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Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily - Further Readings

Petitioner
James Zurcher, Chief of Police of Palo Alto
Respondent
The Stanford Daily
Petitioner's Claim
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments did not prohibit third party search warrants, even if the third party is not suspected of a crime, and the First Amendment does not protect newspapers from such searches.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Robert K. Booth
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Jerome B. Falk, Jr.
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Byron R. White (writing for the Court)
Justices Dissenting
Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens, Potter Stewart, (William J. Brennan, Jr., did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
31 May 1978
Decision
Reversed a district court's ruling that a state is prevented by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments from issuing a search warrant to a third party not suspected of a crime.
Significance
The Court ruled that the First Amendment would not protect newspapers and other media outlets from third party search warrants and that such search warrants were not overly intrusive into the daily operations of newspapers.
What the First Amendment Protects and What the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments Prohibit
On 9 April 1971, after a telephone call from the director of Stanford University Hospital to remove demonstrators, officers from the Palo Alto Police Department and the Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department responded to the call.The demonstrators had occupied the hospital's administrative offices for a day-and-a half. Once at the hospital, officers were unable to persuade the demonstrators to leave. As officers forced their way into a corridor at the westend of the hospital, demonstrators sprang through the doors at the east endand attacked a group of nine officers with sticks and clubs. All of the officers were injured. The officers were only able to identify two assailants. Oneofficer, however, did see a photographer taking pictures at the east doors.No police photographers were present at the east doors and other possible eyewitnesses such as reporters and bystanders were stationed on the west side.
Two days after the melee, a special edition of the Stanford Daily, theuniversity's student newspaper, published articles and photographs on the incident. The byline credit on the photographs was a Daily staff memberand suggested that he was positioned at the east end of the hospital hallway,which enabled him to photograph the attack on the officers. One day after the Daily published the article and the photos, the Santa Clara County district attorney's office obtained a search warrant to search the Daily's offices for negatives, film and pictures of the demonstrations. The warrant made no suggestion that the newspaper or any staff member was involved with the criminal activity at the hospital. Four police officers search the Daily's offices later that same day. Some members of Daily staff were present at the time the search was executed. Staff members later claimed that police had gone beyond the limits of the search warrant, which the policeofficers denied.
A month after the search took place, the Daily and several staff members initiated a civil action in the U.S. District Court for Northern Districtof Columbia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants in thesuit included the chief of police, the district attorney and the judge who issued the search warrant. The Stanford Daily claimed that the search was unconstitutional because it violated its rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the request for an injunction, butgranted declaratory relief. The district court held that third party searchwarrants were unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reasoned that when the third party was a newspaper that the First Amendment issues were pertinent and that a search warrant was legal "only in therare circumstance where there is a clear showing that (1) important materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order would be futile." An appeals court affirmed the district court's ruling.
Justice White, writing for the majority, took issue with the district court'sanalysis of what was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
It is an understatement to say that there is no direct authority in this wayor any other federal court for the District Court's sweeping revision of theFourth Amendment. Under existing law, valid warrants may be issued to searchany property, whether or not occupied by a third party, at which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crimewill be found. Nothing on the face of the amendment suggests that a third-party search warrant should not normally issue.

Justice White reasoned that the whether the third party was suspected of criminal activity was irrelevant. The only issue was whether there was "reasonable cause to believe that the specific things to be searched for and seized arelocated on the property to which entry is sought."
The district court had also concluded that a search would be "physically disruptive" to newsroom operations; that it could potentially endanger any relationship with confidential sources; that such searches would expose the internal operations of a daily newspaper, and that the press would engage in self-censorship rather than risk certain information being sought by police. White wrote: "Properly administered, the preconditions for a warrant--probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness--should afford sufficient protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices." Finally, Justice White reasoned that to obtain a search warrant required meeting certain standards that would eliminate any undue burden to the press.
Justice Stewart in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall believed that the search of the Daily's offices violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of a free press. Justice Stewart agreed with the district court's reasoning that search warrants would place an extraordinary burden on the operations of a daily newspaper. He wrote: "Policemen occupying a newsroom and searching it thoroughly for what may be an extended period of time will inevitably interrupt its normal operations, and thus impair or even temporarily prevent the processes of newsgathering, writing, editing, and publishing." He found the potential breach to confidential sources even more hazardous. "Protection of those sources is necessary to ensure that the press canfulfill its constitutionally designated function of informing the public, because important information can often be obtained only by an assurance that the source will not be revealed." Ultimately, he feared that such searches would result in "a diminishing flow of potentially important information to the public." Justice Stewart concluded that warrants should only be issued when amagistrate finds probable cause and determines that attaining information through the less-intrusive means of delivering a subpoena is impossible. The benefit of a subpoena from the press's standpoint regards the fact that with a subpoena the newspaper would be able to challenge the request before the search was conducted. In situations involving a warrant, the newspaper would not be able to respond until after a search when "the constitutional protection ofthe newspaper has been irretrievably invaded," Justice Stewart wrote.
Impact
As a direct result of the Court's decision Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act in 1980. It required all law enforcement officers, local, state andfederal, to use subpoenas when attempting to gain potential evidence from themedia. The only time a search warrant can be used is when there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the materials will be destroyed if a subpoena is issued.
Related Cases

  • Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
  • Minneapolis & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460U.S. 575 (1983).
  • Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 408 U.S. 221 (1987).
  • Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
  • Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 633 (1991).

The Privacy Protection Act
The Privacy Protection Act of 1980 adds further strength to the media's Freedom of Press rights under the First Amendment. Specifically, the act providesguidelines that must be followed by law enforcement officials seeking accessto information in the possession of the media. The act imposes parameters upon authorities in connection to searches of newspapers when they are a "thirdparty" to a crime. This means the media may have information pertaining to acriminal activity, but are not directly involved.
In most cases, a search warrant must be obtained first if newspaper staff arenot suspected of criminal activity. Certain requirements must be met beforea judge will issue a search warrant. There must be "reasonable cause" for therequest of a search warrant. He or she must be convinced that evidence is located at the site addressed by the search warrant before issuance. An exception is made for the requirement of a search warrant if there's suspicion of criminal activity by newspaper personnel. Materials may also be seized if authorities have a legitimate belief that evidence may be destroyed, or to preventdeath or serious injury to an individual.
Sources
Cornell. http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/
Privacy Protection Act, http://stasi.bradley.edu/privacy/PPA.html

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