Plaintiff
Albert Smith, President of the Village of Skokie, Illinois
Defendant
Frank Collin, on behalf of the National Socialist Party of America
Plaintiff's Claim
That Skokie had illegally prevented the American Nazis from holding a political march.
Chief Lawyer for Plaintiff
Gilbert Gordon, Harvey Schwartz
Chief Defense Lawyer
David A. Goldberger
Judge
U.S. District Court Judge Bernard M. Decker
Place
Chicago, Illinois
Date of Decision
2 December 1977
Decision
That Skokie could not prevent the Nazis from marching.
Significance
Despite the fact that the Nazis had deliberately chosen a heavily Jewish community to march in, the courts stuck firm to the First Amendment principle that unpopular groups must be allowed to express their political opinions.
Prior to World War II, there was a small yet fairly significant Nazi movementin the United States, which grew out of the German-American Bund. After thewar, the movement was discredited, and survived only due to the leadership ofGeorge Lincoln Rockwell, who was assassinated in 1967. As with other fringegroups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, hatred and prejudice kept the National Socialist Party of America alive with a small but vocal membership. In the mid-1970s, to generate publicity and attract new members, Nazi leader Frank Collintargeted the Chicago, Illinois suburb of Skokie as a site for a series of marches and demonstrations.
Over half of Skokie's 70,000 residents were Jewish, and many were survivors of German concentration camps. Seeing Nazi marchers and the swastika was boundto bring back tragic memories. Skokie was initially successful in getting aninjunction against any Nazi marches from the Illinois state courts, but theSupreme Court summarily dismissed the injunction as unconstitutionally infringing the Nazis' First Amendment right to political expression. Determined toprotect its Jewish residents, on 2 May 1977, Skokie decided to thwart the Nazis by passing a series of municipal ordinances. The ordinances required any group wishing to stage a public demonstration to obtain $350,000 in liabilityand property insurance, and forbade the dissemination of racist literature and the wearing of military-style uniforms by group members during such demonstrations. The Nazis promptly took Albert Smith, president of the Village of Skokie, and other municipal officials to court.
Nazis Must be Allowed to March
Ironically, both sides were represented by Jewish attorneys. David A. Goldberger from the American Civil Liberties Union represented the Nazis; Gilbert Gordon and Harvey Schwartz represented Smith and Skokie. The case was heard before U.S. District Court Judge Bernard M. Decker in Chicago on 2 December 1977.
Collin was brutally honest about his party's beliefs. He stated that the Nazis believed blacks were inferior, and that Jews were involved in an international financial and communist conspiracy. Further, Collin testified that the Nazis deliberately copied the military uniform style of the notorious "Brownshirts" of Hitler's Third Reich:
On 23 February 1978 Decker issued his decision. Stating that "it is better toallow those who preach racial hate to expend their venom in rhetoric ratherthan to be panicked into embarking on the dangerous course of permitting thegovernment to decide what its citizens may say and hear," Decker held that the ordinances violated the First Amendment and were unenforceable.
Skokie appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and thecase was argued on 14 April 1978. On 22 May 1978, the Seventh Circuit refused to overturn Decker's decision:
Finally, Skokie asked the Supreme Court to review the case, a procedure called "petition for a writ of certiorari." On 16 October 1978 the justicesof the Supreme Court voted to deny certiorari, and so Decker's original decision was upheld. Justices Harry Blackmun and Byron White, however, dissented. Blackmun and White felt that the Court should make an official pronouncement on the important First Amendment issues in the Skokie litigation, andnot just let the lower court decision stand by default:
There was now nothing to prevent Collin and the Nazis, victorious in the courts, from marching in Skokie. Collin, however, abruptly called the march off.Declaring that his aim had been to generate "pure agitation to restore our right to free speech," Collin proclaimed the whole affair a moral victory for the Nazis and never marched in Skokie. Whether the Skokie affair was a victoryfor the Nazis is debatable, but it was certainly a victory for the right ofevery minority group, no matter how unpopular, to express its political viewswithout government interference.
Related Cases
Albert Smith, President of the Village of Skokie, Illinois
Defendant
Frank Collin, on behalf of the National Socialist Party of America
Plaintiff's Claim
That Skokie had illegally prevented the American Nazis from holding a political march.
Chief Lawyer for Plaintiff
Gilbert Gordon, Harvey Schwartz
Chief Defense Lawyer
David A. Goldberger
Judge
U.S. District Court Judge Bernard M. Decker
Place
Chicago, Illinois
Date of Decision
2 December 1977
Decision
That Skokie could not prevent the Nazis from marching.
