Petitioner
Elmer Gertz
Respondent
Robert Welch, Inc.
Petitioner's Claim
That an article in the respondent's magazine had defamed him, and that the respondent was liable for damages.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Wayne B. Giampietro
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Clyde J. Watts
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, William O. Douglas, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 June 1974
Decision
The Court overruled the court of appeals and district court rulings and heldthat the respondent was liable for damages.
Significance
The decision established a precedent for libel cases involving private individuals. Unlike public officials or public figures, private individuals did notneed to establish actual malice in order to receive damages.
Defamation in Common Law
Laws governing defamation evolved from English common law and remained basically constant until the 1960s. Traditionally, plaintiffs in defamation suits needed only to prove that defendants had published defamatory statements aboutthem. In most cases, unless defendants could establish that the statements were true, they were then subjected to strict liability. Strict liability, also known as liability without fault, applies to a defendant regardless of negligence. Thus a defendant who handles dangerous substances such as poisonous snakes--or words--is liable for any accidents that may occur, no matter how much care is exercised. The burden of proof was on defendants, as encouragementfor them to check facts thoroughly before publication.
Damages were typically awarded without proof of actual loss. The loss in question was usually loss of reputation, and loss of reputation was difficult toestablish in court. The actual (or compensatory) damages were often monetarysums arrived at with little reference to actual monetary loss. Punitive damages could then be awarded with proof of actual malice (knowingly or recklesslypublishing falsehoods).
Precedent
In New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), the Court held that, except in acase of actual malice, the press enjoyed a constitutional protection againstsuch liability if the defamed person was a public official. The Court reasoned that the common law burden of proof on the press would stifle free speechand discourage democratic debate. Decisions following New York Times,such as Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967), extended this protection to media statements about public figures, as well as public officials. Oneoutstanding question was whether the media were still protected if the objectof defamation was a private individual.
This was the question before the Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia (1971). The decision in Rosenbloom did little to clarify a confusing issue. The Court announced a variety of opinions, reflecting a range of approaches to the New York Times precedent. The plurality, composed of Brennan,Burger, and Blackmun, concluded that the New York Times standard applied to the private individual, if the individual was involved in an event ofpublic or general interest. Justice Black concurred, but on the grounds thatthe First Amendment granted the media absolute protection from liability. White also concurred, with yet another line of reasoning: Private individuals who were affected by or involved in official business of public servants were not protected.
Justice Harlan dissented. Private persons are less able to effectively, publicly rebut defamation. They have also not voluntarily exposed themselves to public scrutiny. Marshall wrote, in a dissent joined by Stewart, that the public or general interest test employed by the plurality would require that the Court decide "what information is relevant to self government." He also felt that the Court's decision did not sufficiently protect private persons from defamation. He concluded that that the states should be "essentially free to continue the evolution of the common law of defamation" using any standard other than strict liability.
TheGertz Case
It was in this confused legal context that Elmer Gertz brought his suit. Gertz, a lawyer, had represented the family of a murder victim in civil litigation against the murderer, a Chicago policeman named Richard Nuccio. The respondent's magazine, American Opinion, then printed a story titled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio and The War On Police." The story alleged that Gertz was part of a conspiracy to overthrow the police, in order to clear the way for a communist dictatorship. The article presented several falsehoods: that Gertz had a police file, that he was involved in Marxist organizations, that he wasa Leninist. The managing editor of the magazine did not fact-check the article.
Gertz sued for libel in district court. Robert Welch, Inc., first moved to dismiss the complaint, as it did not make a specific claim for damages. The court ruled that Gertz need not claim special damages as the case involved libelper se. The respondent then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that Gertz was a public figure and that the article involved a matter ofpublic concern. The district court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, but apparently agreed with the respondent that the New York Times standard applied for the reasons given. The burden was therefore on Gertz to show that the respondent had acted with actual malice.
In the trial, the court decided that because Gertz was not a public figure, the respondent was not protected, despite the fact that the article was on a matter of public interest. But after a jury awarded $50,000 to Gertz, the court reconsidered and ruled for the respondent, deciding that discussion of public speech was indeed protected.
