Appellant
Richard Grayned
Appellee
City of Rockford
Appellant's Claim
That he should not have been convicted for his participation in a demonstration that allegedly violated the city of Rockford's anti-picketing and antinoise ordinances because the ordinances were overbroad and should be struck down.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Sophia H. Hall
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
William E. Collins
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Thurgood Marshall (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William O. Douglas
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1972
Decision
That the anti-picketing ordinance was overbroad and was therefore invalid; that the antinoise ordinance, which prohibited only noise that took place neara public school and might disrupt school activity, was valid; and that therefore Grayned's conviction under the anti-picketing ordinance was reversed while his conviction under the antinoise ordinance was upheld.
Significance
Although the Court upheld the antinoise ordinance, it gave a ringing endorsement to the right of access to "a public forum," affirming that citizens havea broad right to freely express their political views in a variety of publicplaces.
On 25 April 1969, some 200 people gathered outside of West Senior High Schoolin Rockford, Illinois. This group had been trying to change things at West Senior High for some time. They had made formal proposals to the school board,but they had been turned down. Now they were staging a demonstration. The picket signs they carried told what their demands were: "Black cheerleaders tocheer too," "Black history with black teachers," "Equal rights, Negro counselors."
Most of the demonstrators were African American students who had been advisedby a faculty member to choose this way of fighting for their rights. They were also joined by former students, family members, and other concerned citizens. Everyone had been told that they must walk quietly, hand in hand, no whispering, no talking. They gathered on a sidewalk about 100 feet from the school building, and began to march.
Who Made the Noise?
At this point, witnesses disagree about what happened. Demonstrators and their supporters claimed that the demonstrators remained quiet and orderly at alltimes. They admitted that there was noise, but they said that most of it came from the 25 police officers who were stationed nearby, using loudspeakers to explain that there was a law against this kind of picketing in Rockford andto tell demonstrators that they might be arrested.
Witnesses who supported the police told a different story. They said that thedemonstrators cheered and chanted, insulting the police officers. They saidthat this noisy demonstration caused hundreds of students to jump up from their desks and line up at the windows to watch, that some demonstrators calledto their friends to leave class and join the demonstration, that many students were late to class because they had been watching the demonstration, and that in general, the demonstration had seriously disrupted the school day.
Everyone agrees that the picketing lasted only 20 to 30 minutes, and that itwas, in the words of one police officer, "very orderly." Everyone also agreesthat Richard Grayned, whose brother and twin sisters were students at the school, made no noise whatsoever as he marched with the group. Nevertheless, hewas one of some 40 demonstrators arrested.
Grayned--along with the other demonstrators--was arrested under two ordinances of the city of Rockford. One of them was an anti-picketing ordinance that prohibited picketing within a certain distance of a public school around the time that school was in session. Another was an antinoise ordinance that prohibited "the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof . . . "
Grayned was interested in more than just reversing his own conviction under the two ordinances. He wanted to strike down both laws, which made any kind ofschool-oriented demonstration impossible. Since the school board had not responded to their original demands, Grayned and others in his community wantedto be able to keep working to win their demands, through peaceful protests aswell as through other means.
Broad Laws and Specific Restrictions
When Grayned's case finally made it to the Supreme Court, the Court had justrecently ruled on another anti-picketing ordinance in the city of Chicago, very similar to the one in Rockford. The Court had invalidated the Chicago ordinance, and so they invalidated the Rockford one as well. That left only the antinoise ordinance.
The Court had to answer the two questions of whether the ordinance too was vague, and was it too broad. Those were the charges brought by Grayned. Clearly, a vague law is not a fair law, because its vagueness makes it too easy forpolice and juries to apply the law only against the people they don't like, rather than treating everyone equally. Likewise, a broad law, while outlawingsome bad things, might at the same time outlaw some activities that are actually protected by the Constitution. To be fair, laws have to be precise and specific.
Justice Marshall, who wrote the decision for the Court, spent a great deal oftime emphasizing that people have a right to protest, to express themselvesfreely, and to engage in protests that take place at or near a school, even while the school is in session. The right to free speech is protected by the First Amendment, and Marshall wanted to be sure that the Rockford law did notcontradict the First Amendment in any way.
However, Marshall also pointed out that honoring the First Amendment does notmean that there are no restrictions on how ideas are expressed. He gave theexample of people who want to hold two parades at once, on the same street. Clearly, a city has the right to give a permit to only one group, to prevent the disruption that having two parades would cause. Likewise, if people want to hold the parade on a busy street during rush hour, a city could forbid theparade on the grounds that it would cause too many traffic problems.
In other words, Marshall said, cities and other branches of government had the right to place "reasonable `time, place and manner' regulations" to protectcertain governmental interests. However, these regulations had to be so clear that no one could interpret them differently for different groups--they hadto apply in the same way to everybody.
In addition, the regulations had to be so specific that they only prohibitedthe part of free expression that would actually interfere with those governmental interests. For example, a law might forbid someone from making a political speech in a library reading room, but the law should allow a silent protest in a library reading room, while allowing the noisier speech in a public park.
