Appellant
Dirk De Jonge
Appellee
State of Oregon
Appellant's Claim
That an Oregon statute outlawing criminal syndicalism, the advocacy of changeof government or business ownership by violence or other unlawful means, violates the right to freedom of assembly, which is protected by the First Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Osmond K. Fraenkel
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Maurice E. Tarshis
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Charles Evans Hughes (writing for the Court), James Clark McReynolds, Owen Josephus Roberts, GeorgeSutherland, Willis Van Devanter
Justices Dissenting
None (Harlan Fiske Stone did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 January 1937
Decision
Declaring that peaceable assembly is as fully protected as freedom of speech,the Supreme Court reversed Dirk De Jonge's conviction and overturned the Oregon statute.
Significance
De Jonge marked the first time the right of free assembly was made applicable to the states by means of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On 27 July 1934, Dirk De Jonge, a member of the Communist Party, participatedin a party meeting in Portland, Oregon. The meeting had been called by the Communist Party to protest illegal raids on workers' halls and homes, as wellas the shooting of striking longshoremen by Portland police. De Jonge spoke to a group, estimated to have been between 150 and 300 people, on these topics, afterward urging those present to recruit more members for the party and attempting to sell some Communist literature. While the meeting was still in progress, it was raided by the police, who seized some of the literature and took De Jonge and others who were conducting the meeting into custody. They were charged under the Oregon criminal syndicalism law, which outlawed participation in a meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party.
At his trial De Jonge made a motion for acquittal, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to convict him under the statute. He then appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to the state supreme court, which upheld hisconviction. He turned finally to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Oregon's criminal syndicalism statute was just one of 20 such state laws passed between the years of 1917 and 1929 as part of an effort to outlaw the radical labor organization, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) or "Wobblies." A large number of convictions under the syndicalism laws took place in the West, where the Wobblies were most active. During the Red Scare that followed World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the U.S. Supreme Courtupheld the constitutionality of several of the criminal syndicalism laws. But as public alarm about Communist infiltration diminished and the power of the Wobblies faded, the attitude of the Court towards syndicalism also relaxed.
Court Finds Freedom of Assembly Protected from State Infringement
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Hughes found that De Jonge, whohad done no more than participate in a meeting called to air grievances, notto advocate government overthrow, had been wrongfully convicted. His rights to freedom of assembly, guaranteed at the federal level by the First Amendment, could not, because of the Fourteenth Amendment, be abridged by the state. Freedom of assembly, Chief Justice Hughes pointedly said, was as fundamentallyimportant to our republic as freedom of speech.
De Jonge was the first case to make freedom of assembly applicable atthe state level, thus contributing to the movement to incorporate the Bill ofRights into the Fourteenth Amendment, which assures that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or due process of law." The decision was infact a harbinger; it was not until later in 1937, with Palko v. Connecticut that the Court formally announced its belief that some of the privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights were so fundamental that states wereobliged to respect them under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Related Cases
Dirk De Jonge
Appellee
State of Oregon
Appellant's Claim
That an Oregon statute outlawing criminal syndicalism, the advocacy of changeof government or business ownership by violence or other unlawful means, violates the right to freedom of assembly, which is protected by the First Amendment.
Chief Lawyer for Appellant
Osmond K. Fraenkel
Chief Lawyer for Appellee
Maurice E. Tarshis
Justices for the Court
Louis D. Brandeis, Pierce Butler, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Charles Evans Hughes (writing for the Court), James Clark McReynolds, Owen Josephus Roberts, GeorgeSutherland, Willis Van Devanter
Justices Dissenting
None (Harlan Fiske Stone did not participate)
Place
Washington, D.C.
Date of Decision
4 January 1937
Decision
Declaring that peaceable assembly is as fully protected as freedom of speech,the Supreme Court reversed Dirk De Jonge's conviction and overturned the Oregon statute.
Significance
De Jonge marked the first time the right of free assembly was made applicable to the states by means of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On 27 July 1934, Dirk De Jonge, a member of the Communist Party, participatedin a party meeting in Portland, Oregon. The meeting had been called by the Communist Party to protest illegal raids on workers' halls and homes, as wellas the shooting of striking longshoremen by Portland police. De Jonge spoke to a group, estimated to have been between 150 and 300 people, on these topics, afterward urging those present to recruit more members for the party and attempting to sell some Communist literature. While the meeting was still in progress, it was raided by the police, who seized some of the literature and took De Jonge and others who were conducting the meeting into custody. They were charged under the Oregon criminal syndicalism law, which outlawed participation in a meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party.
At his trial De Jonge made a motion for acquittal, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to convict him under the statute. He then appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to the state supreme court, which upheld hisconviction. He turned finally to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Oregon's criminal syndicalism statute was just one of 20 such state laws passed between the years of 1917 and 1929 as part of an effort to outlaw the radical labor organization, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) or "Wobblies." A large number of convictions under the syndicalism laws took place in the West, where the Wobblies were most active. During the Red Scare that followed World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the U.S. Supreme Courtupheld the constitutionality of several of the criminal syndicalism laws. But as public alarm about Communist infiltration diminished and the power of the Wobblies faded, the attitude of the Court towards syndicalism also relaxed.
Court Finds Freedom of Assembly Protected from State Infringement
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Hughes found that De Jonge, whohad done no more than participate in a meeting called to air grievances, notto advocate government overthrow, had been wrongfully convicted. His rights to freedom of assembly, guaranteed at the federal level by the First Amendment, could not, because of the Fourteenth Amendment, be abridged by the state. Freedom of assembly, Chief Justice Hughes pointedly said, was as fundamentallyimportant to our republic as freedom of speech.
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to overthrow of ourinstitutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights if free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, tothe end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and thatchanges, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government . . .It follows from these considerations that, consistent with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime.
De Jonge was the first case to make freedom of assembly applicable atthe state level, thus contributing to the movement to incorporate the Bill ofRights into the Fourteenth Amendment, which assures that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or due process of law." The decision was infact a harbinger; it was not until later in 1937, with Palko v. Connecticut that the Court formally announced its belief that some of the privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights were so fundamental that states wereobliged to respect them under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Related Cases
- Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
- Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
- Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
Further Readings
- Abernathy, M. Glenn. The Right of Assembly and Association, 2nd ed. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981.
- Salerno, Salvatore. Red November, Black November: Culture and Community in the Industrial Workers of the World. Albany: State University of NewYork Press, 1989.
- Worton, Stanley N. Freedom of Assembly and Petition. Rochelle Park, NJ: Hayden Book Co., 1975.
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