June Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court (13,) (1966)

ERNESTO A. MIRANDA, PETITIONER,
V.
STATE OF ARIZONA.

MICHAEL VIGNERA, PETITIONER,
V.
STATE OF NEW YORK.

CARL CALVIN WESTOVER, PETITIONER,
V.
UNITED STATES.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER,
V.
ROY ALLEN STEWART.

NOS. 759–761, 584.

Argued Feb. 28, March 1 and 2, 1966.
Decided June 13, 1966.
Rehearing Denied No. 584 Oct. 10, 1966.
See 87 S.Ct. 11.

384 U.S. 436

Criminal prosecutions. The Superior Court, Maricopa County, Arizona, rendered judgment, and the Supreme Court of Arizona, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721, affirmed. The Supreme Court, Kings County, New York, rendered judgment, and the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, 21 A.D.2d 752, 252 N.Y.S.2d 19, affirmed, as did the Court of Appeals of the State of New York at 15 N.Y.2d 970, 259 N.Y.S.2d 857, 207 N.E.2d 527. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Northern Division, rendered judgment, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 342 F.2d 684, affirmed. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California, rendered judgment and the Supreme Court of California, 62 Cal.2d 571, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97, reversed. In the first three cases, defendants obtained certiorari, and the State of California obtained certiorari in the fourth case. The Supreme Court, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held that statements obtained from defendants during incommunicado interrogation in police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of constitutional rights, were inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Judgments in first three cases reversed and judgment in fourth case affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White dissented; Mr. Justice Clark dissented in part.

Certiorari was granted in cases involving admissibility of defendants' statements to police to explore some facets of problems of applying privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.

Constitutional rights to assistance of counsel and protection against self-incrimination were secured for ages to come and designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.

Prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of defendant unless it demonstrates use of procedural safeguards effective to secure privilege against self-incrimination. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

"Custodial interrogation," within rule limiting admissibility of statements stemming from such interrogation, means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused person of the right to silence and to assure continuous opportunity to exercise it, person must, before any questioning, be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has right to presence of attorney, retained or appointed. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Defendant may waive effectuation of right to counsel and to remain silent, provided that waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.

There can be no questioning if defendant indicates in any manner and at any stage of interrogation process that he wishes to consult with attorney before speaking. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 6.

Police may not question individual if he is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated.

Mere fact that accused may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.

Coercion can be mental as well as physical and blood of accused is not the only hallmark of unconstitutional inquisition. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Incommunicado interrogation of individuals in police-dominated atmosphere, while not physical intimidation, is equally destructive of human dignity, and current practice is at odds with principle that individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Privilege against self-incrimination is in part individual's substantive right to private enclave where he may lead private life. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Constitutional foundation underlying privilege against self-incrimination is the respect a government, state or federal, must accord to dignity and integrity of its citizens.

Government seeking to punish individual must produce evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Privilege against self-incrimination is fulfilled only when person is guaranteed right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in unfettered exercise of his own will. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces and subjected to techniques of persuasion employed by police, cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

When federal officials arrest individuals they must always comply with dictates of congressional legislation and cases thereunder. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc.rule 5(a), 18 U.S.C.A.

Defendant's constitutional rights have been violated if his conviction is based, in while or in part, on involuntary confession, regardless of its truth or falsity, even if there is ample evidence aside from confession to support conviction.

Whether conviction was in federal or state court, defendant may secure post-conviction hearing based on alleged involuntary character of his confession, provided that he meets procedural requirements.

Voluntariness doctrine in state cases encompasses all interrogation practices which are likely to exert such pressure upon individual as to disable him from making free and rational choice. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Independent of any other constitutional proscription, preventing attorney from consulting with client is violation of Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel and excludes any statement obtained in its wake. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 6.

Presence of counsel in cases presented would have been adequate protective device necessary to make process of police interrogation conform to dictates of privilege; his presence would have insured that statements made in government-established atmosphere were not product of compulsion. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.

Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed from being compelled to incriminate themselves. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

To combat pressures in in-custody interrogation and to permit full opportunity to exercise privilege against self-incrimination, accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and exercise of these rights must be fully honored. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

If person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has right to remain silent, as threshold requirement for intelligent decision as to its exercise, as absolute prerequisite in overcoming inherent pressures of interrogation atmosphere, and to show that interrogators are prepared to recognize privilege should accused choose to exercise it. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Awareness of right to remain silent is threshold requirement for intelligent decision as to its exercise. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

It is impermissible to penalize individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Prosecution may not use at trial fact that defendant stood mute or claimed his privilege in face of accusation.