By those standards, Marshall said, the city of Rockford's ordinance was neither too vague nor too broad. The Court recognized that communities have a right to protect their schools. If noise or disturbances will disrupt the schoolday or incite students to leave the classroom, then certainly, the Court felt, a community has a right to take action. The city of Rockford's antinoise ordinance was precisely limited to just that type of noise that might disrupt the school day. Therefore, the Court upheld it--and Grayned's conviction underit.
The Lone Dissenter
Every one of the Court's nine justices agreed that the city of Rockford's antinoise ordinance was appropriately specific. However, Justice Douglas did dissent from one part of Marshall's opinion. He felt that the demonstration thatGrayned had been a part of, which had always been intended as a silent demonstration, was not actually in violation of the antinoise ordinance. "There was noise," Douglas wrote, "but most of it was made by the police . . . "
As a result, Douglas wrote, Grayned's conviction should certainly be overturned, even though Grayned's argument had not rested on his own behavior, but only the question of the ordinance being too broad. Douglas felt that if the ordinance really was not too broad, it should not be understood to apply to thedemonstration that Grayned had been a part of--and it certainly should not have been applied to Grayned himself.
Related Cases
When is picketing constitutionally protected?
Picketing is normally a peaceful carrying of signs and banners clearly advertising a grievance or the purpose of a demonstration. It is a recognized meansof communication.
Beginning in the 1930s, some states sought to hinder the development of laborunions by passing laws prohibiting pickets. The states argued picketing is conduct, not speech, and, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment. In1941 the Supreme Court concluded, however, that peaceful picketing is a constitutionally protected means of transmitting ideas.
The guarantee of free expression has often been weighed against a state's desire to preserve public peace through picketing restrictions. Normally, picketing that becomes an instrument of force, vandalism, intimidation, or coercionis not protected by the First Amendment. Similarly, First Amendment protection does not apply to picketing that is part of other conduct violating statelaw. For example, if the purpose of picketing is to force an employer to replace his non-union workers with union workers, the activity would be contraryto a state's valid right-to-work law. The Court would uphold a state's actionto stop the picketing. Therefore, the First Amendment protects from state restriction all non-violent picketing that is not part of other illegal conduct.
Sources
Biskupic, Joan and Witt, Elder. Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1997.
Richard Grayned
Appellee
City of Rockford
Appellant's Claim
That he should not have been convicted for his participation in a demonstration that allegedly violated the city of Rockford's anti-picketing and antinoise ordinances because the ordinances were overbroad and should be struck down.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Sophia H. Hall
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
William E. Collins
Justices for the Court
Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., Warren E. Burger, Thurgood Marshall (writing for the Court), Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
Justices Dissenting
William O. Douglas
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
26 June 1972
Decision
That the anti-picketing ordinance was overbroad and was therefore invalid; that the antinoise ordinance, which prohibited only noise that took place neara public school and might disrupt school activity, was valid; and that therefore Grayned's conviction under the anti-picketing ordinance was reversed while his conviction under the antinoise ordinance was upheld.
Significance
Although the Court upheld the antinoise ordinance, it gave a ringing endorsement to the right of access to "a public forum," affirming that citizens havea broad right to freely express their political views in a variety of publicplaces.
On 25 April 1969, some 200 people gathered outside of West Senior High Schoolin Rockford, Illinois. This group had been trying to change things at West Senior High for some time. They had made formal proposals to the school board,but they had been turned down. Now they were staging a demonstration. The picket signs they carried told what their demands were: "Black cheerleaders tocheer too," "Black history with black teachers," "Equal rights, Negro counselors."
Most of the demonstrators were African American students who had been advisedby a faculty member to choose this way of fighting for their rights. They were also joined by former students, family members, and other concerned citizens. Everyone had been told that they must walk quietly, hand in hand, no whispering, no talking. They gathered on a sidewalk about 100 feet from the school building, and began to march.
Who Made the Noise?
At this point, witnesses disagree about what happened. Demonstrators and their supporters claimed that the demonstrators remained quiet and orderly at alltimes. They admitted that there was noise, but they said that most of it came from the 25 police officers who were stationed nearby, using loudspeakers to explain that there was a law against this kind of picketing in Rockford andto tell demonstrators that they might be arrested.
Witnesses who supported the police told a different story. They said that thedemonstrators cheered and chanted, insulting the police officers. They saidthat this noisy demonstration caused hundreds of students to jump up from their desks and line up at the windows to watch, that some demonstrators calledto their friends to leave class and join the demonstration, that many students were late to class because they had been watching the demonstration, and that in general, the demonstration had seriously disrupted the school day.
Everyone agrees that the picketing lasted only 20 to 30 minutes, and that itwas, in the words of one police officer, "very orderly." Everyone also agreesthat Richard Grayned, whose brother and twin sisters were students at the school, made no noise whatsoever as he marched with the group. Nevertheless, hewas one of some 40 demonstrators arrested.
