Petitioner
Time, Inc., publisher of Time magazine
Respondent
Mary Alice Firestone
Petitioner's Claim
That the finding of libel was inappropriate because the respondent was a public figure.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
John H. Pickering
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Edna L. Caruso
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White (John Paul Stevensdid not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
2 March 1976
Decision
That Firestone was not a public figure for the purposes of this trial; case remanded to state court for determination of whether defendant was at fault.
Significance
The Court was agreed to accept the principles of the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) verdict of two years earlier, which held that the nature ofthe person being allegedly defamed, rather than the nature of the issue which the defamation pertained to, would determine whether the plaintiff was a public figure and how much protection he or she was entitled to in matters of libel.
Russell Firestone, scion of a wealthy industrial family, married Mary Alice Firestone in 1961. The couple separated in 1964, and Mary Alice filed a complaint for separate maintenance. Russell countered with a suit for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. The divorce was granted by a Florida Circuit Court judge, whose decision read in part:
The divorce had attracted a good deal of media attention in Palm Beach, and somewhat less in the national media, but Mary Alice did hold a number of pressconferences during the course of the trial. Upon the announcement of the verdict, Time magazine ran a short announcement of the divorce in its "Milestones" department, saying that it was granted on the grounds for which itwas sought: extreme cruelty and adultery. This was based on a newspaper account, a wire story, and information the magazine received from a stringer and abureau chief. Mary Alice asked for a retraction, and when the magazine refused, she sued for libel, claiming the divorce was not stipulated on those points.
As is often the case with libel trials, there were several complicating points with the Firestone case. One was whether or not the divorce had, infact, been granted on the grounds for which it was sought. The Florida Supreme Court called the report a "flagrant example of journalistic negligence," noting that there was no possible way the divorce could have been granted on grounds of adultery, because alimony was granted to Mary Alice, whereas alimonywould not be granted under Florida law if a divorce was granted on those grounds. The divorce was granted, however, on the concept of "lack of domestication between the two parties," a concept that heretofore had no basis in Florida law and could have been considered a judicial error. Justice Powell in a concurring opinion and Justice Brennan in a dissent both entertained the ideathat the divorce decree was worded ambiguously enough that an interpretationthat the divorce was granted on the grounds of adultery was not wholly unreasonable. The Court decided, however, as the two Florida courts had before it,that Time's account was inaccurate.
Another question which the Court addressed was that of fault. Previous Supreme Court rulings had decreed that the media be given some room for understandable and honest mistakes, so that self-censorship not hamper the free communication of information and ideas. Florida law made no mention of fault being necessary for a finding of libel, and the state courts made no mention in theirjudgments, but freedom of the press being a constitutional issue, the federal criteria overrode the state rules. It was for this reason the case was remanded to the state courts for the matter of fault to be considered.
The issue of fault, however, was contingent upon the matter for which the case was most significant: the question of whether the allegedly libeled individual was a public figure or a private figure. The Court was fragmented in itsevaluation of the Firestone case--it produced no fewer than five opinions among the eight justices hearing the case--but seven of the eight judgesagreed on the answer to this question. Mary Alice Firestone was not a publicfigure, the Court decreed, and in so doing clarified a point with which it had been struggling for some years.
In 1964, with the New York Times v. Sullivan decision, the Supreme Court coined the concept of "actual malice." In what was seen as a victory for freedom of the press, the judgment held that for a libel case against a publicofficial to be won, the offending party must print false and damaging information with the knowledge of the information's falsity, or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or not. This gave leeway to the press, so that it does not need to constantly second-guess itself for fear of being sued foran honest mistake, but the decision did not explicitly address the question of when these rules would apply, based on the status of the litigants as public or private figures.
In 1967 the Court expanded the New York Times rule to cover public figures, such as celebrities or political activists, who were not public officials. In1974 with the Gertz case the Court did some important fine-tuning of these criteria. It decided that individuals who were well-known enough to haveaccess to the media, and thus the ability to correct erroneous reports adequately, would have to prove actual malice, as would individuals who deliberately thrust themselves into the public eye to influence some public issue. Thismoved the Court away from a trend in which it was trying to apply the actualmalice rules depending on whether a libel case involved a "public issue," hence the shifting of the focus from the issue to the individual. The Gertz decision found the Court heavily split, however, and created some doubt as to how future cases would be decided.
The Firestone decision, then, unified the Court on this point. The actual malice standard must be met for plaintiffs to receive damages if they aredeemed public figures, whereas private individuals may receive damages withmerely a finding of fault. Firestone was a major step toward clarifying an issue the Court had been wrestling with for a long time.
Related Cases
Time, Inc., publisher of Time magazine
Respondent
Mary Alice Firestone
Petitioner's Claim
That the finding of libel was inappropriate because the respondent was a public figure.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
John H. Pickering
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Edna L. Caruso
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), Potter Stewart
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White (John Paul Stevensdid not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
2 March 1976
Decision
That Firestone was not a public figure for the purposes of this trial; case remanded to state court for determination of whether defendant was at fault.