The court of appeals, to which Gertz turned next, considered Rosenbloom v.Metromedia, Inc. (1971), a precedent for protecting any media presentation of a matter of public interest, not just those involving public figures. Because Gertz failed to present any evidence of actual malice, the court upheld the district court's ruling. The case then proceeded to the Supreme Court.
A Balance
The Court faced the same general problem here as in Rosenbloom: how tostrike a balance between freedom of speech and of the press, on one hand, and the rights of the individual, on the other. Justice Powell, writing for themajority, laid out the dangers:
Rejecting the possibility that courts proceed on a case-by-case basis, the Court laid out some guidelines. Echoing Harlan in his Rosenbloom dissent, the Court noted that 1) private individuals cannot so easily rebut defamatory statements and 2) they have not voluntarily put themselves in the public eye, and thus do not willingly assume the risk of defamation. Therefore, "private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officialsand public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery."
The Court repudiated Rosenbloom's "public or general interest" test, claiming that it did not serve either side of the dispute. It did not adequately protect private individuals, but neither did it protect the media in casesin which the subject matter was not considered to be of public interest. And, again recalling a dissent in Rosenbloom, the Court noted Marshall'swarning that the courts should not decide what information people need to govern themselves.
The Court left it to the states to define an appropriate standard of liability, as long as it was not strict liability. States might award damages in theabsence of actual malice, but the Court set a limit: In cases using a standard less stringent than New York Times, plaintiffs could recover compensation only for actual injury. Juries would not be permitted to award punitivedamages.
Gertz Not a Public Figure
Last, the Court addressed the respondent's argument that Gertz was in fact either a public figure or a public official. In the Court's view, he was neither. Unless all lawyers were regarded as "public officials," Gertz clearly didnot belong in that category. As to the "public figure" designation, the Courtidentified two types: all-purpose and limited-purpose. The all-purpose public figure was famous (or notorious) in all contexts. The limited-purpose public figure was well-known, either voluntarily or not, in the context of one particular public controversy. Despite the fact that Gertz was active in professional organizations and civic groups, he was not well-known enough to qualifyas a public figure.
The Court therefore reversed the lower court's ruling. The New York Times standard did not apply in this case. The original jury award of $50,000 had to be reconsidered, though, because the jury had imposed strict liability.
Impact
In Gertz the Court attempted to formulate a test to identify public figures. Lower courts have not been able to discern a clear precedent, though,particularly for the limited-purpose public figure. They have thus produced inconsistent and unpredictable judgments regarding who is a public figure. Theeffect is a press unsure of its protection when commenting on certain individuals, resulting perhaps in some self-censorship.
Related Cases
Definition of a Public Figure
In 1974 the U.S. Supreme Court established the definition of a public figure.The case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. provided a useful characterization that could be applied by other courts deciding libel cases.
The Court allowed that while a person could become a "public figure" withoutspecific action on his or her own, this happened rarely. Rather, they found it more likely that individuals had " . . . assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society." For example, anyone running for political office becomes more vulnerable to public scrutiny and media attention. Other wellknown individuals like entertainers, writers, athletes, and other celebrities are considered public figures too.
In some instances, persons become viewed as public figures because of involvement in a controversial public issue. The general recognition accorded them as a result of the controversy may subsequently allow the person to influencethe outcome of the issue. This may be referred to as the "public controversy"test.
Finally, the Court asserted that in many cases people are considered public figures because of the enormous power and influence they wield in general.
Sources
Cornell. http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/.
Findlaw. http://www.findlaw.com/casecode/supreme.html.
http://law.vill.edu/Fed-Ct/Supreme/Flite/opinions.418US323.htm.
Elmer Gertz
Respondent
Robert Welch, Inc.
Petitioner's Claim
That an article in the respondent's magazine had defamed him, and that the respondent was liable for damages.