Significance
Despite the fact that the Nazis had deliberately chosen a heavily Jewish community to march in, the courts stuck firm to the First Amendment principle that unpopular groups must be allowed to express their political opinions.
Prior to World War II, there was a small yet fairly significant Nazi movementin the United States, which grew out of the German-American Bund. After thewar, the movement was discredited, and survived only due to the leadership ofGeorge Lincoln Rockwell, who was assassinated in 1967. As with other fringegroups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, hatred and prejudice kept the National Socialist Party of America alive with a small but vocal membership. In the mid-1970s, to generate publicity and attract new members, Nazi leader Frank Collintargeted the Chicago, Illinois suburb of Skokie as a site for a series of marches and demonstrations.
Over half of Skokie's 70,000 residents were Jewish, and many were survivors of German concentration camps. Seeing Nazi marchers and the swastika was boundto bring back tragic memories. Skokie was initially successful in getting aninjunction against any Nazi marches from the Illinois state courts, but theSupreme Court summarily dismissed the injunction as unconstitutionally infringing the Nazis' First Amendment right to political expression. Determined toprotect its Jewish residents, on 2 May 1977, Skokie decided to thwart the Nazis by passing a series of municipal ordinances. The ordinances required any group wishing to stage a public demonstration to obtain $350,000 in liabilityand property insurance, and forbade the dissemination of racist literature and the wearing of military-style uniforms by group members during such demonstrations. The Nazis promptly took Albert Smith, president of the Village of Skokie, and other municipal officials to court.
Nazis Must be Allowed to March
Ironically, both sides were represented by Jewish attorneys. David A. Goldberger from the American Civil Liberties Union represented the Nazis; Gilbert Gordon and Harvey Schwartz represented Smith and Skokie. The case was heard before U.S. District Court Judge Bernard M. Decker in Chicago on 2 December 1977.
Collin was brutally honest about his party's beliefs. He stated that the Nazis believed blacks were inferior, and that Jews were involved in an international financial and communist conspiracy. Further, Collin testified that the Nazis deliberately copied the military uniform style of the notorious "Brownshirts" of Hitler's Third Reich:
We wear brown shirts with a dark brown tie, a swastika pin on the tie, a leather shoulder strap, a black belt with buckle, dark brown trousers, black engineer boots, and either a steel helmet or a cloth cap, depending on the situation, plus a swastika arm band on the left arm and an American flag patch on the right arm.
On 23 February 1978 Decker issued his decision. Stating that "it is better toallow those who preach racial hate to expend their venom in rhetoric ratherthan to be panicked into embarking on the dangerous course of permitting thegovernment to decide what its citizens may say and hear," Decker held that the ordinances violated the First Amendment and were unenforceable.
Skokie appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and thecase was argued on 14 April 1978. On 22 May 1978, the Seventh Circuit refused to overturn Decker's decision:
No authorities need be cited toestablish the proposition, which the Village does not dispute, that First Amendment rights are truly precious and fundamental to our national life. Nor isthis truth without relevance to the saddening historical images this case inevitably arouses. It is, after all, in part the fact that our constitutionalsystem protects minorities unpopular at a particular time or place from government harassment and intimidation, that distinguishes life in this country from life under the Third Reich.
Finally, Skokie asked the Supreme Court to review the case, a procedure called "petition for a writ of certiorari." On 16 October 1978 the justicesof the Supreme Court voted to deny certiorari, and so Decker's original decision was upheld. Justices Harry Blackmun and Byron White, however, dissented. Blackmun and White felt that the Court should make an official pronouncement on the important First Amendment issues in the Skokie litigation, andnot just let the lower court decision stand by default:
[We] feel that the present case affords the Court an opportunity to consider whether,in the context of the facts that this record appears to present, there is nolimit whatsoever to the exercise of free speech. There indeed may be no suchlimit, but when citizens assert, not casually but with deep conviction, thatthe proposed demonstration is scheduled at a place and in a manner that is taunting and overwhelmingly offensive to the citizens of that place, that assertion, uncomfortable though it may be for judges, deserves to be examined. Itjust might fall into the same category as one's "right" to cry "fire" in a crowded theater, for "the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." [Quoting Schenck v. United States.]
There was now nothing to prevent Collin and the Nazis, victorious in the courts, from marching in Skokie. Collin, however, abruptly called the march off.Declaring that his aim had been to generate "pure agitation to restore our right to free speech," Collin proclaimed the whole affair a moral victory for the Nazis and never marched in Skokie. Whether the Skokie affair was a victoryfor the Nazis is debatable, but it was certainly a victory for the right ofevery minority group, no matter how unpopular, to express its political viewswithout government interference.
Related Cases
- Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
- Hurley v. Irish American GLIB Association, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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