Ladue v. Gilleo

Petitioner
City of Ladue, et al.
Respondent
Margaret P. Gilleo
Petitioner's Claim
That the city of Ladue's ban on residential signs except in ten exempted cases did not violate Margaret Gilleo's First Amendment right to free speech.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Jordan B. Cherrick
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Gerald P. Greiman
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens(writing for the Court), Clarence Thomas
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
13 June 1994
Decision
Upheld the lower court's ruling that the city of Ladue's ban on residential signs did in fact violate Margaret Gilleo's First Amendment right to free speech.
Significance
The ruling affirmed the Supreme Court's belief that a city cannot infringe upon the free speech rights of its inhabitants without a compelling reason to do so. In this case the city's desire to reduce clutter in residential areas was found not to be compelling enough to justify a ban on signage.
The Facts of the Case
Margaret P. Gilleo, a citizen of Ladue, Missouri, placed a sign outside her home calling for an end to the Persian Gulf War. The city informed her that her sign was banned under a local law which prohibited signs in residential areas. Its justification for banning the sign was that widespread display of signs would make the city look cluttered and ugly. Gilleo fought to keep her sign where it was and won a case in district court stopping the city from enforcing its ordinance. She then placed another sign, reading "For Peace in the Gulf," in her front window. The Ladue City Council responded by passing a new law that banned all signs over a certain size that were not covered by ten specific exemptions (such as "For Sale" and "Beware of Dog" signs). The city hoped this new ban would pass constitutional muster. Margaret Gilleo believed itviolated her right to free speech and filed a new action in district court challenging the revised law.
The Lower Courts Rule
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found for Margaret Gilleo. It held the new law unconstitutional and ordered the city of Ladueto stop enforcing it. The case then went to the U.S. Court of Appeals, whichaffirmed the decision. It asserted the city was choosing to regulate Gilleo's free speech on the basis of what she was saying, rather than its stated reason of eliminating clutter. It also found that the city's reasons for banningsigns, while valid, were not compelling enough to warrant such a content-based restriction. The city of Ladue then appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
The Supreme Court Rules
On 13 June 1994, the Supreme Court issued its decision. It affirmed the rulings of the lower courts, holding that the new Ladue city ordinance violated Margaret Gilleo's right to free speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the unanimous majority, with Justice O'Connor writing a concurring opinion The Supreme Court based its decision on four key points.
The first point made by Stevens was that, although cities have a right to regulate the placement of signs, they cannot enforce the law selectively based on the messages contained in the signs. However, in this case, the Supreme Court accepted from the outset that the city of Ladue's law banning signs did not discriminate on the basis of content. It simply found that the city's interest in regulating clutter was outweighed by Gilleo's right to express her opinion.
In its second point, the Supreme Court asserted that the city of Ladue had "almost completely foreclosed" on a vital means of expression by its citizens.Even if not done on the basis of content, the banning of an entire media--inthis case signs--poses too much of a threat to the free speech of citizens tobe allowed to stand.
Third, the Court rejected the city's claim that Gilleo could have found othermeans of expressing her viewpoint, such as pamphlets or newspaper advertisements. The Court ruled that personal signs are a unique way of expressing one's opinion and cannot be equated with other methods of expression. As JusticeStevens wrote, "Residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient formof communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility,a yard or window sign may have no practical substitute." Therefore the citycould not choke off this avenue entirely without severe free speech repercussions.
Finally, the Court sought to put the issue at hand into a historical context.It affirmed Americans' special regard for individual liberty in the home andwarned against government attempts to restrict a person's ability to speak there. The Court also suggested that Ladue residents' own interest in maintaining their property values would prompt them to police themselves on the issueof rampant proliferation of signs. Justice Stevens wrote, "We are confidentthat more temperate measures could in large part satisfy Ladue's stated regulatory needs without harm to the First Amendment rights of its citizens. As currently framed, however, the ordinance abridges those rights."
Impact
Ladue v. Gilleo reaffirmed the U.S. Supreme Court's commitment to strict scrutiny of all governmental attempts to restrict free speech. It established a precedent for future cases in which the balance between state regulation of signage and the rights of expression come into conflict.
Related Cases

• First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
  
• Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
  
• Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).