Brief for Appellants in Nos. 2 (1,) and 3 and for Respondents in No. on Further Reargument (5 ) - Conclusion

Much of the opposition to forthwith desegregation does not truly rest on any theory that it is better to accomplish it gradually. In considerable part, if indeed not in the main, such opposition stems from a desire that desegregation not be undertaken at all. In consideration of the type of relief to be granted in any case, due consideration must be given to the character of the right to be protected. Appellants here seek effective protection for adjudicated constitutional rights which are personal and present. Consideration of a plea for delay in enforcement of such rights must be preceded by a showing of clear legal precedent therefor and some public necessity of a gravity never as yet demonstrated.

There are no applicable legal precedents justifying a plea for delay. As a matter of fact, relevant legal precedents preclude a valid plea for delay. And, an analysis of the non-legal materials relevant to the issue whether or not relief should be delayed in these cases shows that the process of gradual desegregation is at best no more effective than immediate desegregation.

WHEREFORE, we respectfully submit that this Court should direct the issuance of decrees in each of these cases requiring desegregation by no later than September of 1955.

CHARLES L. BLACK JR.,
ELWOOD H. CHISOLM,
WILLIAM T. COLEMAN JR.,
CHARLES T. DUNCAN,
GEORGE E. C. HAYES,
LOREN MILLER,
WILLIAM R. MING JR.,
CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY,
JAMES M. NABRIT JR.,
DAVID E. PINSKY,
FRANK D. REEVES,
JOHN SCOTT,
JACK B. WEINSTEIN, of Counsel.
HAROLD BOULWARE,
ROBERT L. CARTER,
JACK GREENBERG,
OLIVER W. HILL,
THURGOOD MARSHALL,
LOUIS L. REDDING,
SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON III,
CHARLES S. SCOTT, Attorneys for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, 3 and for Respondents in No. 5.