Appellant
Pruneyard Shopping Center and Fred Sahadi, owner
Appellee
Michael Robins, et al.
Appellant's Claim
That a provision of the California Constitution guaranteeing an individual'sright to free speech at privately owned shopping centers violates the owner'sproperty and free speech rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Max L. Gillam, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Philip L. Hammer
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), JohnPaul Stevens, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
9 June 1980
Decision
Denied the appellant's claim and affirmed the ruling of the California Supreme Court.
Significance
Although the Court had previously found that the Constitution did not guarantee freedom of speech at privately owned shopping centers, this ruling grantedstates a greater latitude of freedom under their own constitutions.
Starting in 1939, the U.S. Supreme Court began to develop the "public forum"doctrine in free speech issues. Controversial protests or leafleting were protected if they occurred in a public forum, though government could set limitson the "time, place and manner" of the speech. Most of the cases that further shaped this doctrine dealt with public spaces or government property. Eventually, the Court also considered if and when a privately owned area could serve as a public forum.
Shopping centers were often the subject of debate, as different political groups tried to picket or distribute information in these privately owned retailareas, and the owners tried to stop them. After some initial inconsistency in the Court's decisions regarding First Amendment protections in a shopping center, the Court clarified its stance in Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board (1976). Shopping centers were not public forums, and they couldrestrict speech, as long as they did it independently, without any state involvement or encouragement.
In 1980, however, a California case tested whether states could compel a shopping center to allow some displays of expression, with certain time, place, and manner restrictions. On a Saturday afternoon, a group of high school students, including Michael Robins, set up a table in the central courtyard at thePruneyard Shopping Center. The center included more than 65 stores, ten restaurants, and a movie theater. The students handed out pamphlets and collectedsignatures for a petition that criticized a United Nations resolution that condemned Zionism, a form of Jewish nationalism.
After a short while, a Pruneyard security guard told the students to leave, as their activities violated the shopping center's regulations against the circulation of petitions. Later, Robins and the other students sued the shoppingcenter in California Superior Court.
The State's Constitutional Guarantee of Free Speech
Both the superior court and the California Court of Appeals ruled that the students did not have a federal or state constitutional right of expression ata privately owned shopping center. The state supreme court, however, overruled this decision. In its interpretation of the state constitution, the supremecourt said the students had a right of expression and petition on private property, as long as it was "reasonably exercised."
Fred Sahadi, the owner of Pruneyard, argued that giving people the right to distribute pamphlets at the center infringed on his property rights. The California Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that Pruneyard attracted 25,000 people a day, and "a handful of additional orderly persons, soliciting signaturesand distributing handbills . . . would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights."
Appealing the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Pruneyard owner again argued for the protection of his property rights. The Court had previously ruled that those rights included the right to exclude others from private property.Pruneyard also claimed that it had First Amendment rights not to be compelledby the state to let others use its land as a public forum. The Court, however, voted unanimously to affirm the decision of the California Supreme Court.
Justice Rehnquist wrote the decision, and he first examined the appellant's claims regarding property rights. He acknowledged that the Court earlier, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972), stated that private property remains private, even when the public is invited to use the land for shopping or other purposes. But the Lloyd decision, Rehnquist continued, did not " . . . limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereignright to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."
As far as the right to exclude, Pruneyard had argued that if it lost that right, the state was in effect unfairly "taking" its property, which was prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. But the Court said not every infringement on property rights constitutes a taking in the constitutional sense, and ensuring freedom of expression at the property owner's expense was not an unconstitutional taking. "There is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center."
The First Amendment Concerns
On the First Amendment issue, the owner of the center cited a precedent thatsaid states may not force an individual to display any kind of ideological message. The case cited, Wooley v. Maynard (1977) which involved a Jehovah's Witness who covered up the New Hampshire state motto, "Live Free or Die," on his car's license plate. Rehnquist, however, said that case was completely different from Pruneyard. The shopping center is open to the public, and the view expressed by a group distributing pamphlets would not necessarily be associated with the owner. Also, the state was not compelling Pruneyard to display one specific message. "Finally," Rehnquist concluded, " . . . appellants can expressly disavow any connection with the message simply by posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand."
Although all nine justices agreed with the judgment in Pruneyard, twoof them took issue with the last section, regarding the First Amendment. Justice Powell, in an opinion joined by Justice White, asserted the appellants had not made a convincing argument. But Powell worried about other instances where property owners might be compelled to let others express opinions the owner did not share. "I do not interpret our decision today as a blanket approval for state efforts to transform privately owned commercial property into public forums. Any such state action would raise substantial federal constitutional questions not present in this case."
Related Cases
Are Malls Public Places?
Should privately owned malls or shopping centers be treated as public places?If the answer is yes, a mall owner cannot restrict the exercise of First Amendment freedoms on his property any more than governments can restrict expression in public places.
Proponents contend the general public has essentially unrestricted access toshopping malls. As such, malls serve the functional equivalent of a community's business district. Whether the mall is publicly or privately owned would not be apparent, and an individual would not normally be aware that he was onprivate property. Therefore, when a shopping mall owner invites the public onto his property to conduct business, he gives up a degree of privacy rights in the public interest.
Opponents point out that even though malls are generally accessible to the public, they do not have all the features of a public business district and still maintain their private character. The public has an invitation to come tothe shopping center to do business with its tenants but has no open-ended invitation to use the center for any and all purposes. Privately-owned malls arenot dedicated to public use and should not be required to permit activitiesunrelated to the mall's business.
Sources
Joan Biskupic and Elder Witt, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1997.
Pruneyard Shopping Center and Fred Sahadi, owner
Appellee
Michael Robins, et al.