Whatever background of person interrogated, warning at time of interrogation as to availability of right to remain silent is indispensable to overcome pressures of in-custody interrogation and to insure that individual knows that he is free to exercise privilege at that point and time. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Warning of right to remain silent, as prerequisite to in-custody interrogation, must be accompanied by explanation that anything said can and will be used against individual; warning is needed to make accused aware not only of privilege but of consequences of foregoing it and also serves to make him more acutely aware that he is faced with phase of adversary system. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Right to have counsel present at interrogation is indispensable to protection of Fifth Amendment privilege. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Need for counsel to protect Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely right to consult with counsel prior to questioning but also to have counsel present during any questioning if defendant so desires. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.

Preinterrogation request for lawyer affirmatively secures accused's right to have one, but his failure to ask for lawyer does not constitute waiver. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

No effective waiver of right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after warnings as to rights have been given. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Proposition that right to be furnished counsel does not depend upon request applies with equal force in context of providing counsel to protect accused's Fifth Amendment privilege in face of interrogation. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has right to consult with lawyer and to have lawyer with him during interrogation, to protect Fifth Amendment privilege. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Warning as to right to consult lawyer and have lawyer present during interrogation is absolute prerequisite to interrogation, and no amount of circumstantial evidence that person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

If individual indicates that he wishes assistance of counsel before interrogation occurs, authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny request on basis that individual does not have or cannot afford retained attorney.

Privilege against self-incrimination applies to all individuals U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

With respect to affording assistance of counsel, while authorities are not required to relieve accused of his poverty, they have obligation not to take advantage of indigence in administration of justice. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 6.

In order fully to apprise person interrogated of extent of his rights, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has right to consult with attorney, but also that if he is indigent lawyer will be appointed to represent him. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 6.

Expedient of giving warning as to right to appointed counsel is too simple and rights involved too important to engage in ex post facto inquiries into financial ability when there is any doubt at all on that score, but warning that indigent may have counsel appointed need not be given to person who is known to have attorney or is known to have ample funds to secure one. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 6.

Once warnings have been given, if individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, interrogation must cease. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

If individual indicates desire to remain silent, but has attorney present, there may be some circumstances in which further questioning would be permissible; in absence of evidence of over-bearing, statements then made in presence of counsel might be free of compelling influence of interrogation process and might fairly be construed as waiver of privilege for purposes of these statements. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Any statement taken after person invokes Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be other than product of compulsion. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

If individual states that he wants attorney, interrogation must cease until attorney is present; at that time, individual must have opportunity to confer with attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.

While each police station need not have "station house lawyer" present at all times to advise prisoners, if police propose to interrogate person they must make known to him that he is entitled to lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during reasonable period of time in which investigation in field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating person's Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

If interrogation continues without presence of attorney and statement is taken, government has heavy burden to demonstrate that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

High standards of proof for waiver of constitutional rights apply to in-custody interrogation.

State properly has burden to demonstrate knowing and intelligent waiver of privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel, with respect to incommunicado interrogation, since state is responsible for establishing isolated circumstances under which interrogation takes place and has only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given.

Express statement that defendant is willing to make statement and does not want attorney, followed closely by statement, could constitute waiver, but valid waiver will not be presumed simply from silence of accused after warnings are given or simply from fact that confession was in fact eventually obtained.

Presuming waiver from silent record is impermissible, and record must show, or there must be allegations and evidence, that accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected offer.

Where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for contention that privilege is waived if individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own before invoking right to remain silent when interrogated. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before statement is made is strong evidence that accused did not validly waive rights. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Any evidence that accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into waiver will show that he did not voluntarily waive privilege to remain silent. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Requirement of warnings and waiver of right is fundamental with respect to Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.

Warnings or waiver with respect to Fifth Amendment rights are, in absence of wholly effective equivalent, prerequisites to admissibility of any statement made by a defendant, regardless of whether statements are direct confessions, admissions of part or all of offense, or merely "exculpatory." U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Privilege against self-incrimination protects individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination.

Statements merely intended to be exculpatory by defendant, but used to impeach trial testimony or to demonstrate untruth in statements given under interrogation, are incriminating and may not be used without full warnings and effective waiver required for any order statement. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

When individual is in custody on probable cause, police may seek out evidence in field to be used at trial against him, and may make inquiry of persons not under restraint.

Rules relating to warnings and waiver in connection with statements taken in police interrogation do not govern general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding crime or other general questioning of citizens in fact-finding process. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement.

Any statement given freely and voluntarily without compelling influences is admissible.

Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by Fifth Amendment; there is no requirement that police stop person who enters police station and states that he wishes to confess a crime or a person who calls police to offer confession or any other statements he desires to make. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

When individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized, and procedural safeguards must be employed to protect privilege. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify accused in custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of his right of silence and to assure that exercise of right will be scrupulously honored, he must be warned before questioning that he has right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in court, and that he has right to presence of attorney and to have attorney appointed before questioning if he cannot afford one; opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout interrogation; after such warnings have been given and opportunity afforded, accused may knowingly and intelligently waive rights and agree to answer questions or make statements, but unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against them. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.

