Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Petitioner
Ronald Hutchinson
Respondent
Senator William Proxmire
Petitioner's Claim
That negative statements against Hutchinson issued by Senator Proxmire in a press release, a newsletter, and a television interview are not protected under the Speech or Debate Clause.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Michael E. Cavanaugh
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Alan Raywid
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Warren E. Burger (writing for the Court), William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr.
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1979
Decision
That the privileges of the Speech or Debate Clause do not extend to press releases, newsletters, and other communications not "essential to the deliberations of the Senate."
Significance
The Supreme Court ruled that a speech made on the floor of the Senate cannotbe protected under the Speech or Debate Clause if it is reprinted in the formof a newsletter, an interview, or a release to the media. The decision reaffirmed the rule set down in Gravel v. United States regarding the nature of official communication.
In the mid-1970s, Senator William Proxmire became well-known for his "GoldenFleece of the Month Award." This dubious honor was given to persons and institutions whom the senator believed had wasted taxpayer money on ridiculous orunnecessary projects. In April of 1975, Proxmire gave one of these awards toDr. Ronald Hutchinson of the National Science Foundation, for his research into the ways animals deal with stress. In a speech on the floor of the Senate,Proxmire ridiculed Hutchinson's work as the study of why monkeys "grind their teeth." This speech was protected under the Speech or Debate Clause of theU.S. Constitution, meaning Hutchinson could not sue Proxmire for libel.
However, Proxmire kept up his barrage against Hutchinson outside the Senate floor. He sent a newsletter to his constituents touting the Golden Fleece Award, issued a press release on the subject, and spoke about it in a televisioninterview. In these communications, Proxmire referred to Hutchinson's work as"monkey business" and urged Congress to "put a stop to the bite Hutchinson and the bureaucrats who fund him have been taking out of the taxpayer." Hutchinson sued Proxmire for damages, claiming that Proxmire's remarks had damagedhis professional reputation and hindered his ability to make a living as a scientist.
The District Court's Ruling
The federal district court ruled in favor of Proxmire. It held that the pressrelease was part of the process by which a senator keeps constituents informed of his or her activities. As a result, it was protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. As for the interview and the newsletter, those too were held tobe protected speech under the First Amendment. Later, an appeals court affirmed this ruling. It even added the newsletter to the category of "informing functions" protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. The courts threw out thedamage claims made by Hutchinson against Proxmire.
The Supreme Court Steps In
Next, the U.S. Supreme Court chose to hear the case. It hoped to resolve several key issues, the first of which it stated very clearly:

Whethera Member of Congress is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution . . . against suits for allegedly defamatory statements made by a Member in press releases and newsletters.

The decision hinged on how the Court defined "legislative business":

Whatever imprecision there may be in the term "legislative activities," itis clear that nothing in the explicit language of the [Speech or Debate] Clause suggests any intention to create an absolute privilege from liability orsuit for defamatory statements made outside the Chamber.

After deliberating, eight of the nine justices--with only Justice Brennan dissenting--held against Proxmire. They chose to define "legislative activity" narrowly, excluding things like newsletters and press releases:

Valuable and desirable as it may be in broad terms, the transmittal of such information by individual members in order to inform the public and other Membersis not a part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make upthe legislative process. As a result, transmittal of such information by press releases and newsletters is not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.

The principle that press releases and newsletters are not a part of the legislative process had in fact been explicitly stated by the Court in an earliercase, United States v. Brewster. In that decision, the Court wrote:

It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage inmany activities other than the purely legislative activities protected by theSpeech or Debate Clause. These include . . . preparing so-called "news letters" to constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered outside the Congress.

Finally, the Court addressed Senator Proxmire's contention that Ronald Hutchinson was a "public figure." If this were true, his libel claim would be invalid, because public figures can claim libel only when they are attacked by statements made with "actual malice" where the attacker knows that the claims are false. To be considered a public figure, Hutchinson would have to have regular and continuing access to the media or have thrust himself into the publicspotlight. The Court found neither of these things to be true. Therefore, itheld that Hutchinson was not a public figure and his claim of libel was valid.
Like Gravel v. United States, Hutchinson v. Proxmire provided important clarification on the breadth of the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. It defined the nature of "legislative activities" more preciselythan ever before and put clear limits on the speech protections afforded tomembers of Congress.
Related Cases

• Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934).
  
• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
  
• United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
  
• Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
  
• Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).

Speech or Debate Clause
The Constitutional Convention of the late 1700s placed the Speech or Debate Clause into Article I, Section 6, Clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution. The clause protects members of Congress from prosecution for their activities relatedto the legislative process. Legislative activities within the Senate or House that may not be part of a prosecution against a member include speeches anddebates, preparing committee reports, voting, conducting committee hearings,and any other task required by the nature and execution of the office.
Legislators are even protected from prosecution when accused of violating another individual's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has held, "Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of the legislative duty . . . for the public good." The protection, although not absolute, extends to congressional aides if their duties involve legislative activities amember of Congress would perform.
Since protection is limited only to conduct which is part of the legislativeprocess, legislators' remarks published in newsletters, made in press releases, or on television are not immune from prosecution. Taking a bribe to influence legislation also falls outside the immunity. In striking a balance, the clause can not be interpreted so broadly as to allow erosion of the legislature's integrity.
Sources
Biskupic, Joan and Witt, Elder. Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1997.