Chief Lawyer for Petitioner
Wayne B. Giampietro
Chief Lawyer for Respondent
Clyde J. Watts
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (writing for the Court), William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart
Justices Dissenting
William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, William O. Douglas, Byron R. White
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
25 June 1974
Decision
The Court overruled the court of appeals and district court rulings and heldthat the respondent was liable for damages.
Significance
The decision established a precedent for libel cases involving private individuals. Unlike public officials or public figures, private individuals did notneed to establish actual malice in order to receive damages.
Defamation in Common Law
Laws governing defamation evolved from English common law and remained basically constant until the 1960s. Traditionally, plaintiffs in defamation suits needed only to prove that defendants had published defamatory statements aboutthem. In most cases, unless defendants could establish that the statements were true, they were then subjected to strict liability. Strict liability, also known as liability without fault, applies to a defendant regardless of negligence. Thus a defendant who handles dangerous substances such as poisonous snakes--or words--is liable for any accidents that may occur, no matter how much care is exercised. The burden of proof was on defendants, as encouragementfor them to check facts thoroughly before publication.
Damages were typically awarded without proof of actual loss. The loss in question was usually loss of reputation, and loss of reputation was difficult toestablish in court. The actual (or compensatory) damages were often monetarysums arrived at with little reference to actual monetary loss. Punitive damages could then be awarded with proof of actual malice (knowingly or recklesslypublishing falsehoods).
Precedent
In New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), the Court held that, except in acase of actual malice, the press enjoyed a constitutional protection againstsuch liability if the defamed person was a public official. The Court reasoned that the common law burden of proof on the press would stifle free speechand discourage democratic debate. Decisions following New York Times,such as Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967), extended this protection to media statements about public figures, as well as public officials. Oneoutstanding question was whether the media were still protected if the objectof defamation was a private individual.
This was the question before the Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia (1971). The decision in Rosenbloom did little to clarify a confusing issue. The Court announced a variety of opinions, reflecting a range of approaches to the New York Times precedent. The plurality, composed of Brennan,Burger, and Blackmun, concluded that the New York Times standard applied to the private individual, if the individual was involved in an event ofpublic or general interest. Justice Black concurred, but on the grounds thatthe First Amendment granted the media absolute protection from liability. White also concurred, with yet another line of reasoning: Private individuals who were affected by or involved in official business of public servants were not protected.
Justice Harlan dissented. Private persons are less able to effectively, publicly rebut defamation. They have also not voluntarily exposed themselves to public scrutiny. Marshall wrote, in a dissent joined by Stewart, that the public or general interest test employed by the plurality would require that the Court decide "what information is relevant to self government." He also felt that the Court's decision did not sufficiently protect private persons from defamation. He concluded that that the states should be "essentially free to continue the evolution of the common law of defamation" using any standard other than strict liability.
TheGertz Case
It was in this confused legal context that Elmer Gertz brought his suit. Gertz, a lawyer, had represented the family of a murder victim in civil litigation against the murderer, a Chicago policeman named Richard Nuccio. The respondent's magazine, American Opinion, then printed a story titled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio and The War On Police." The story alleged that Gertz was part of a conspiracy to overthrow the police, in order to clear the way for a communist dictatorship. The article presented several falsehoods: that Gertz had a police file, that he was involved in Marxist organizations, that he wasa Leninist. The managing editor of the magazine did not fact-check the article.
Gertz sued for libel in district court. Robert Welch, Inc., first moved to dismiss the complaint, as it did not make a specific claim for damages. The court ruled that Gertz need not claim special damages as the case involved libelper se. The respondent then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that Gertz was a public figure and that the article involved a matter ofpublic concern. The district court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, but apparently agreed with the respondent that the New York Times standard applied for the reasons given. The burden was therefore on Gertz to show that the respondent had acted with actual malice.
In the trial, the court decided that because Gertz was not a public figure, the respondent was not protected, despite the fact that the article was on a matter of public interest. But after a jury awarded $50,000 to Gertz, the court reconsidered and ruled for the respondent, deciding that discussion of public speech was indeed protected.