Fifth Amendment provision that individual cannot be compelled to be witness against himself cannot be abridged. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

In fulfilling responsibility to protect rights of client, attorney plays vital role in administration of criminal justice. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 6.

Interviewing agent must exercise his judgment in determining whether individual waives right to counsel, but standard for waiver is high and ultimate responsibility for resolving constitutional question lies with courts.

Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation, and Congress and states are free to develop their own safeguards for privilege, so long as those required by court. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

Issues of admissibility of statements taken during custodial interrogation were of constitutional dimension and must be determined by courts.

Where rights secured by Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.

Statements taken by police in incommunicado interrogation were inadmissible in state prosecution, where defendant had not been in any way apprised of his right to consult with attorney or to have one present during interrogation, and his Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to incriminate himself was not effectively protected in any other manner, even though he signed statement which contained typed in clause that he had full knowledge of his legal rights. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.

Mere fact that interrogated defendant signed statement which contained typed in clause stating that he had full knowledge of his legal rights did not approach knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination.

State defendant's oral confession obtained during incommunicado interrogation was inadmissible where he had not been warned or any of his rights before questioning, and thus was not effectively apprised of Fifth Amendment privilege or right to have counsel present. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.

Confessions obtained by federal agents in incommunicado interrogation were not admissible in federal prosecution, although federal agents gave warning of defendant's right to counsel and to remain silent, where defendant had been arrested by state authorities who detained and interrogated him for lengthy period, both at night and the following morning, without giving warning, and confessions were obtained after some two hours of questioning by federal agents in same police station. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.

Defendant's failure to object to introduction of his confession at trial was not a waiver of claim of constitutional inadmissibility, and did not preclude Supreme Court's consideration of issue, where trial was held prior to decision in Escobedo v. Illinois.

Federal agents' giving of warning alone was not sufficient to protect defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege where federal interrogation was conducted immediately following state interrogation in same police station and in same compelling circumstances, after state interrogation in which no warnings were given, so that federal agents were beneficiaries of pressure applied by local in-custody interrogation; however, law enforcement authorities are not necessarily precluded from questioning any individual who has been held for period of time by other authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warning.

California Supreme Court decision directing that state defendant be retired was final judgment, from which state could appeal to federal Supreme Court, since in event defendant were successful in obtaining acquittal on retrial state would have no appeal. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(3).

In dealing with custodial interrogation, court will not presume that defendant has been effectively apprised of rights and that has privilege against self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on record that does not show that any warnings have been given or that any effective alternative has been employed, nor can knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights be assumed on silent record. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

State defendant's inculpatory statement obtained in incommunicado interrogation was inadmissible as obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege where record did not specifically disclose whether defendant had been advised of his rights, he was interrogated on nine separate occasions over five days' detention, and record was silent as to waiver. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

No. 759:

John J. Flynn, Phoenix, Ariz., for petitioner.

Gary K. Nelson, Phoenix, Ariz., for respondent.

Telford Taylor, New York City, for State of New York, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. (Also in Nos. 584, 760, 761 and 762)

Duane R. Nedrud, for National District Attorneys Ass'n, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. (Also in Nos. 760, 762 and 584)

No. 760:

Victor M. Earle, III, New York City, for petitioner.

William I. Siegel, Brooklyn, for respondent.

No. 761:

F. Conger Fawcett, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner.

Sol. Gen. Thurgood Marshall, for respondent.

No. 584:

Gordon Ringer, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner.

William A. Norris, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court.

The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.

We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible.

[1] This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in accessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions.¹ A wealth of scholarly material has been written tracing its ramifications and underpinnings.² Police and prosecutor have speculated on its range and desirability.³ We granted certiorari in these cases, 382 U.S. 924, 925, 937, 86 S.Ct. 318, 320, 395, 15 L.Ed. 2d 338, 339, 348, in order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.

[2] We start here, as we did in Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution—that "No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," and that "the accused shall * * * have the Assistance of Counsel"—rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing. These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured "for ages to come, and * * * designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it," Cohens v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 387, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).

Over 70 years ago, our predecessors on this Court eloquently stated:

"The maxim 'Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare,' had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] not uncommon even in England. While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him my assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596–597, 16 S.Ct. 644, 646, 40 L.Ed. 819(1896).

In stating the obligation of the judiciary to apply these constitutional rights, this Court declared in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 30 S.Ct. 544, 551, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910):

"* * * our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction."

This was the spirit in which we delineated, in meaningful language, the manner in which the constitutional rights of the individual could be enforced against overzealous police practices. It was necessary in Escobedo, as here, to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not become but a "form of words," Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920), in the hands of government officials. And it is in this spirit, consistent with our role as judges, that we adhere to the principles of Escobedo today.

[3–9] Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.⁴ As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.