke ruled that a new trial would not be given since Chessman's case was criminal andnot civil. In September of 1948 the job of transcribing the notes was givento Stanley Fraser, the uncle of the prosecutor in the case who also receivedthree times the standard pay rate to complete the transcription. Other issuesof rulings made by Fricke, as well as the unbalanced jury of 11 women and one man in a sexual assault case added to Chessman's plea for a new trial.
Sources
Knappman, Edward W., ed. Great American Trials. Detroit, MI: Visible Ink Press, 1994.
Troy Leon Gregg
Respondent
State of Georgia
Petitioner's Claim
That the death penalty, even when imposed under the safeguards applied in thestate of Georgia, violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
G. Hughel Harrison
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
G. Thomas Davis
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart (writing for the Court), Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
2 July 1976
Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the death penalty as imposed by Georgia.
Significance
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court had declared that thedeath penalty was unconstitutional. Over the next few years, a change in justices, as well as the imposition of certain procedures to prevent arbitrariness and prejudice in state trials of capital crimes, resulted in a changed attitude towards capital punishment.
Troy Gregg was charged with two counts each of armed robbery and murder. At his trial, evidence was presented that Gregg, together with a traveling companion, Floyd Allen, had been hitchhiking north in Florida when, on 21 November1973, they had been picked up by Fred Simmons and Bob Moore. After their carbroke down, Simmons purchased another with cash that he was carrying, and thefour traveled on together into Georgia, where they stopped at a highway reststop. The next morning, Simmons's and Moore's bodies were found in a nearbyditch. Allen and Gregg, who were riding in Simmons's car, were picked up thenext afternoon by police. Claiming self-defense, Gregg signed a confession admitting he had shot, then robbed, Simmons and Moore. Allen, however, told police that Gregg had first threatened to rob the two victims after they left the car. When they started to climb up an embankment towards the car, Allen said, Gregg climbed up on the automobile in order to improve his aim. After felling the two men, Gregg shot each in the head, execution style, and robbed them of their valuables.
Owing to a U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Furman v. Georgia (1972), that had been handed down just the year before, the state of Georgia had implemented new procedures for trying criminal defendants charged with crimes punishable by death. Before Furman, in which the Court for the first time struck down the death penalty as unconstitutional, the decision of whether or notto impose capital punishment had been more or less left to the unlimited discretion of juries. The result was often arbitrary, with African-American, poor, or socially disadvantaged defendants being sentenced to death in disproportionate numbers. After Furman, all 36 states that authorized the deathpenalty halted executions while procedural safeguards were put in place.
In Georgia, the legislature adopted the following provisions: 1) in trials for capital offenses, guilt or innocence is determined in the first part of a two-part trial, during which the judge is required to instruct the jury aboutthe possibility of finding guilt for other, lesser offenses, 2) after a verdict is handed down, another hearing is conducted as to the possible presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances that could affect the sentence imposed, 3) at least one of 10 aggravating circumstances (such as the defendant having a prior criminal record) must exist before the death penalty could be imposed, 4) after the death sentence is imposed, it is automatically appealedin order to determine whether it was fairly imposed and is proportional to the crime, and 5) if the death penalty is upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court,that court must include in its decision references to other, similar cases the court has considered.
The trial judge in Gregg followed these procedures. He advised the jury that it could impose either life-in-prison or the death penalty for each ofthe crimes charged and that it could consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He instructed the jury that the death sentence would apply only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murders were committed under any of three possible scenarios that could be considered aggravating: 1) that they were committed in the course of committing other capital crimes, 2)that they were committed to facilitate robbery, or 3) that they were outrageously inhumane. The jury found that the first two aggravating circumstances applied and sentenced Gregg to death. The Georgia Supreme Court, following thenew statutory guidelines, upheld the sentence, finding that it was neither excessive nor arbitrary. It did, however, reverse the sentences for robbery, finding that the death penalty was rarely imposed for this crime. Gregg then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In Furman, the Court had declined to declare the death penalty a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The reason given in this case for outlawing capital punishment was that itwas improperly administered. With the adoption and application of court rules such as those under consideration in Gregg, this objection seemed tohave been answered. The Court upheld the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court. Justices Brennan and Marshall were the two dissenting votes; in Gregg, as in every death penalty case that came before the Court during their tenures, the dissenting justices found capital punishment a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Death Penalty Upheld Under Certain Circumstances
The justices were unable to agree on a single opinion, but Justices Stewart,Powell, and Stevens spoke for the seven-member majority. The Eighth Amendmentprohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was not a static concept, they declared. Instead, it was subject to the public's evolving standards of decency. At the time the Constitution and Bill of Rights were drafted, capitalpunishment was a common practice. Although less common in the latter half ofthe twentieth century, the ultimate punishment was still endorsed by publicopinion as expressed in the legislation of a majority of the states. Accordingly, the Court was obliged to defer to public acceptance of the appropriateness of the death penalty as punishment for certain crimes, provided that it was imposed under strict conditions designed to rule out cruelty and unfairness:
[O]ur cases . . . make clear that public perceptions are not conclusive. A penalty also must accord with "the dignity of man," which is the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment." This means, at least, that the punishment not be "excessive." When a form of punishment in the abstract (in this case, whether capital punishment may ever be imposed as a sanction formurder) rather than in the particular (the propriety of death as a penalty to be applied to a specific defendant for a specific crime) is under consideration, the inquiry into "excessiveness" has two aspects. First, the punishmentmust not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . Second,the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of thecrime.
Subsequent critics have pointed out the disparity between the Court's claim that the Eighth Amendment embodies a concept of fundamental human decency andits endorsement of a wide variety of considerations by state courts in deathpenalty cases. How, these critics ask, can a single standard for evaluating the appropriateness of the death penalty be squared with a proliferation of rules for its application? Seen from this perspective, Gregg gave statespermission to continue to impose the death penalty without providing much guidance as to how this should be done. For some Court observers--as well as for Justices Brennan and Marshall--the Gregg decision had only succeededin perpetuating the arbitrariness Furman condemned.
Related Cases
- Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
- Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
- Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
- Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1976).
Caryl Chessman Trial
After eight stays of execution, the convicted "Red Light Bandit," Caryl Chessman, was put to death 2 May 1960, just seconds before a ninth stay of execution was telephoned. The case was significant due to the generation of worldwide attention and sympathy for Chessman's documented struggle against capital punishment and the U.S. death penalty process.
The main point of argument for a new trial had been that after Chessman had been sentenced 21 May 1948, the court reporter, Ernest Perry, died of coronarythrombosis, leaving behind 1,800 pages of shorthand testimony to be transcribed. Under California law, if the court reporter dies before transcribing hisnotes a new trial must be held. On 25 June 1948, Judge Charles W. Fricke ruled that a new trial would not be given since Chessman's case was criminal andnot civil. In September of 1948 the job of transcribing the notes was givento Stanley Fraser, the uncle of the prosecutor in the case who also receivedthree times the standard pay rate to complete the transcription. Other issuesof rulings made by Fricke, as well as the unbalanced jury of 11 women and one man in a sexual assault case added to Chessman's plea for a new trial.
Sources
Knappman, Edward W., ed. Great American Trials. Detroit, MI: Visible Ink Press, 1994.
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