The court of appeals, to which Gertz turned next, considered Rosenbloom v.Metromedia, Inc. (1971), a precedent for protecting any media presentation of a matter of public interest, not just those involving public figures. Because Gertz failed to present any evidence of actual malice, the court upheld the district court's ruling. The case then proceeded to the Supreme Court.
A Balance
The Court faced the same general problem here as in Rosenbloom: how tostrike a balance between freedom of speech and of the press, on one hand, and the rights of the individual, on the other. Justice Powell, writing for themajority, laid out the dangers:
Although the erroneous statementof fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate . . . And the punishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press . . . Allowing the media to avoid liability only byproving the truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate protection to First Amendment liberties.On the other hand, the statedoes have an interest in protecting the individual from wrongful injury by the press.
Rejecting the possibility that courts proceed on a case-by-case basis, the Court laid out some guidelines. Echoing Harlan in his Rosenbloom dissent, the Court noted that 1) private individuals cannot so easily rebut defamatory statements and 2) they have not voluntarily put themselves in the public eye, and thus do not willingly assume the risk of defamation. Therefore, "private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officialsand public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery."
The Court repudiated Rosenbloom's "public or general interest" test, claiming that it did not serve either side of the dispute. It did not adequately protect private individuals, but neither did it protect the media in casesin which the subject matter was not considered to be of public interest. And, again recalling a dissent in Rosenbloom, the Court noted Marshall'swarning that the courts should not decide what information people need to govern themselves.
The Court left it to the states to define an appropriate standard of liability, as long as it was not strict liability. States might award damages in theabsence of actual malice, but the Court set a limit: In cases using a standard less stringent than New York Times, plaintiffs could recover compensation only for actual injury. Juries would not be permitted to award punitivedamages.
Gertz Not a Public Figure
Last, the Court addressed the respondent's argument that Gertz was in fact either a public figure or a public official. In the Court's view, he was neither. Unless all lawyers were regarded as "public officials," Gertz clearly didnot belong in that category. As to the "public figure" designation, the Courtidentified two types: all-purpose and limited-purpose. The all-purpose public figure was famous (or notorious) in all contexts. The limited-purpose public figure was well-known, either voluntarily or not, in the context of one particular public controversy. Despite the fact that Gertz was active in professional organizations and civic groups, he was not well-known enough to qualifyas a public figure.
The Court therefore reversed the lower court's ruling. The New York Times standard did not apply in this case. The original jury award of $50,000 had to be reconsidered, though, because the jury had imposed strict liability.
Impact
In Gertz the Court attempted to formulate a test to identify public figures. Lower courts have not been able to discern a clear precedent, though,particularly for the limited-purpose public figure. They have thus produced inconsistent and unpredictable judgments regarding who is a public figure. Theeffect is a press unsure of its protection when commenting on certain individuals, resulting perhaps in some self-censorship.
Related Cases
- New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
- Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
- Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Definition of a Public Figure
In 1974 the U.S. Supreme Court established the definition of a public figure.The case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. provided a useful characterization that could be applied by other courts deciding libel cases.
The Court allowed that while a person could become a "public figure" withoutspecific action on his or her own, this happened rarely. Rather, they found it more likely that individuals had " . . . assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society." For example, anyone running for political office becomes more vulnerable to public scrutiny and media attention. Other wellknown individuals like entertainers, writers, athletes, and other celebrities are considered public figures too.
In some instances, persons become viewed as public figures because of involvement in a controversial public issue. The general recognition accorded them as a result of the controversy may subsequently allow the person to influencethe outcome of the issue. This may be referred to as the "public controversy"test.
Finally, the Court asserted that in many cases people are considered public figures because of the enormous power and influence they wield in general.
Sources
Cornell. http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/.
Findlaw. http://www.findlaw.com/casecode/supreme.html.
http://law.vill.edu/Fed-Ct/Supreme/Flite/opinions.418US323.htm.
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