Appellant's Claim
That a provision of the California Constitution guaranteeing an individual'sright to free speech at privately owned shopping centers violates the owner'sproperty and free speech rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Max L. Gillam, Jr.
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Philip L. Hammer
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist (writing for the Court), JohnPaul Stevens, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
None
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
9 June 1980
Decision
Denied the appellant's claim and affirmed the ruling of the California Supreme Court.
Significance
Although the Court had previously found that the Constitution did not guarantee freedom of speech at privately owned shopping centers, this ruling grantedstates a greater latitude of freedom under their own constitutions.
Starting in 1939, the U.S. Supreme Court began to develop the "public forum"doctrine in free speech issues. Controversial protests or leafleting were protected if they occurred in a public forum, though government could set limitson the "time, place and manner" of the speech. Most of the cases that further shaped this doctrine dealt with public spaces or government property. Eventually, the Court also considered if and when a privately owned area could serve as a public forum.
Shopping centers were often the subject of debate, as different political groups tried to picket or distribute information in these privately owned retailareas, and the owners tried to stop them. After some initial inconsistency in the Court's decisions regarding First Amendment protections in a shopping center, the Court clarified its stance in Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board (1976). Shopping centers were not public forums, and they couldrestrict speech, as long as they did it independently, without any state involvement or encouragement.
In 1980, however, a California case tested whether states could compel a shopping center to allow some displays of expression, with certain time, place, and manner restrictions. On a Saturday afternoon, a group of high school students, including Michael Robins, set up a table in the central courtyard at thePruneyard Shopping Center. The center included more than 65 stores, ten restaurants, and a movie theater. The students handed out pamphlets and collectedsignatures for a petition that criticized a United Nations resolution that condemned Zionism, a form of Jewish nationalism.
After a short while, a Pruneyard security guard told the students to leave, as their activities violated the shopping center's regulations against the circulation of petitions. Later, Robins and the other students sued the shoppingcenter in California Superior Court.
The State's Constitutional Guarantee of Free Speech
Both the superior court and the California Court of Appeals ruled that the students did not have a federal or state constitutional right of expression ata privately owned shopping center. The state supreme court, however, overruled this decision. In its interpretation of the state constitution, the supremecourt said the students had a right of expression and petition on private property, as long as it was "reasonably exercised."
Fred Sahadi, the owner of Pruneyard, argued that giving people the right to distribute pamphlets at the center infringed on his property rights. The California Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that Pruneyard attracted 25,000 people a day, and "a handful of additional orderly persons, soliciting signaturesand distributing handbills . . . would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights."
Appealing the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Pruneyard owner again argued for the protection of his property rights. The Court had previously ruled that those rights included the right to exclude others from private property.Pruneyard also claimed that it had First Amendment rights not to be compelledby the state to let others use its land as a public forum. The Court, however, voted unanimously to affirm the decision of the California Supreme Court.
Justice Rehnquist wrote the decision, and he first examined the appellant's claims regarding property rights. He acknowledged that the Court earlier, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972), stated that private property remains private, even when the public is invited to use the land for shopping or other purposes. But the Lloyd decision, Rehnquist continued, did not " . . . limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereignright to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."
As far as the right to exclude, Pruneyard had argued that if it lost that right, the state was in effect unfairly "taking" its property, which was prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. But the Court said not every infringement on property rights constitutes a taking in the constitutional sense, and ensuring freedom of expression at the property owner's expense was not an unconstitutional taking. "There is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center."
The First Amendment Concerns
On the First Amendment issue, the owner of the center cited a precedent thatsaid states may not force an individual to display any kind of ideological message. The case cited, Wooley v. Maynard (1977) which involved a Jehovah's Witness who covered up the New Hampshire state motto, "Live Free or Die," on his car's license plate. Rehnquist, however, said that case was completely different from Pruneyard. The shopping center is open to the public, and the view expressed by a group distributing pamphlets would not necessarily be associated with the owner. Also, the state was not compelling Pruneyard to display one specific message. "Finally," Rehnquist concluded, " . . . appellants can expressly disavow any connection with the message simply by posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand."
Although all nine justices agreed with the judgment in Pruneyard, twoof them took issue with the last section, regarding the First Amendment. Justice Powell, in an opinion joined by Justice White, asserted the appellants had not made a convincing argument. But Powell worried about other instances where property owners might be compelled to let others express opinions the owner did not share. "I do not interpret our decision today as a blanket approval for state efforts to transform privately owned commercial property into public forums. Any such state action would raise substantial federal constitutional questions not present in this case."
Related Cases
- Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
- West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
- Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
- Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 705 (1972).
- Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
- Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 242 U.S. 507 (1976).
- Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
- Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
Are Malls Public Places?
Should privately owned malls or shopping centers be treated as public places?If the answer is yes, a mall owner cannot restrict the exercise of First Amendment freedoms on his property any more than governments can restrict expression in public places.
Proponents contend the general public has essentially unrestricted access toshopping malls. As such, malls serve the functional equivalent of a community's business district. Whether the mall is publicly or privately owned would not be apparent, and an individual would not normally be aware that he was onprivate property. Therefore, when a shopping mall owner invites the public onto his property to conduct business, he gives up a degree of privacy rights in the public interest.
Opponents point out that even though malls are generally accessible to the public, they do not have all the features of a public business district and still maintain their private character. The public has an invitation to come tothe shopping center to do business with its tenants but has no open-ended invitation to use the center for any and all purposes. Privately-owned malls arenot dedicated to public use and should not be required to permit activitiesunrelated to the mall's business.
Sources
Joan Biskupic and Elder Witt, Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1997.
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