New York Times v. Sullivan - Further Readings

Appellant
The New York Times Company
Appellee
L. B. Sullivan
Appellant's Claim
That the Supreme Court of Alabama's affirmation of a libel judgment against the Times violated the free speech and due process rights as defined bythe First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution and certain SupremeCourt decisions; also, that an advertisement published in the Times was not libelous and the Supreme Court should reverse the decision of the Alabama trial court.
Chief Lawyers for Appellant
Herbert Brownell, Thomas F. Daly and Herbert Wechsler
Chief Lawyers for Appellee
Sam Rice Baker, M. Roland Nachman, Jr. and Robert E. Steiner III
Justices for the Court
Hugo Lafayette Black, William J. Brennan, Jr. (writing for the Court), Tom C.Clark, William O. Douglas, Arthur Goldberg, John Marshall Harlan II, PotterStewart, Earl Warren, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
9 March 1964
Decision
The Alabama courts' decisions were reversed.
Significance
The U.S. Supreme Court limited for the first time states' authority to awardlibel damages based on individual state laws and defined "actual malice" as anational standard for determining libel cases involving public figures.
On 23 March 1960 an organization calling itself the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South" paid the New York Times to publish a certain advertisement. The ad took up one full pageand was a call for public support and money to defend Reverend Martin LutherKing, Jr. and the civil rights struggle in the South. Bearing the caption "Heed Their Rising Voices" in large, bold print, the ad was published in the 29March 1960 edition of the Times.
The ad criticized several Southern jurisdictions, including the city of Montgomery, Alabama, for breaking up various civil rights demonstrations. No individual was mentioned by name. Further, the ad declared that "Southern violators of the Constitution" were determined to destroy King and his movement. Thereference was to the entire South, not just Montgomery and other localities,and again no individual was mentioned by name.
Over 600,000 copies of the 29 March 1960 Times edition carrying the adwere printed. Only a couple hundred went to Alabama subscribers. MontgomeryCity Commissioner L.B. Sullivan learned of the ad through an editorial in a local newspaper. Incensed, on 19 April 1960 Sullivan sued the Times forlibel in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. Sullivan claimed that the ad's reference to Montgomery and to "Southern violators of the Constitution" had the effect of defaming him, and he demanded $500,000 in compensation.
On 3 November 1960 the circuit court found the Times guilty and awarded Sullivan the full $500,000 in damages. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court judgment on 30 August 1962. In its opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court gave an extremely broad definition of libel:

Where thewords published tend to injure a person libeled by them in his reputation, profession, trade or business, or charge him with an indictable offense, or tends to bring the individual into public contempt [they] are libelous per se .. . We hold that the matter complained of [by Sullivan] is, under the above doctrine, libelous per se.

Supreme Court Protects the Press
On 9 March 1964, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Alabama courts' decisions, holding that Alabama libel law violated the Times's First Amendment rights. Justice Brennan stated for the Court that:

We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of thepress that are required by the First [Amendment] in a libel action brought bya public official against critics of his official conduct.

The Court was in fact only recognizing what Alabama's own newspapers had beensaying, namely that Alabama's libel law was a powerful tool in the hands ofanti-civil rights officials. The Montgomery Advertiser had even printed an edition (before the Sullivan case went to the Court) with the headline "STATE FINDS FORMIDABLE LEGAL CLUB TO SWING AT OUT-OF-STATE PRESS," reporting that "State and city authorities have found a formidable legal bludgeon to swing at out-of-state newspapers whose reporters cover racial incidentsin Alabama." The Court's decision invalidated Alabama's overly broad libel law so that it could not be used anymore to threaten freedom of the press.
Next, Justice Brennan stated what the Court had determined was the proper basis of libel law under the First Amendment in cases involving publications concerning public officials:

The constitutional guarantees require,we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice."

Sullivan had not proven that the Times acted with actual malice, so even if Alabama's libel law was not unconstitutional, his lawsuit still had tobe rejected. The Court defined actual malice as: " . . . knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
In certain libel lawsuits after New York Times v. Sullivan, the Courtexpanded the First Amendment's protection. For any "public figure" to sue forlibel, he would have to prove actual malice. The Court has said that publicfigures include anyone widely known in the community, not just public officials. Further, anyone accused of libel is protected by this actual malice requirement, not just newspapers like the Times. The Sullivan case was a tremendous advance for personal as well as press freedom of speech, andit prevented legitimate criticism and social commentary from being suppressedby the threat of damaging libel lawsuits. Sullivan has not, however,become a license to print anything that the papers see fit: as in Reynoldsv. Pegler, defendants who do act with actual malice are subject to severe penalties.
Related Cases

• Stromberg v. California,283 U.S. 359 (1931).
  
• DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
  
• Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
  
• Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
  
• Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
  
• Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
  
• NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).

Actual Malice Standards
Until 1964, each state used its own standards to determine what was considered libelous. This changed after the U.S. Supreme Court decision of New YorkTimes v. Sullivan. This landmark case established the criteria that would be used nationwide when determining libel cases involving public officials.
The Court stated that "actual malice" must be shown by the publishers of alleged libelous material, when the falseness of the material is proven. JusticeWilliam J. Brennan, Jr., author of the decision, clarified this further. He stated that to show malice in a libel case, information had to have been printed despite "knowledge" of its falsity, or "with reckless disregard of whetherit was false or not."
This standard was later broadened by the High Court to include not only public officials, but also "public figures." This includes well known individualsoutside of public office who receive media attention, such as athletes, writers, entertainers, and others who have celebrity status.
Sources
Cornell. http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/
http://www.usia.gov/usa/infousa/media/unfetter/press08.htm