Significance
The Court was agreed to accept the principles of the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) verdict of two years earlier, which held that the nature ofthe person being allegedly defamed, rather than the nature of the issue which the defamation pertained to, would determine whether the plaintiff was a public figure and how much protection he or she was entitled to in matters of libel.
Russell Firestone, scion of a wealthy industrial family, married Mary Alice Firestone in 1961. The couple separated in 1964, and Mary Alice filed a complaint for separate maintenance. Russell countered with a suit for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. The divorce was granted by a Florida Circuit Court judge, whose decision read in part:
According to certain testimony in behalf of the defendant, extramarital escapades of the plaintiff (Mary Alice) were bizarre and of an amatory nature which would have made Dr. Freud's hair curl. Other testimony, in plaintiff's behalf, would indicate that defendant (Russell) was guilty of bounding from one bedpartner to another with the erotic zest of a satyr. The court is inclined to discount muchof this testimony as unreliable. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion and finding of the court that neither party is domesticated, within the meaning of that term as used by the Supreme Court of Florida . . . In the present case, itis abundantly clear from the evidence of marital discord that neither of theparties has shown the least susceptibility to domestication, and that the marriage should be dissolved.
The divorce had attracted a good deal of media attention in Palm Beach, and somewhat less in the national media, but Mary Alice did hold a number of pressconferences during the course of the trial. Upon the announcement of the verdict, Time magazine ran a short announcement of the divorce in its "Milestones" department, saying that it was granted on the grounds for which itwas sought: extreme cruelty and adultery. This was based on a newspaper account, a wire story, and information the magazine received from a stringer and abureau chief. Mary Alice asked for a retraction, and when the magazine refused, she sued for libel, claiming the divorce was not stipulated on those points.
As is often the case with libel trials, there were several complicating points with the Firestone case. One was whether or not the divorce had, infact, been granted on the grounds for which it was sought. The Florida Supreme Court called the report a "flagrant example of journalistic negligence," noting that there was no possible way the divorce could have been granted on grounds of adultery, because alimony was granted to Mary Alice, whereas alimonywould not be granted under Florida law if a divorce was granted on those grounds. The divorce was granted, however, on the concept of "lack of domestication between the two parties," a concept that heretofore had no basis in Florida law and could have been considered a judicial error. Justice Powell in a concurring opinion and Justice Brennan in a dissent both entertained the ideathat the divorce decree was worded ambiguously enough that an interpretationthat the divorce was granted on the grounds of adultery was not wholly unreasonable. The Court decided, however, as the two Florida courts had before it,that Time's account was inaccurate.
Another question which the Court addressed was that of fault. Previous Supreme Court rulings had decreed that the media be given some room for understandable and honest mistakes, so that self-censorship not hamper the free communication of information and ideas. Florida law made no mention of fault being necessary for a finding of libel, and the state courts made no mention in theirjudgments, but freedom of the press being a constitutional issue, the federal criteria overrode the state rules. It was for this reason the case was remanded to the state courts for the matter of fault to be considered.
The issue of fault, however, was contingent upon the matter for which the case was most significant: the question of whether the allegedly libeled individual was a public figure or a private figure. The Court was fragmented in itsevaluation of the Firestone case--it produced no fewer than five opinions among the eight justices hearing the case--but seven of the eight judgesagreed on the answer to this question. Mary Alice Firestone was not a publicfigure, the Court decreed, and in so doing clarified a point with which it had been struggling for some years.
In 1964, with the New York Times v. Sullivan decision, the Supreme Court coined the concept of "actual malice." In what was seen as a victory for freedom of the press, the judgment held that for a libel case against a publicofficial to be won, the offending party must print false and damaging information with the knowledge of the information's falsity, or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or not. This gave leeway to the press, so that it does not need to constantly second-guess itself for fear of being sued foran honest mistake, but the decision did not explicitly address the question of when these rules would apply, based on the status of the litigants as public or private figures.
In 1967 the Court expanded the New York Times rule to cover public figures, such as celebrities or political activists, who were not public officials. In1974 with the Gertz case the Court did some important fine-tuning of these criteria. It decided that individuals who were well-known enough to haveaccess to the media, and thus the ability to correct erroneous reports adequately, would have to prove actual malice, as would individuals who deliberately thrust themselves into the public eye to influence some public issue. Thismoved the Court away from a trend in which it was trying to apply the actualmalice rules depending on whether a libel case involved a "public issue," hence the shifting of the focus from the issue to the individual. The Gertz decision found the Court heavily split, however, and created some doubt as to how future cases would be decided.
The Firestone decision, then, unified the Court on this point. The actual malice standard must be met for plaintiffs to receive damages if they aredeemed public figures, whereas private individuals may receive damages withmerely a finding of fault. Firestone was a major step toward clarifying an issue the Court had been wrestling with for a long time.
Related Cases
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
- Cox Broadcasting Corp, v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
Further Readings
- Brooklyn Law Review, Summer, 1976, p. 123.
- Creighton Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 351.
- DePaul Law Review, Summer, 1977, p. 863.
- Mercer Law Review,Vol. 38, p. 809.
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