Grayned--along with the other demonstrators--was arrested under two ordinances of the city of Rockford. One of them was an anti-picketing ordinance that prohibited picketing within a certain distance of a public school around the time that school was in session. Another was an antinoise ordinance that prohibited "the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof . . . "
Grayned was interested in more than just reversing his own conviction under the two ordinances. He wanted to strike down both laws, which made any kind ofschool-oriented demonstration impossible. Since the school board had not responded to their original demands, Grayned and others in his community wantedto be able to keep working to win their demands, through peaceful protests aswell as through other means.
Broad Laws and Specific Restrictions
When Grayned's case finally made it to the Supreme Court, the Court had justrecently ruled on another anti-picketing ordinance in the city of Chicago, very similar to the one in Rockford. The Court had invalidated the Chicago ordinance, and so they invalidated the Rockford one as well. That left only the antinoise ordinance.
The Court had to answer the two questions of whether the ordinance too was vague, and was it too broad. Those were the charges brought by Grayned. Clearly, a vague law is not a fair law, because its vagueness makes it too easy forpolice and juries to apply the law only against the people they don't like, rather than treating everyone equally. Likewise, a broad law, while outlawingsome bad things, might at the same time outlaw some activities that are actually protected by the Constitution. To be fair, laws have to be precise and specific.
Justice Marshall, who wrote the decision for the Court, spent a great deal oftime emphasizing that people have a right to protest, to express themselvesfreely, and to engage in protests that take place at or near a school, even while the school is in session. The right to free speech is protected by the First Amendment, and Marshall wanted to be sure that the Rockford law did notcontradict the First Amendment in any way.
However, Marshall also pointed out that honoring the First Amendment does notmean that there are no restrictions on how ideas are expressed. He gave theexample of people who want to hold two parades at once, on the same street. Clearly, a city has the right to give a permit to only one group, to prevent the disruption that having two parades would cause. Likewise, if people want to hold the parade on a busy street during rush hour, a city could forbid theparade on the grounds that it would cause too many traffic problems.
In other words, Marshall said, cities and other branches of government had the right to place "reasonable `time, place and manner' regulations" to protectcertain governmental interests. However, these regulations had to be so clear that no one could interpret them differently for different groups--they hadto apply in the same way to everybody.
In addition, the regulations had to be so specific that they only prohibitedthe part of free expression that would actually interfere with those governmental interests. For example, a law might forbid someone from making a political speech in a library reading room, but the law should allow a silent protest in a library reading room, while allowing the noisier speech in a public park.
By those standards, Marshall said, the city of Rockford's ordinance was neither too vague nor too broad. The Court recognized that communities have a right to protect their schools. If noise or disturbances will disrupt the schoolday or incite students to leave the classroom, then certainly, the Court felt, a community has a right to take action. The city of Rockford's antinoise ordinance was precisely limited to just that type of noise that might disrupt the school day. Therefore, the Court upheld it--and Grayned's conviction underit.
The Lone Dissenter
Every one of the Court's nine justices agreed that the city of Rockford's antinoise ordinance was appropriately specific. However, Justice Douglas did dissent from one part of Marshall's opinion. He felt that the demonstration thatGrayned had been a part of, which had always been intended as a silent demonstration, was not actually in violation of the antinoise ordinance. "There was noise," Douglas wrote, "but most of it was made by the police . . . "
As a result, Douglas wrote, Grayned's conviction should certainly be overturned, even though Grayned's argument had not rested on his own behavior, but only the question of the ordinance being too broad. Douglas felt that if the ordinance really was not too broad, it should not be understood to apply to thedemonstration that Grayned had been a part of--and it certainly should not have been applied to Grayned himself.
Related Cases
- Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
- Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
- Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
- Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
- Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
When is picketing constitutionally protected?
Picketing is normally a peaceful carrying of signs and banners clearly advertising a grievance or the purpose of a demonstration. It is a recognized meansof communication.
Beginning in the 1930s, some states sought to hinder the development of laborunions by passing laws prohibiting pickets. The states argued picketing is conduct, not speech, and, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment. In1941 the Supreme Court concluded, however, that peaceful picketing is a constitutionally protected means of transmitting ideas.
The guarantee of free expression has often been weighed against a state's desire to preserve public peace through picketing restrictions. Normally, picketing that becomes an instrument of force, vandalism, intimidation, or coercionis not protected by the First Amendment. Similarly, First Amendment protection does not apply to picketing that is part of other conduct violating statelaw. For example, if the purpose of picketing is to force an employer to replace his non-union workers with union workers, the activity would be contraryto a state's valid right-to-work law. The Court would uphold a state's actionto stop the picketing. Therefore, the First Amendment protects from state restriction all non-violent picketing that is not part of other illegal conduct.
Sources
Biskupic, Joan and Witt, Elder. Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1997.
Further Readings
- Werhan, Keither. "The Supreme Court's public forum doctrine and the return of formalism." Cardozo Law Review, Winter 1986, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 335-437.
User Comments Add a comment…